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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE FINANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND JAPAN FROM 1880 TO 1930  
by 
Yumiko Morii  
Florida International University, 2008 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kenneth Lipartito, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Mira Wilkins, Co-Major Professor 
This study explained the diversity of corporate financial practices in two nations. 
Existing studies have emphasized the reliance on equity finance in U.S. firms and bank 
loans in Japanese firms. In fact, patterns of corporate finance were much more complex. 
Financial institutions, which were created by national economic policy and regulation, 
affected corporate financial practices, but corporate financial practices often differed 
from what policymakers expected. Differences in corporate financial practices between 
nations also reflected differences in the mixture of industries in each nation. Many factors 
such as the amount of fixed capital, the process of production, the level of risk, the degree 
of innovation, and the importance of the industry in the national economy affected 
corporate financial practices. In addition, corporate financial practices within each nation 
differed from firm to firm due to managers’ considerations about stock ownership, which 
would affect their control power; corporate finance was closely related to control over 
management through ownership.  
 vii 
To explain these complexities of corporate financial practices, the study linked 
corporate finance with the development of financial institutions in the United States and 
in Japan. While financial institutions affected corporate financial practices, the response 
of the firms to financial institutions and opportunities were diverse. The study also 
attempted to grasp variations in corporate financial practices by dealing with companies 
in three sectors: railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing.  Finally, the study 
examined the structure of firm ownership. Contradictory to the widely held belief that 
U.S. firms distributed securities more widely to the public than did Japanese firms, many 
large American firms remained closely held, while some Japanese counterparts built 
publicly-held corporations.   
 viii 
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Chapter 1   
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 National Patterns of Capitalist Systems and Corporate Financial Practices 
 After the collapse of the communist economic system in the late twentieth 
century, the world economy seemed to converge on capitalism. However, not all forms of 
capitalism are the same. In his book, Scale and Scope, Alfred D. Chandler Jr. classifies 
the forms as personal capitalism, as in Britain, competitive managerial capitalism, the 
pattern in the United States, and cooperative managerial capitalism, as exemplified by 
Germany.[1] Peter A. Hall divides capitalism into coordinated market economies in 
Germany and Japan and liberal market economies in Britain and the United States. [2] J. 
Rogers Hollingsworth also points out that the Japanese system is based on a collective 
form of economic coordination, and in contrast, the American one on a market-oriented 
form. [3] Thus, international economic and business historians have attempted to clarify 
the distinctive patterns of the national economies. They often argue that national 
differences are attributable to path dependency. That is, the diversity of history and 
culture among nations created distinctive economic systems that continue over time 
through their own logic.  This prevents convergence on a single economic model. [4]  
Similarly, existing studies classify part of capitalist systems, corporate finance, 
according to national patterns. The classic works to explain national patterns of corporate 
finance are Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, published in 1932, and Alexander Gerschenkron’s Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective, published in 1962. According to Berle and Means, the 
 2 
transformation of numerous private businesses into a small number of large corporations 
in the United States led to the wide distribution of stock and the separation of ownership 
and control. As the size of corporations expanded, ―ownership was so widely distributed 
that no individual and small group has even a minority interest large enough to dominate 
the affairs of the company.‖ [5] Shareholders thus surrendered control over their wealth 
to managers of the corporation. Shareholders became simply suppliers of capital. Berle 
and Means use as examples three large companies, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and the United States Steel 
Corporation.  In all of the three companies, any principal shareholder in 1929 held less 
than 1 per cent of the outstanding shares and the twenty largest owned less than 5.1 per 
cent. [6] Thus, Berle and Means associated corporate financial practices with the size of 
companies. American big businesses serving a huge domestic market were destined to 
move toward the concentration of capital, wide distribution of ownership, and the 
separation of ownership and control.   
On the other hand, Gerschenkron related corporate financial practices to the 
timing of industrialization. The more backward the country, he explained, the greater the 
―spur‖ of its economic growth. Therefore, advanced countries like England experienced 
the gradual process of industrialization, which ―obviated the pressure for developing any 
institutional devices for provision of long-term capital to industry.‖ In fact, 
industrialization in England dispensed with ―substantial utilization of banking for long-
term investment purposes.‖[ 7 ] In contrast, relatively backward countries required a 
considerable amount of capital in a short time to deal with the rapid process of 
industrialization. However, capital in those countries was scarce and diffused. In 
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addition, investors’ ―distrust of industrial activity,‖ huge fixed costs associated with the 
formation of big business, and ―the scarcity of entrepreneurial talent‖ in the backward 
country hampered efforts to raise funds. [8] Under these circumstances, a banking system 
for supplying long-term funds was indispensable for industrialization. In more backward 
countries, however, no banking system was able to raise enough funds to finance 
industrialization due to extreme ―scarcity of capital,‖ ―the low standards of honesty in 
business,‖ and the general distrust of the public. [9] Financing industrialization required 
―the compulsory machinery of the government.‖[10] According to Gerschenkron, timing 
of industrialization determined corporate financial practices.  
Deeply influenced by these classics, scholarship has emphasized national patterns 
of corporate finance. In their recent A History of Corporate Governance around the 
World, Randall Morck and Lloyd Steier divided capitalism in terms of finance. Britain 
and the United States represent shareholder capitalism, in which firms issue stock and 
bonds to investors to raise funds for industrial activity. On the other hand, post-war 
Germany and Japan belong to bank capitalism, where investors put money in the bank 
and then the bank lends the money to companies for long-term funds. Sometimes, the 
bank also invests in companies by purchasing their securities. [ 11 ] In Comparing 
Financial Systems, Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale also classified corporate financial 
system as market-oriented and bank oriented. They listed the United States and Germany 
as the polar opposites; the former is based on market-led system and the latter on bank 
oriented system. Many other countries are located between the two poles. 
Assuming the national patterns, some scholars focus on the determinants of 
corporate financial practices. In The Visible Hand, Chandler explains that the size and the 
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evolution of complex organization in modern corporations related to corporate financial 
practices in the United States. In the nineteenth century, he explains, entrepreneurs and 
their partners funded small scale family enterprise by themselves. In this stage, owners 
maintained control over their firms. As the size of firms expanded in railroad companies 
in the last half of the nineteenth century, railroad owners began to rely on bankers who 
had access to other financial sources. In return for financial support from bankers, owners 
had to accept bankers’ intervention in management. Finally, after World War I when 
firms achieved immense scale and scope, shares of modern corporations were widely 
distributed in the public to raise huge amount of funds from broader sources. While the 
ownership was diffused to the general public, professional managers controlled 
management of the firms. [12]   
Meanwhile, Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer argue that the nature of productive 
activity of firms determines the suitable corporate financial practices in any nation. They 
state that market-oriented financial systems and widely distributed ownership (for 
example, in the United Kingdom and the United States) are associated with innovative, 
high-risk activities. The wide distribution of ownership distributes high risk to many 
shareholders, and the resulting managerial autonomy makes firms more flexible to 
change. On the other hand, bank-oriented systems (for example, in Germany and Japan) 
are closely related to longer-term investment in imitative production, which often 
requires many stakeholders, such as suppliers and purchasers. Firms are able to 
concentrate ownership though the use of bank loans, which enable them to have power to 
protect stakeholders rather than shareholders. [13]  
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Mark Roe’s arguments on corporate financial practices focus on interest of 
stakeholders. He insists that the influence of stakeholder interests on the allocation of 
resources determines corporate financial practices.  If political support to stakeholder 
interest is strong as in continental Europe and Japan, managers try to hold large 
controlling stakes to weaken the power of stockholders so that they can respond to other 
stakeholders. This strategy strengthens banks’ role and reduces firms’ use of the 
securities market. On the other hand, if stakeholders do not have political power, as in the 
United States, mechanisms such as transparent accounting and a vigorous market for 
corporate control develop, which contribute the development of the securities market and 
facilitate the wide distribution of ownership. [14] 
Rafael Laporta, Franco Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny 
argue that legal traditions of minority shareholders and creditors create the national 
patterns of corporate finance.  In the common law country such as Britain and the United 
States, publicly held corporations prevail because minority shareholders and creditors are 
protected from the exploitation of large shareholders. In the meantime, in the civil law 
countries including Germany, France, and Japan, firms tend to retain the majority of 
ownership due to less legal protection to minority shareholders and creditors. [15]   
Finally, John Zysman insists that financial institutions, which are politically 
created, affected the degree of government intervention in the economy and corporate 
governance after World War II. He classifies financial systems as state-led, market-led 
and negotiated (bank-led) systems. He maintains that in Japan, under a state-led system, 
the government deterred the use of the securities market and facilitated financing from 
banks by keeping interest rates low. It also guaranteed bank loans as a last resort to 
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diminish the risk of debt financing. In the United States, in contrast, the market-led 
financial system, characterized by decentralization and a strong securities market, 
minimized the role of the banks and the government. [16]  
Thus, existing studies widely accept national patterns of corporate finance, similar 
to the division of capitalist systems by national patterns. However, as I will argue, 
patterns of corporate finance were much more complex in reality. Financial institutions, 
which were created by national economic policy and regulation, affected corporate 
financial practices, but corporate financial practices often differed from what 
policymaker expected. Differences in corporate financial practices between nations also 
reflected differences in the mixture of industries in each nation. Many factors such as the 
amount of fixed capital, the process of production, the level of risk, the degree of 
innovation, and the importance of the industry in the national economy affected corporate 
financial practices. In addition, corporate financial practices within each nation differed 
from firm to firm due to managers’ ownership consideration; corporate finance is closely 
related to control over management through ownership.  
This study attempts to explain these complexities through comparisons of 
practices and patterns in two major industrial nations, the United States and Japan, from 
the 1880s to 1930. According to the Gerschenkron model, the United States during the 
time period was often regarded as one of the developed countries, while Japan was 
considered as a latecomer of industrialization. Although the Japanese economy did not 
exactly fit the word of ―backwardness‖ as Gerschenkron explained, it was still considered 
as ―backward‖, compared with the American economy. Quantitative data such as the 
structure of industrial population and of the GDP shows Japan’s ―backwardness‖ relative 
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to the United States. [17]  In Japan, 78 per cent of the industrial population was engaged 
in agriculture and fishery in 1877, and 55 per cent in 1930. The manufacturing population 
was much smaller. It accounted for 9 per cent of the total industrial population in 1877 
and 22 per cent in 1930. Although industrialization progressed, Japan was still an 
agricultural country. On the other hand, the population dealing with agriculture and 
fishery in the United States was 50 per cent of the total industrial population in 1880 and 
22 per cent in 1930, while the population engaged in manufacturing was 25 per cent in 
1880 and 31 per cent in 1930. In the United States, more laborers were put in the 
manufacturing sector than in Japan. Similarly, in 1895, 42.7 per cent of the GDP in Japan 
came from agriculture and fishery and 13.2 per cent from manufacturing. Then, in 1925, 
28.1 per cent came from agriculture and fishery and 19.5 per cent in manufacturing. In 
other words, agriculture and fishery accounted for larger amounts of the GDP than 
manufacturing even though the importance of manufacturing increased throughout the 
time in Japan. On the other hand, in the United States, manufacturing was consistently an 
important sector in the GDP. From 1889 to 1899, 17.9 per cent of the GDP came from 
agriculture and fishery, and 25.4 per cent from manufacturing.  From 1919 to 1929, 11.2 
per cent of the GDP came from agriculture and fishery and 23.8 per cent in 
manufacturing. [18] Thus, although Japan was rapidly industrialized from 1880 to 1930, 
it was s a latecomer of industrialization and less industrialized, compared with the United 
States.   
This study links corporate finance with the development of financial institutions. 
As Richard Sylla and George David Smith argue, ―Americans’ ideological hostility to 
concentrated financial power‖ led to the creation of the fragmented banking system.[19] 
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In Japan, on the other hand, the government attempted to create a centralized banking 
system to finance industrialization in the late nineteenth century. The paths of economic 
and financial development in the two nations certainly influenced corporate financial 
practices, but the responses of companies varied. In fact, from the late nineteenth century 
to the early twentieth century, American firms often sold stock to a limited numbers of 
investors without using stock markets, while widely distributing bonds.  In Japan, some 
firms relied on securities and others on financial support from holding companies rather 
than bank loans.  
This study also attempts to demonstrate that corporate financial practices were 
different from industry to industry and even from firm to firm within an industry. When 
existing studies deal with the national patterns of corporate finance in the United States, 
they usually focus on big businesses based on mass production of standardized products.  
It is believed that large mass-production firms required huge amount of fixed capital to 
begin and expand operations, which capital mainly came from stock issues. However, the 
American economy was diverse, depending not only on the size of the companies but 
also on the production system. In Endless Novelty, Philip Scranton explores another kind 
of American business; specialty production firms, which make many different products to 
meet various and irregular consumer demands. In specialty production, managers tried to 
lower their fixed costs in order to make it easy to change production methods. [20] They 
also relied on retained earnings rather than securities issues due to the market risk of their 
products.  
 In the Japanese economy as well, not all businesses were large, although existing 
studies have dealt with large companies and often characterized their financial practice as 
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bank oriented. In fact, during industrialization, small firms and large firms coexisted. 
According to William W. Lockwood, in such industries as textile and ceramics, small 
firms tied themselves to large ones by supplying ―raw materials and services or handled 
certain stage of manufacturing.‖ Small firms also contributed to the expansion of foreign 
trade. The strength of small firms was in part explained by ―wide distribution of electric 
power‖ since the early twentieth century. This facilitated mechanization even in a small 
production unit. [21] 
This sort of diversity among firms undercuts notions of a single national pattern 
of finance and capitalism.  My study, however, will look at diversity from another 
angle—among the large firms themselves, which are typically studied by those seeking 
out national patterns.  Small and medium firms’ financial practices are relatively simple. 
If entrepreneurs cannot provide enough capital, they may borrow money from family 
members, relatives, and friends or they rely on local financial institutions. [22] As the 
size of companies grows, however, corporate financial practices became complicated 
because of the huge demand for capital and their necessity to rely on external funds. By 
focusing on large corporations, this study shows how they met their huge financial needs 
and at the same time shows the diversity of corporate financial practices among large 
corporations.  
Also, this study shows that corporate financial practices within a nation change 
over time. The so-called national patterns of corporate financial practice in the two 
nations do not always correspond in any time period. In the United States, as Chandler 
explains, corporate finance was transferred from personal through financial to managerial 
capitalism, but managerial capitalism was not the final form. According to Michael C. 
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Jensen, in the 1980s, many companies in the United States used leveraged buyouts to 
reduce the dispersal of ownership and eliminate the conflict between ownership and 
management.  Through the huge amount of debt issue and the limited amount of equity 
held by manager-owners, managers’ incentives came into line with those of owner. By 
paying out dividends from retained earnings, the investment in unprofitable 
diversification within firm was avoided. [23]  
Likewise, in Japan, the reliance on bank loans was not persistent across time. 
Bank loan finance was closely related to corporate groups called keiretsu, which 
appeared after World War II. They were organized by major companies through 
interlocking shareholding and strong ties among firms within groups. [24] A main bank 
was included in each keiretsu, which played a role as a major financier for group 
companies. The bank not only supplied funds but also provided newly emerging modern 
firms with managerial skills and organizational techniques. Furthermore, the bank 
monitored the firms; when the firms were not well managed, it interfered with 
management of the firms. These bank-centered financial practices were rarely seen in 
zaibatsu, which were pre-World War II corporate groups and the predecessors of 
keiretsu.   Also, the post-war bank oriented system was weakened after 1970. Kang and 
Stulz, Morck and Nakamura, and Weinstein and Yafeh contest the contribution of main 
banks in firm’s profitability and the economic growth. [ 25 ] Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein, and Miyajima state that in the late 1970s, firms relied on the bond market 
more than bank loans due to deregulation. [26] 
These changes of corporate financial practices are not compatible with the theory 
of path dependency. According to path dependency, financial institutions are created in 
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the path of economic development and under the influence of culture. Corporate financial 
practices are defined by historically and culturally created financial institutions. These 
would not converge into a single model. The stickiness of history and culture preserved 
national patterns. In reality, however, corporate financial practices were dynamic. As 
Caroline Fohlin concludes in her research of German financial system, ―[financial] 
systems may differ more within one country over time than they do across countries at a 
given time. Much of the variation and change stems from idiosyncratic factors and defies 
standardization.‖ [27] Thus neither broad and distinct national patterns that persist over 
time nor convergence is the correct way to understand patterns of corporate finance. 
1.2 Methodology 
This study focuses on the 1880s to 1930. This time period is important in both 
nations; it covers the emergence and the evolution of big businesses in the United States 
and industrialization of Japan. In the United States, big businesses, which required huge 
amounts of funds, made the issue of corporate finance critical. In Japan, importing 
western institutions and technology, the nation experienced rapid industrialization. 
Financing industrialization came to be a serious problem in the national economy. The 
study divides the time period by two:  from 1880 to before World War I and from World 
War I to 1930. World War I was a watershed that changed the path of economic 
development.  During and after the war, both nations experienced economic booms, 
which significantly affected corporate financial practices. The research ends when the 
economic expansion stopped with the Great Depression. This economic calamity shifted 
corporate financial practices again by the increasing government intervention in 
economic activity.  
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     This study deals with three industrial sectors to examine patterns of corporate 
finance: railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing. Railroads were important because 
they were the first business with huge fixed costs and a corresponding need for capital.  
Their extensive facilities and geographical scope made them giant scale enterprises. They 
introduced modern corporate financial practices, which became a model of other 
industries in both nations. In the United States, the railroad industry heavily relied on the 
bond market by using investment bankers, while in Japan it facilitated the development of 
the stock market and relied on stock finance. Public utilities also needed large amounts of 
capital for facilities and the application of new technology. They mostly followed the 
financial practices of railroads, but their peculiar nature as ―public‖ differentiated their 
financial activity from railroads. The services provided by public utilities were regarded 
as indispensable for the public and needed to be available to all people. Hence, public 
utility services were provided in wider area than that of railroads. While being allowed to 
monopolize the market to achieve efficient production, public utilities were subject to the 
government regulation of their rates and services. On the other hand, manufacturing 
companies were private enterprises. Due to their smaller size than railroads and utilities, 
manufacturing companies usually required less fixed capital. They also needed to take 
risk without government interference. They dominated the American and Japanese 
economies; big businesses emerging through vertical and horizontal integration in the 
United States and burgeoning modern industrials corporations in Japan played significant 
roles in the national economies.  
In the United States, the patterns of corporate financial practice of these three 
sectors are examined. Instead of three industrial sectors, in Japan, three industries 
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belonging to the three industrial sectors, that is, railroads, electric utility, and cotton 
spinning, are explained. This different handling of the United States and Japan was 
caused by distinct industrial structures in each nation. In the United States, important 
industries such as telephones in public utilities and steels in manufacturing attained de 
facto monopoly status. Since their corporate financial practices also formed industry-
specific practices due to their monopolistic status, the research in the patterns of 
corporate finance in the two industries overlapped with that of major companies in the 
industries. On the other hand, in Japan, corporate financial practices in each sector were 
too diverse to generalize. In public utilities, several industries were more or less owned 
by the government. Also, in manufacturing, industries faced the different stages of 
development; some were engaged in hand-craft manufacturing and others in factory 
production. Therefore, instead of examining industrial sectors, two major industries were 
selected in addition to railroads: electric utilities, which were founded without 
government ownership, and cotton spinning, one of the first to achieve modernization 
among manufacturing. 
After examining corporate financial practices in each industrial sector or industry, 
corporate finance of an individual firm belonging to each industrial sector or industry is 
studied by using financial data from annual reports. The companies dealt with are the 
major ones of their industry. In the United States, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and the United States Steel 
Corporation, are selected. These companies were tremendously huge in size.  These are 
also the same companies as Berle and Means used as large-scale corporations with 
widely held stock in the public in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. In 
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Japan, the Nihon Railway Company, the Tokyo Electric Light Company, and the 
Kanebuchi Spinning Company are chosen. Similar to the U.S companies selected in 
Chapter 2, these companies were one of the biggest companies in the industry.  
Thus, not all of the industries the companies belonged to are the same between the 
United States and Japan. This is explained in part by the difference in industrial 
organization and in part by the different stage of industrialization between the two 
nations. In the United States, the telephone industry monopolized by the A.T.&T was the 
first to expand its business geographically in public utilities. In Japan, on the other hand, 
the telephone industry was not appropriate to be selected in this study because it was 
owned by the government. Instead, the electric utility industry, which prospered without 
government ownership, was chosen. In manufacturing, the United States Steel, also 
monopolizing the steel industry, was the biggest manufacturing company in the early 
twentieth century. Meanwhile, in Japan, similar to the telephone industry, the steel 
industry was owned by the government in its early years. Instead, another major industry, 
cotton spinning, was selected. However, cotton spinning was no longer a major industry 
in the United States in the early twentieth century; the size of the firms in the industry 
was much smaller than that of major firms in the steel, auto, and chemical industries.    
Financial sources in these industries including securities, loans, and internal funds 
are examined in conjunction with the development of the securities market and the 
banking system in the United States and Japan. In addition to these financial institutions, 
however, holding companies came to play a significant role in financing industries in 
both nations. In the United States, by using the holding company system, a number of 
companies were consolidated into a gigantic entity with relatively small amounts of 
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capital. In Japan, holding companies in family-based corporate groups called zaibatsu 
more or less participated in corporate finance of the major three industries—the railroad, 
electric light, and cotton spinning. However, their managerial and financial influence on 
other industries as a holding company was even larger than those of the major industries.  
In order to present the complexity and variety of corporate financial practices, this study 
presents the development of holding companies and their roles in both nations in brief.   
1.3 Arrangement of the thesis 
This study consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 examines corporate 
financial practices in the United States in the two time periods: from 1880 to before 
World War I and from World War I to 1930. It focuses on the railroad, public utility, and 
manufacturing by using case studies of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the A.T. & T., and the 
United States Steel respectively. In the three sectors, equity finance was not a major 
financial method, while their corporate financial practices were different from each other. 
The chapter also shows that corporate financial practices of the three companies differed 
from those of the industrial sectors they belonged to.  
  Chapter 3 deals with corporate financial practices in Japan in the same time 
periods of the United States. Specifically, it also examines three sectors (albeit with 
different industries): railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing. In this case, the 
financial data of the Nihon Railway, the Tokyo Electric Light, and the Kanebuchi 
Spinning are used to examine whether corporate financial practices of an individual 
company fit industry-specific financial practices. Although financial practices were 
diverse, these industries all relied on securities rather than bank loans. This chapter also 
shows the diversity of corporate financial practice of individual companies.  
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Chapter 4 presents the development of the holding company system, its 
managerial and financial roles in the United States and Japan, and the corporate finance 
of the holding company. In the United States, first railroads and then public utility 
companies attempted to achieve efficiency and take financial advantages through the 
holding company system. Using various devices, the holding companies distributed their 
stocks widely in the public. Meanwhile, in Japan, this chapter examines zaibatsu. The 
chapter especially deals with major zaibatsu, the Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, and to a lesser 
extent, the Sumitomo. The zaibatsu holding company system was an efficient tool for the 
mixture of administrative concentration and operational autonomy of the constituent 
companies. Interestingly, unlike the main bank system in keiretsu after World War II, 
zaibatsu were reluctant to use banks as major financiers.   
 In conclusion, (Chapter 5), corporate financial practices of both nations are 
compared. Despite the distinct patterns of corporate financial practices in both nations, 
corporate financial practices of both nations often do not fit the nationally based models 
and patterns. Corporate financial practices in each nation did not always conform with 
what financial institutions intended. Also, corporate financial practices were diverse and 
changing across time.   
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Chapter 2   
FINANCING BIG BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
2.1 Introduction 
 When economic historians have compared corporate financial practices in the 
United States with those of other countries, they have often contended that corporate 
finance in the United States was market-oriented since the 1930s. The company collects 
funds from the market, issuing stock to a number of shareholders. Since stock was widely 
held in the public, the power of owners was weakened. Instead, managers controlled the 
company by using their managerial expertise. This theory has been long asserted when 
Berle and Means published the book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.[28] 
This chapter shows that corporate financial practices of the major industries in the 
United States from the 1880s to the 1930s were not always compatible with the 
conventional idea of the reliance of American companies on the stock markets. In fact, 
major sectors such as railroads, public utilities, and to a lesser extent, big industrial 
businesses often relied on bonds and internal funds including depreciation accrual, 
reserves and undistributed earnings to meet their huge financial demands. This chapter 
also shows that there were a variety of corporate financial practices that differed from 
sector to sector and even from firm to firm. Many factors such as the size of the business, 
monopolistic power, and nature and risk of business, economic policy, and corporate 
preference created firm-specific as well as sector-specific corporate financial practices.     
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2.2 Railroad Finance, 1840-1930 
2.2.1 Financial Institutions and Railroad Finance before the 1880s  
The development of financial institutions in United States history has reflected 
strong public sentiments distrustful of monopolistic power and financial concentration. In 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the First and Second Bank of the United States, 
which expected to function like a central bank, ceased to exist in part because of the 
antagonism toward monopolistic financial power. Without financial control by a central 
bank, American banking system remained decentralized. Financial activities of state-
chartered banks were typically limited to the state level.  A large number of small non-
chartered banks appeared as many states enacted Free Banking laws, which permitted 
free entry into banking business. But these moves also promoted still more 
decentralization. Even when the federal government attempted to regulate banking 
activity during the Civil War, the banking system failed to be centralized. Although the 
National Banking Act of 1864 aimed to replace state-chartered banks with federally-
chartered banks, the prohibition of branch banking and the minimum capital requirement 
for national banks hampered the establishment of the national banking system.[29]     
This decentralized banking system facilitated the development of the securities 
market, which served American industrialization. The key to its evolution was the 
emergence of the railroad, the first industry to require a huge amount of fixed capital. In 
the very beginning, the railroad was still a local transportation, which could be financed 
by the sale of stock to local investors.  Railroads’ relatively small demand for capital was 
met without bond issues and did not require the integration of the local securities 
markets. [30] However, the railroad construction boom from the late 1840s facilitated the 
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development of a broader securities market.[ 31 ] Particularly, the New York Stock 
Exchange became a dominant securities market, where securities all over the United 
States were traded by the mid 1850s.[32]   
With the development of the securities market, many investors outside the local 
region began to subscribe railroad bonds. Not only the investors in the United States but 
also those in Europe who lost investment opportunity due to the Revolution of 1848 were 
eager to invest in American railroads. In fact, from 1848 to 1853, American railroads 
obtained German, French, Swiss and British capital. In 1852, American railroad bonds 
were issued to the public in London for the first time. [33] Foreign investors regarded 
railroad bonds as safe next to U.S. federal and state bonds; they were confident in 
American railroad bonds because these bonds were sponsored by respected investment 
bankers, who connected the demand of railroads and the supply of funds. These were 
private bankers whose financial activity was not regulated by state and federal laws. 
Taking advantage of their freedom, they underwrote railroad securities to provide client 
companies the assurance of sales and then sold those securities across national borders 
through their connections with European countries. [34]   
Despite the contribution of investment bankers, their role as financiers in 
American business should not be exaggerated before the 1870s. According to Vincent P. 
Carosso, they were engaged in financing trade and dealing in commodities as merchant 
banks rather than selling securities. In addition, often times, they merely participated in 
London houses’ securities business due to their deep reliance on the London market. [35]  
It was the strategic change of railroad industry that developed the financial 
function of investment bankers. Before the 1870s, railroad companies had made use of 
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―informal alliances with connecting and competing roads,‖ to avoid loss from excessive 
competition. [36] However, the strategy was no longer possible when the informal 
cooperation was busted after the depression of 1873. Now, railroad managers sought to 
obtain power to control the industry through geographical expansion. Railroad companies 
constructed extensive lines, purchased additional cars, and consolidated existing railroad 
companies, which increased their financial burdens. To finance the expansion, they began 
to rely heavily on investment bankers.  Responding to the financial demand of railroads, 
investment bankers began to use syndicates of ―fellow bankers and agents,‖ which 
enabled them to raise huge amounts of capital at reduced risk to the underwriters. Each 
member of the syndicate had responsibility for the underwriting or selling securities 
allocated, and in the end, the profit or loss made through these transactions were divided 
among member firms. The Pennsylvania Railroad was the first private enterprise to be 
financed by the syndicate to create a gigantic railroad system. From 1869 to 1873 the 
company ―sold or otherwise disposed of $87 million worth of securities‖. [37] This 
security issue was huge; it is equivalent to $1.4 billion in 2006. [38] While it sold most of 
stock to the existing shareholders and other American investors by itself, the syndicate 
was responsible for the sale of bonds assigned. [39] 
Thus, before industrial big businesses emerged, the American financial system 
based on the securities was already formed. However, the securities market dealt with 
much larger amount of bonds than stock. Ronald Michie shows that, in 1910, all U.S. 
securities markets—New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago—sales stocks amounted to 
$239.8 million and sales bonds to $700.5 million. [40] Investment bankers distributed the 
bonds, which strengthened the power of bankers in railroad management. (Table 1)   
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                                                                                       (in Million Dollars)  
  Stocks Bonds 
Market Number Proportion Par 
Value 
Proportion 
New York 215.1 89.7% 645.8 92.1% 
Boston 15.5 6.5% 32.7 4.7% 
Philadelphia 8.3 3.5% 14.6 2.1% 
Chicago 0.9 0.4% 7.4 1.1% 
Total 239.8 100.1% 700.5 100.0% 
                                         Source: Michie, p170 
Table 1: U.S Securities Markets, Sales in 1910 
 
2.2.2 The Expansion of Railroad and Railroad Finance from 1880 to 1914 
After 1880, railroad companies grew rapidly in size. They extended additional 
lines and facilitated consolidation to create cooperation and harmony in the industry. This 
movement was, however, irreconcilable with public sentiment of anti-monopoly. To 
justify their concentrated power, railroad companies insisted on the compatibility of 
monopolistic power and public goods. President of Pennsylvania Railroad, Alexander J. 
Cassatt, justified consolidation and cooperation by using the term of community of 
interest;  ―the ownership of shares of rival lines in sufficient amounts to obtain 
representation upon their boards of directors would maintain harmony among roads‖ and, 
in turn, contributed ―community of interest.‖ [41] 
The desire of railroad officials to control competition was supported by economic 
policies at the time. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 unintentionally encouraged 
consolidation. The act responded to popular protest against consolidation and fear of 
monopoly. It called for ―just and reasonable rates,‖ forbade ―a greater charge for a short 
haul than for a long haul,‖ and prohibited ―all preference not only as between individuals 
but as between localities‖. The act also ruled out pooling in railroads and other industries. 
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The result of the Act was, however, different from what the lawmakers intended: it did 
not hamper the increasing power of monopoly but strengthen it. As the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle states, ―The long-and short-haul clause has favored to large 
distributing centers at the expense of the smaller ones. The prohibition of pools has made 
it harder for weak and short roads to live.‖ [42]  
Similarly, the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 accelerated the movement of 
consolidation. The Act prohibited any contracts and combinations to restrain trade. The 
prohibition of cartels and trust arrangement led railroad companies to consolidation, 
which was the only means left to them to avoid destructive competition. [43] As a result 
of the weariness toward excessive competition of railroad directors and the unintended 
results of anti-monopoly policies, the industry became highly concentrated. In 1906, two-
thirds of the mileage of railroads in the United States was controlled by seven groups—
the Vanderbilt roads, the Pennsylvania system, the Morgan roads, the Gould roads, 
Moore’s roads, the Hill’s roads and the Harriman Lines. [44]   
The expansion and consolidation of the railroad companies required a massive 
amount of long-term capital for the extensive construction, the purchase of cars and other 
equipment, and the acquisition of securities and properties of other railroad companies. 
To meet these huge long-term financial needs, railroad companies relied on securities. 
Among them, bonds were the primary financial instrument.  While promoters and initial 
investors who lived along the lines preferred to own stocks to maintain their control over 
management, the Eastern and European investors preferred bonds.  They believed that 
bonds would be safer and provide more regular income than stock because interest 
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payment, unlike dividends, was obligatory. In fact, the proportion of bonds to capital 
stock shifted from 5:7 to 7:3 between 1855 and 1914. [45] 
Compared with bonds and even common stock, preferred stock was much less 
important for railroad finance. As second-class stock, it had been used only to finance 
emergency funds and to supplement common stock during the construction periods.[46] 
After railroad competition intensified, preferred stock was mainly used for 
reorganization, under which dividends were set low without the need to make it attractive 
to investors. As Arthur S. Dewing argues, dividend rate of railroad preferred stock 
seldom exceeded 4 per cent, and its average was much lower than that of industrials and 
public utilities. [47]  
Most of the bonds railroad companies used were mortgage bonds. When they 
expanded, they used existing roads as collateral to finance additional construction, 
considering that mortgages could protect interests of bondholders. In fact, however, the 
mortgage was often worthless, as Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr. argues, because the value of 
mortgage depended on operation and earning power of the company. In particular, 
―before the roads have actually built,‖  ―when traffic was too low,‖ or ―when competition 
forced the road ruinously low rates,‖ the collateral was of no value. Also, overuse of 
mortgages ruined the security of bonds.  Railroad companies adopted open mortgages to 
finance the huge demand for capital, but the second, third, and even fourth mortgage 
bonds were not well secured.[48]  
Given these risks and limitations on mortgage bonds, railroad companies had to 
issue various other kinds of bonds to meet their financial needs.  For example, they used 
debentures, a form of debt not secured ―by any direct or indirect pledge of property.‖[49] 
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These were issued either when the railroad company could not afford to use collateral or 
when its financial credit was high enough to sell this form of unsecured debt. Second, 
collateral trust bonds were secured by ―a lien on securities deposited with a trustee as 
collateral.‖[50] It was useful for consolidation. ―The acquisition of the stock of one 
railroad by another‖ was done ―through the issue of its own bonds secured by the 
acquired stock as collateral.‖[51] Another instrument, income bonds paid interest, only 
when the company had profits. Convertible bonds were securities exchangeable for 
capital stock after the business was going well. The merits to use convertible bonds were 
their salability because of the promise of regular payment of interest and the reduction of 
fixed-interest charge after the success in business. [52] Lastly, equipment trust bonds 
were used to purchase new equipments.  These were secured by ―a direct lien on a 
specific lot of rolling stock. [53] 
Huge amounts of these railroad securities had been marketed in foreign countries 
especially after the railroad crisis in the 1870s. Although foreign investment in U.S. 
railroads did not increase constantly, it was an important financial source. According to 
Mira Wilkins, in 1914, 20 to 30 per cent of the nominal value of U. S railroad securities 
was sold in foreign countries including Britain, Germany, Holland, France, Canada, and 
other nations.[54]  
When railroad companies issued these securities, they mostly relied on investment 
bankers. One of the most renowned investment bankers were the Morgans, who made 
their reputations as railroad financiers in the late 1870s when they dealt with Vanderbilt’s 
sale of stock of New York Central Railroad. Jewish investment bankers such as Kuhn, 
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Loeb & Co., Speyer & Co., and J. W. Seligman & Co. also came to participate in railroad 
finance in the early twentieth century.  
A significant role of investment bankers was mediation between investors and 
companies. To protect investors, investment bankers investigated the safety of the 
securities they offered. Those securities should be ―economically justifiable‖ [ 55 ] 
because dealing with speculative securities would harm investors’ confidence. Even after 
distributing the securities, in order for investors to escape a loss, investment bankers 
interfered with management of the client companies as directors when these companies 
were in financial difficulties. As J. Bradford De Long argues, their representation upon 
the railroad board was advantageous because it warranted that ―the firm was managed by 
capable and energetic executives.‖[56] In fact, institutional investors such as insurance 
companies required bankers’ representation as a condition of purchase of securities.[57] 
Thus, as Richard Sylla and George David Smith argue, owner’s power over management 
was replaced by control of financiers who did not necessarily own shares of the company. 
In other words, personal capitalism was transformed into ―financial capitalism.‖ [58] 
2.2.2.1 Financing Reorganization 
The number of railroad companies that succeeded in the geographic expansion of 
their lines and made considerable profits was few. Most of the railroad companies rather 
faced financial problems especially after the depression of 1893. According to Arthur 
Stone Dewing, an observer of these years, ―upwards of 40 per cent of the railway mileage 
of the country passed into receivers’ hands‖ at that time. [59] Railroad companies tended 
to extend their lines against each other, which resulted in overexpansion. The over-
expansion led not only to a decreasing rate of return, but also to the excessive use of 
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funded debt, which in turn meant the need for regular income to serve the debt.   When 
the earnings could not meet interest payments, the companies, facing increasing floating 
debts, had to cut the expenditures for maintenance. In the end, these companies, unable to 
pay off their fixed charges, needed to be reorganized.  
Reorganization aimed at the reduction of the fixed charges toward railroad 
companies and at the provision of ample new funds to pay ―the accumulated debt,‖ ―the 
improvement of the roads‖, and ―the expenses of reorganization.‖ [60] In general, to 
reduce fixed charges, general first mortgage bonds were replaced by new mortgage bonds 
with lower interest rates. Also, ―all the bonds junior to these first mortgage bonds‖ were 
―refunded into contingent charge security‖ such as preferred stock. Meanwhile, new 
funds were obtained mainly from three sources. First, funds were collected by assessment 
charged on the shareholders of the company. Shareholders had two options; they paid the 
assessments to keep their stock or gave up the ownership without paying it. The second 
financial source was the sale of newly issued bonds. Since it was not easy to sell the 
securities of the railroad company during its reorganization, the syndicate that dealt in the 
reorganization often subscribed a large block of bonds. [61] Lastly, receivers could 
collect funds through the issuance of receivers’ certificate. Due to the difficulty in 
securing enough money to reconstruct impoverished railroads, the court permitted them 
to borrow funds ―on the credit of the whole estate‖ of the railroads. [62] 
Investment bankers played a central role in railroad reorganization. As financiers, 
they decided the terms and conditions of newly issued securities of the railroad company. 
They also set up a voting trust to obtain the power to represent the majority of 
stockholders. [63] In addition, they provided newly reorganized companies with funds by 
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paying the assessments in place of defaulting security holders and by purchasing a block 
of newly issued securities of the new corporations as mentioned above. [64]  
Investment bankers’ involvement in railroad reconstruction is not only explained 
by their economic interests. While Edward G. Campbell attributes the involvement of 
investment bankers in railroad reorganization to sizeable profits they could make through 
their financial activity, others contended a sense of honor and responsibility of 
investment bankers as financiers. [65] For example, John Moody explained that J. P. 
Morgan could not stand that railroad securities they dealt in became ―a worthless paper 
before the eyes of the world.‖ [ 66 ] Ron Chernow also argued that J.P Morgan 
reorganized railroad companies in receivership, following gentlemen’s agreement, when 
English investors asked him protection of their railroad securities.[67] 
2.2.2.2 The Decline of the Railroad Industry before World War I 
Although the scale of railroad companies expanded, the industry came to show 
the signs of a decline right before World War I. In fact, the industry had many problems.  
Scholars are skeptic of the role of investment bankers in railroad finance. Although, as 
seen in the case of Northern Securities Company, investment bankers often contributed to 
the prevention of excessive competition and the provision of harmony in the industry, 
Campbell accused investment bankers of the stagnation of the industry.[68] He stated that 
reorganization led by investment bankers brought stock watering; a huge amount of 
common and preferred stock was distributed to existing stockholders and bond holders to 
compensate for their financial sacrifice during the reorganization. The capitalization of 
floating debt through reorganization was, he argues, another problem in the industry. To 
secure new funds for reorganization, the newly issued bonds were sold to a syndicate, 
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which increased fixed charges for the railroad companies. Furthermore, he continues that 
―the cost of receivership and reorganization proceeding‖ hampered sound finance of the 
industry. ‖The salaries of receivers, legal expenses,‖ and syndicate fees, all were so 
expensive that the companies were forced to sell new securities. [69]  
On the other hand, Albro Martin attributed the problem of the industry to the 
failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to allow increases in rates. He argues that 
the Hepburn Act of 1906, which granted the ICC the authority to set the maximum rate, 
reduced earnings of railroad companies. At the same time the shock of 1907 led to long 
economic recession, and the rising costs of materials, labor, and capital all caused 
financial difficulty. As a result, the railroads turned to short-term bank-loans, and weaker 
lines often went into bankruptcy by failing to refund promissory notes. [70]     
Another problem was caused by the way of expansion of the railroad, that is, the 
acquisition of stocks of constituent companies by the holding company. The acquisition 
was often financed by collateral trust bonds. When the earnings of the acquired 
companies could not pay dividends enough to cover the interest on the collateral trust 
bonds, the parent company was burdened with unprofitable acquisition. [ 71 ] More 
important, the legality of the holding company, in particular the pure holding company, 
was dubious. In 1904, a pure holding company, the Northern Securities Company, which 
held the shares of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific, was dissolved due to the 
violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. 
When the railroad industry faced these problems, the key financiers of the 
industry, investment bankers, were also challenged. In spite of the significant 
contribution of investment bankers in railroad finance, the government, skeptical of the 
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concentrated financial power, began to regulate and suppress investment banking. In 
1905, the Armstrong investigation looked into the close tie of life insurance companies 
and investment bankers. As a result of this investigation, life insurance companies as 
clients of investment bankers were prohibited from underwriting securities. [72] In 1911, 
the Supreme Court decision on the dissolution of Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
retarded mergers of railroad companies, in which investment bankers had been actively 
involved. In 1912, the Pujo investigation revealed a high degree of financial 
concentration in New York City and the absence of any control of it. This investigation 
led to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. The Act forbade mergers and acquisitions where 
competition was substantially harmed and ―the interlocking directorates of banks and 
trust companies.‖[73] Also, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 prohibited the 
―unfair methods of competition,‖ which could include large system-building strategies of 
railroads. In addition, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 built a federal banking system. 
The twelve federal banks came to check the concentration of financial power in the 
Northeast.[74] Although investment bankers’ contribution in railroad finance did not 
deteriorate greatly before World War I, the changing business environment gradually 
limited their role after the war.   
2.2.3 Railroad Finance from World War I to 1930 
 World War I was a watershed of corporate financial practices in the railroad 
industry. When United States joined the war in 1917, railroad companies were placed 
under federal control due to war emergency. Until the railroad companies were returned 
to previous owners in 1920, railroad operations were controlled and supervised by the 
Railroad Administration of the United States. The impact of the war on the American 
 30 
economy and business environments affected railroad corporate financial practices in the 
post-war period.  
First of all, the overexpansion of the business under the federal control had many 
railroad companies fall into debt in the early 1920s. Meeting the increasing war demand 
for the transportation, government administrators extended lines, improved facilities and 
added more locomotives and cars. To finance the expansion of business, railroads 
received loans from the government and issued a huge amount of securities repeatedly 
under the approval of the government. [75] In spite of the huge investment in the 
industry, however, railroad facilities and equipment was not well-maintained. The 
Railroad Administration failed to operate the industry properly due to its inexperience in 
railroad management. [76] After the war, therefore, railroad companies needed to make 
huge investments for improvement, while paying off war-time debt.     
Another impact of the war was the change of anti-monopoly policy. The 
government overturned its anti-monopoly policy toward the railroads after the experience 
of federalization. To ―compensate their owners‖ and to achieve ―profitable and efficient 
operation in post-war years,‖ the Transportation Act of 1920 was passed. The Act 
encouraged consolidation. [77] It attempted to consolidate railroads into a limited number 
of systems and allowed them to acquire properties of other railroads according to a 
consolidation plan devised by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Although 
consolidation was not achieved as the government had hoped, railroad companies were 
allowed to combine voluntarily with the governmental approval. [78]   
 These financial needs in improvements and the purchase of securities of railroad 
companies were mainly financed by internal funds. In the hearings before the Temporary 
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National Economic Committee in 1939, John W. Barriger, who was associated with the 
Pennsylvania Railroad and many other railroad companies, testified that ―the industry’s 
own revenues, especially, funds derived from the depreciation charges‖ had been the 
principal financial source. Between 1920 and 1937, total depreciation charges of the 
Class I railroads, that is ―the railroads with a gross revenue in excess of $1,000,000,‖ 
amounted to $3.6 billion. [79] On the other hand, net capital secured from the sale of 
securities marked only $1.9 billion, of which the funds raised through the sale of funded 
debt was $1.6 billion and stock finance was $0.3 billion. [80] In 1909, the Corporate Tax 
Act had allowed the companies to deduct depreciation from taxable income. [81] 
 The use of internal funds in the industry during the 1920s was explained in part 
by the difficulty in selling securities at that time. After World War I, railroad companies 
were not able to raise sufficient funds in the capital markets. The market value of railroad 
securities decreased from $20 billion before the war to $12 billion after. [82] Also, 
intensified competition for capital among the industries made it difficult for railroad 
companies to raise funds in the markets. In the 1920s, public utilities prospered through 
holding companies, and many manufacturing companies grew rapidly. Compared with 
public utility and industrial companies, the growth of railroads was slow. From 1919 to 
1928 gross assets of 44 railroad companies grew by 2.4 per cent annually. On the other 
hand, those of 71 industrial companies grew by 5.2 per cent and those of 35 public utility 
companies by 12.3 per cent. [83] In addition, the government intervention in security 
issues hampered the use of securities. The Transportation Act of 1920 gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission ―blanket powers over the issuance of new securities.‖ To 
approve new issues, the ICC determined that the issue is ―for a necessary purpose, 
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compatible with the public interest,‖ and that ―the proposed issue is reasonably necessary 
and appropriate for such purpose.‖ The ICC even intervened in the amount and the price 
of issues, interest and dividend, profits of underwriters, and the relationship between the 
companies and certain bankers.  [84] 
 The major railroad companies were profitable enough to accumulate internal 
funds; the rate problem before the war faded away during war emergency and the 
companies were able to secure return under the Transportation Act. When the 
government had controlled railroads during World War I, it realized that rates should be 
high enough to ―maintain the credit of the roads and to enable them to perform efficiently 
their public functions under the present unusual and extraordinary condition.‖[85] Facing 
war emergency, the ICC had approved the rate increase during the war. After the war 
ended, the ICC again granted the rate increase to ―yield railroads a fair return upon the 
value of their properties used for transportation purposes" under the Transportation Act. 
[86] At that time, the rate increase was 20 per cent on passenger traffic and 25 to 35 per 
cent on freight.[87] Although the definition of a ―fair return‖ was still controversial, the 
trend toward rate increase improved financial condition of railroad companies.   
 Another financial method for expansion of the railroads in particular in the late 
1920s was the use of pure holding companies. Consolidation through the use of stock 
acquisition had been quite common practices in the industry since the late nineteenth 
century, but after the Transportation Act of 1920 was passed, railroad companies were 
required to obtain the authorization of the ICC for consolidaton. The formation of pure 
holding companies, however, made it possible to evade federal control on the railroad 
consolidation. For example, O.P and M.J Sweringen had used the device of pure holding 
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company to build up their vast railroad system since 1916. By exchanging collateral stock 
of holding companies and stock of constituent companies, they pyramided holding 
companies with ―a mere shoe-string investment of their own capital‖.[88] In 1929, 
finally, the Alleghany Corporation as the top pure holding company owned all the stock 
already held by the Van Sweringens in various railroads. [89]     
As the use of internal funds increased, the close ties between investment bankers 
and railroad companies gradually loosened. In fact, traditional financial activity of long-
established banking houses was challenged by the newly emerging commercial banks. In 
the stock market boom of the 1920s, new bankers were eager to deal in stocks. [90] After 
the crash of the stock market in 1929, however, public confidence in the investment 
bankers was totally collapsed.‖[91]    
Thus, before 1930, railroad companies did not use equity finance, but bonds and 
internal funds.  Before World War I, they mostly relied on bond issues through the 
conduit of investment bankers. After the war, on the other hand, they mostly used 
retained earnings, especially depreciation accruals, and to a lesser extent, bond issues. 
These financial features do not always fit to all railroad companies, however. In fact, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, one of the biggest railroad companies in the United 
States, was quite different than most of the other railroads.   
2.2.4 The Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
2.2.4.1 Corporate Finance before World War I 
The Pennsylvania Railroad was incorporated in 1846. The original line was 249 
miles between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh. The company completed the system, extending 
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lines from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh in 1857. Pittsburgh was a hub of the railroad 
network. It was a ―leading trade center‖, and developed ―sizable industries‖ such as iron 
and glass manufacturing. More important it had an access to coal mines. At that time, it 
came to be one of the largest cities west of the Appalachian Mountains. [92]  Not only an 
operating company, the Pennsylvania was a holding company that obtained control over 
other railroad companies through acquisitions of stock. The aggregate lengths of the lines 
in the operating companies accounted for 4,541 miles in the end of 1915. [93] The 
company was one of the biggest and most successful railroads in the United States.  
In the Pennsylvania Railroad, gross assets increased from $151 million in 1880 to 
$952 million in 1914, of which long-term assets consistently accounted for between 80 to 
90 per cent. Two major items in long-term assets were the expansion of business, 
including construction of roads, the purchase of equipment, and the investment in other 
properties on one hand, and acquisitions of securities on the other hand. In other words, 
the company grew both with additional construction and with consolidation. Most of the 
increasing financial needs for these purposes were met by long-term funds. The total 
amount of stock and funded debt rose from $131 million in 1880 to $717 million in 1914 
along with the increasing financial demand. (Table 2)  
One of the unique features of financial practices of the Pennsylvania Railroad was 
its heavy reliance on equity finance. The ratio of stock to gross assets from 1880 to 1914 
was between 44 per cent and 60 per cent.  Unlike other railroad companies, the amount of 
capital stock issued was more than that of bonds. The ratio of funded debt to capital stock 
declined from 0.9 in 1880 to 0.43 in 1914. The decrease in the ratio was a general trend 
except the recession years of 1907 and 1908. [94] The company’s newly issued stock was 
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(in Million Dollars)  
 A B B/A C C/B 
 Gross Assets Fixed Assets  Securities  
1880 151.3 125.1 82.70% 130.9 104.6% 
1885 207.9 171.9 84.30% 161.9 94.2% 
1890 258.5 207.1 80.10% 189.5 91.5% 
1895 278.3 236.4 85% 217.0 91.8% 
1900 333.3 290.8 87.20% 240.1 82.6% 
1905 577.1 469.1 81.30% 494.4 105.4% 
1910 835.2 718.9 86.10% 652.2 90.7% 
1914 951.5 850.6 89.40% 717.1 84.3% 
           Source: Annual Reports, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1880-1914 
 
Table 2: Long-Term Finance of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
 
 
mostly sold without using the open market. From 1891 to 1914, capital stock increased 
by $376,183,650, of which $307, 081,600 was subscribed by existing shareholders, 
$45,988,550 was transferred from scrip dividends and convertible bonds, and $14, 
413,500 was exchanged in the process of acquisition. [ 95 ] The rest of the stock, 
$8,700,000 only, was sold to the open market. [96] In other words, more than 97 per cent 
of the increase in stock was distributed without using stock exchanges, and the allocation 
of new stock to existing shareholders accounts for more than 80 per cent of the increase 
in stock.  
The avoidance to use the open market for the sales of new stock was attributable 
to several factors. Investors’ suspicion of stock might make it difficult to sell. Stock was 
regarded as speculative unlike bonds with liens. Also, the company might allocate new 
stock to existing shareholders in order to obtain their acceptance of new issues. Since the 
increase in the number of shareholders would decrease the receipt of dividends for each 
shareholder, shareholders might be opposed to authorize the increase in stock without 
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subscription privilege of new stock. In addition, the company might aim to create loyal 
investors instead of speculators by offering such privilege to existing shareholders.  
Although most of the newly issued stock was distributed to the existing 
shareholders, the stock ownership was not necessarily concentrated; since some of the 
shares were sold in the markets from one investor to others, the number of shareholders 
increased. From 1880 to 1914, along with the increase on stock outstanding, shareholders 
increased from 13,000 to 91,571. However, as Table 3 shows, the average number of 
shares per shareholder did not increase during the period despite the allocation of new 
stock to existing shareholders.     
   Year Shares Shareholders Shares per 
shareholder  
1880   1,377,404           13,000  106.0 
1902   4,087,497           28,408  143.9 
1903   5,928,365           42,437  139.7 
1904   6,025,713           42,230  142.7 
1905   6,050,947           40,385  149.8 
1906   6,119,027           40,153  152.4 
1907   6,291,833           57,226  109.9 
1908   6,292,084           58,273  108.0 
1909   8,021,296           56,809  141.2 
1910   8,252,214           65,283  126.4 
1911   9,077,557           73,165  124.1 
1912   9,077,559           75,155  120.8 
1913   9,984,677           88,586  112.7 
1914   9,984,072           91,571  109.0 
Source: Berle and Means, p55, Table VII , Annual Reports 
 
Table 3: The Number of Shares and Shareholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
 
The company’s decision to use stock was in part explained by its reluctance to 
increase fixed charges borne from bond issues, since excessive bond issues had led many 
railroad companies to financial problems since the late nineteenth century. In spite of the 
huge financial needs, the high standing of the company enabled it to use common stock 
rather than bonds. In fact, it could stabilize dividends at a moderate level in order to 
 37 
obtain investors who preferred sound management of the company. In particular, after the 
recession in the early 1890s, the company maintained the dividend between 5 to 7 per 
cent. [97] 
Meanwhile, preferred stock was not used in the company. As mentioned above, 
preferred stock was used for emergency finance and for reorganization in the railroad 
industry; the Pennsylvania Railroad did not have to use such securities. The strong 
confidence in the company enabled it to raise funds without using preferred stock.   
Despite its heavier reliance on stock than on bonds, the value of bonds the 
company issued increased from $56,713,300 in 1880 to $196,495,020 in 1914 along with 
the growing financial demands. Among various bonds, general and consolidated 
mortgage bonds accounted for a large portion of funded debt. Although these bonds were  
―issued under blanket mortgages which come after all the preceding mortgages‖, [98] 
they were regarded as least risky; the company had only a small amount of first mortgage 
bonds, and the amount of the general and consolidated mortgage bonds were relatively 
stable due to the limitation set by mortgage. In fact, from 1880 to 1914, mortgage bonds 
were issued three times. In 1893, the $3,000,000 Consolidated Mortgage Bonds due 1943 
were sold for the purposes of construction and equipment purchase. In 1895, the 
company’s urgent needs of funds to redeem bonds and the favorable money market in 
London led to the issue of the $4,850,000 Consolidated Sterling Bond due 1945. Finally, 
in 1908, the company issued the $19,400,000 Consolidated Mortgage Sterling Bonds and 
the $20,000,000 Consolidated Dollar Bonds both due 1948 to meet current financial 
obligation. [99] The first two issues were negligible in terms of its amounts. The large 
issue of 1908 was the reaction against financial emergency during the recession.     
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To supplement mortgage bonds, the company used other kinds of bonds. 
Collateral trust bond were introduced in 1883 to finance a part of improvement and 
construction; the 10,000,000 4 ½ per cent Collateral Trust Loan due 1913 was secured by 
bonds of ―branch and auxiliary lines representing a par value of $12,500,000.‖ [100] The 
use of collateral trusts bonds, instead of the sale of bonds of auxiliary lines, was 
advantageous. Whereas bonds of auxiliary lines owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad 
bore interest at 5 to 7 per cent, interest payment for collateral trust bonds was 4 per cent 
only due to the confidence in the Pennsylvania Railroad. [101] The company also used 
various series of equipment trusts bond. This is a method to finance the purchase of new 
equipment at lower interest rate; it bore 3 ½ to 4 per cent. [102] Lastly, convertible bonds 
were sold twice between 1880 and 1914:  the $50,000,000 3 ½ per cent Convertible 
Bonds were issued in 1902 in order to meet expenditure for the equipment and the 
construction, and the $100,000,000 3 ½ per cent Convertible Bonds in 1905 for the 
redemption of the Consolidated Mortgage Bonds. [103] After 1902, convertible bonds 
accounted for a large part of funded debt, which reflected the company’s preference to 
equity finance.   
A huge amount of these bonds were marketed in foreign countries. In fact, 
Pennsylvania Railroad had used foreign capital since the 1850s. According to Wilkins, in 
1853, ―$2.5 million of its $3 million in bond outstanding‖ of the company was held in 
foreigners. [104] She also points out that British enterprises and French investors were 
also attracted by bonds of the company in the early twentieth century. [105]    
In spite of the confidence of the public in the company, it often used investment 
bankers as underwriters to distribute its bonds. Although fees and commissions for 
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underwriting business were not small, keeping a long-term relation with investment 
bankers was useful for the company. Investment bankers provided financial support in 
case of emergency, and more important, the company could avoid risk in the sale of 
bonds; underwriting syndicate of investment bankers received unsold bonds. [106]  
In addition to stocks and bonds, the company also used retained earnings. During 
1880 and 1914, the accumulated surplus and reserves increased from $9.7 million to 
$133.7 million. Accumulated depreciation increased from $6,327,159 in 1910 to 
$18,897,398 in 1914. Figure  shows the ratio of the sum of these internal funds to gross 
assets. [107] 
 
                          Source: Annual Reports 
 
Figure 1: The Ratio of Accumulated Internal Funds to Gross Assets. 
 
 
The ratio gradually increased in the late nineteenth century, but it rapidly 
plummeted in the early 1900s due to new stock issues, the stagnation of the increase in 
retained earnings, and the economic recession of 1907. In 1910, when the company 
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applied depreciation, it again rose to 12.1 per cent. In 1914, it reached 17.0 per cent. 
Although the contribution of internal funds was not negligible, it is still smaller than the 
ratio of stock to gross assets and that of bonds, 52 per cent and 22 per cent in 1914 
respectively. 
2.2.4.2 Corporate Finance during and after World War I 
During World War I, gross assets of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
continued to grow, although the rise of wage, fuels, other supplies, and taxes during the 
war reduced income.[108] During federal control from December 1917 to March 1920, 
the company invested in additions and improvements of properties in order to deal with 
the expanding demand for transportation for war purposes. At that time, in contrast, the 
increase in the investment in the securities of affiliated and other companies was 
sluggish. Despite the huge expenditure, however, the properties under federal control 
were under-maintained when they were returned to the previous owners after the war. 
The company claimed the loss of $400,000,000 for the under maintenance of roads and 
structures. [109] Consequently, the company needed to make a huge investment for 
improvement. In addition, after the post-war recession, the company needed funds for 
mergers and acquisition. While the Transportation Act of 1920 limited the expansion of 
the company as a holding company until the middle of the 1920s, it was still able to 
engage in consolidation through acquisitions. After the revision of the Act in 1925, as a 
holding company, it began to increase the number of its subsidiaries once again. [110] 
Unlike in the pre-war years, the role of stock in meeting these increasing financial 
needs gradually declined during and after the World War I. In fact, no new stock was 
issued from 1913 to 1927. It was during the stock boom in the late 1920s that the 
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company issued new stock. [111] Instead of stock, the Pennsylvania increased bonds. 
Outstanding funded debt increased rapidly after 1914. The change of financial practices 
was led by President Samuel Rea. In 1914, he supported the use of bonds in future 
financing ―because money could thus be obtained at a lower rate than the established 
dividend, and also because bond interest could be deducted from income before 
computing the new federal income tax.‖ [112] To extend bond finance, he created a new 
mortgage amounting to $80,000,000. The Board and then shareholders authorized the 
new mortgage bonds ―to an amount not in excess at any time of the outstanding capital 
stock.‖ [113]   Thus, from 1914 to 1930, the company increased its reliance on mortgage 
bonds.   
These bonds were salable abroad only with higher interest rate. While the interest 
rate of the best American railroads were 4.5 to 5 per cent before World War I, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad issued 7 per cent 10 year secured bonds in 1920.[114] Since 
American railroad securities lost their popularity, only a few major railroad companies 
that could afford the high interest could market their securities in foreign countries.    
More important, the company began to use more internal funds than before. Of 
the increase in gross assets from 1914 to 1930, 47.4 per cent was attributed to the use of 
internal funds, 18.3 per cent to stock and minus 5.2 per cent to bonds. [115] This increase 
in the use of internal funds is also reflected on the ratio of internal funds to gross assets.  
As Figure 2 shows, the ratio of internal funds to gross assets rapidly increased 
after World War I. Compared with the ratio of stock and bonds, internal funds was one of 
major financial sources in the company. (Table 4) 
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                                                 Source: Annual Reports  
 
Figure 2: The Ratio of Internal Funds to Gross Assets of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports 
 
Table 4: Long-Term Finance of the Pennsylvania Railroad after 1914  
 
 
At the Pennsylvania Railroad, as Berle and Means argued, stock came to be 
widely distributed among the public.  In part, due to its gigantic financial needs, the 
company required a huge number of shareholders. From 1914 to 1927, while the number 
of shares of stock outstanding was not changed, the number of shareholders increased 
from 91,571 to 143,249. The average number of shares per shareholder decreased from 
109 shares in 1914 to 70 shares in 1927 and 63 shares in 1930. [116] (Figure 3) The wide 
distribution of shares of the company seems to fit the idea of the separation of ownership 
and management. However, in the 1920s, other financial sources became more important 
  1914 1917 1920 1925 1929 
Stock/Gross Assets 52% 40% 27% 27% 28% 
Bonds/Gross Assets 22% 24% 21% 33% 27% 
Internal Funds/Gross Assets 17% 27.3% 21.5% 28.6% 34.1% 
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than stock. The use of bonds increased to a same extent as stock, and more important, the 
company relied on internal funds more than any other financial sources. The company 
seemed to achieve a certain level of managerial autonomy based not only on the 
dispersion of stock to the public but also on self-finance in the late 1920s.    
 
Source: Berle and Means p55, Table VII; Annual Reports, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, 1902-1930)  
 
Figure 3: The Number of Shares per shareholder in the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
 
 
While the pattern of railroad finance is characterized as bond finance before 
World War I and the use of internal funds after, stock issues was a major financial source 
of the Pennsylvania throughout the time due to its high standing and the managers’ 
reluctance to have fixed charges through bond issues. After World War I, the company 
came to use bonds and internal funds to a similar extent as stock. Its reliance on stock and 
wide distribution of stock seem to fit Berle and Means model, but the Pennsylvania, one 
of the biggest railroads, was an exception.   
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2.3 Public Utility Finance, 1870-1920 
2.3.1 Corporate Finance before World War I  
According to Vincent P. Carosso, public utilities began to use the capital market 
from the late 1870s. [117] At that time, most of public utility issues were relatively small 
because public utilities were basically local businesses, whose securities were ―salable 
only in their local market.‖ [118] However, in twenty years, they expanded and improved 
their facilities to meet the increasing demand from the public. Especially, large 
companies organized holding companies to execute monopolistic control over the market. 
Although antimonopoly sentiments prevailed in the public, public utilities companies 
were allowed to create big business. The necessity of the expansion of utilities was later 
explained by Walter Lagerquist; considering the narrow market and huge amounts of 
fixed cost of public utilities companies, competition meant the ―duplication of physical 
facilities,‖ which would impose additional charges on the public. [119] To have the 
utility companies provide public service at proper rates, the privilege of monopoly should 
be given to them under the control by the government regulation. [120] This theory fit 
such industries as gas and electricity, where economies of scale exist.   
To finance the establishment of huge facilities and the purchase of equipment, 
utility companies, in particular, gas and electric utilities relied on bonds rather than stock 
in the early years; the public was not confident in stock of newly emerging businesses. In 
fact, utilities stocks were rated as too speculative for individual investors as well as for 
organizational investors in the New York Stock Exchange. [121] Even through bonds, 
however, it was difficult for the companies to obtain sufficient capital. Since the demand 
for utility securities was not large enough to finance the business, utilities companies 
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often exchanged their bonds for the equipment produced by manufacturing companies. 
Even if they could sell all the bonds issued, funds raised through bonds were still short 
because the amount of bonds they could issue was usually limited due to the adoption of 
closed-end mortgages. [122]    
After 1900 the public utility companies could obtain funds through bond issues 
easier than before. Investors came to regard public utility bonds as safe because of stable 
demand, governmental protection from competition, reasonable returns fixed by public 
authority, and mortgage security based on heavy investment at that time.[123] Also, the 
use of convertible bonds, sinking funds, and depreciation provisions made utility bonds 
attractive. In addition, the adoption of open-end mortgage bonds helped increase the 
amount of bonds the companies could issue. [124]  
As did railroads, public utility companies utilized various types of bonds in 
addition to mortgage bonds. They began to use collateral trust bonds during the economic 
recovery in 1898. [125] Especially, public utility holding companies in the 1880s realized 
money from a multitude of small bond issues by using the first mortgage bonds of the 
subsidiary companies as the security. [126] Refunded debt was also used extensively 
after 1898. Although those bonds in the railroad industry were primary used during 
reorganizations, public utilities used them for consolidations, mergers, and simplification 
of the financial structure.[127] In addition, the utility companies, especially larger ones, 
often issued debenture bonds after the Recession of 1907, facing urgent financial needs, 
although investors in public utilities had usually demanded a direct lien. 
Dewing argued that ideally 50 per cent of public utility financing should be done 
by funded debt, with the rest divided equally between common and preferred stock. 
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Although these per centages were different from industry to industry, there is no doubt 
that bonds in general played a major role in public utility financing. [128]  
 Though stock was less important than bonds in public utility finance, public 
utilities companies used stock, in particular preferred stock, more often than railroad 
companies did. While most of common stock of public utilities was absorbed by the 
manufacturing companies and holding companies due to the difficulty in marketing the 
shares of utility companies, preferred stock, which was regarded as ―conservative 
speculation,‖ was more readily absorbed by the public. Preferred shares carried high 
dividend, which was attractive to investors. In fact, in 1914 high-grade preferred stock 
usually yielded 6 to 7 per cent [129] 
The increasing reliance on securities markets by public utility companies led 
investment bankers to become more involved in public utility finance in the 1890s, 
although financial relations between investment bankers and public utilities companies 
was not new. For example, as Carosso explains, the Drexel, Morgan & Co. began to 
participate in public utilities finance from 1870s, but its commitment gradually increased.  
The Edison Electric Light Company was the first Drexel, Morgan had been interested in 
among the public utilities since the late 1870s. In the 1880s, Drexel, Morgan ―held the 
company’s deposit, and arranged loans, and managed some of its foreign business.‖[130] 
In 1889, it arranged the consolidation of Edison’s properties and established the Edison 
General Electric Company. [131] As the size of the utilities companies expanded along 
with the increasing demand for public services, they needed more capital than before. At 
the time, investment bankers no longer treated most of public utilities companies as risky 
business; investment in the established utilities firms was regarded as safe and profitable. 
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Especially, after railroad business declined during the panic of 1893, investment bankers' 
dealings in public utilities accelerated. One of the exceptions was the telephone industry. 
Cautious of its newness, J.P Morgan & Co, as renamed from Drexel, Morgan, began to be 
involved in corporate finance of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company after the 
turn of the century. [132]   
As with the railroad industry, investment bankers dealt with bonds but not with 
stock of the public utility industry because of stock watering.  Public utilities were often 
overcapitalized through the process of merger, amalgamation and sales of stock of 
holding companies. Thus, investment bankers’ influence on the management of public 
utilities was based on their marketing of bonds. [133] 
2.3.2 Corporate Finance from World War I to 1930 
The growth of the public utilities was temporary hampered by World War I.  
During the War, the lack of labor, materials, and capital drove up operating costs. Also, 
the increase in corporate taxes due to the war emergency hit the industry hard. In 
addition, the restriction on the use of lighting imposed by the United States Fuel 
Administration reduced revenues in the electric power and the gas industries. [134] The 
rising cost and taxes and the decrease in revenues forced the companies to issue an 
―undue proportion of bonds.‖[135]   
 In the 1920s, the public utility sector grew rapidly as the economy recovered.  To 
meet their financial need, public utilities increased their bond issues. According to Eli 
Winston Clemens, capital required in the sector increased from $ 0.5 billion in 1920 to 
2.4 billion in 1930. In the 1920s, 69 to 87 per cent of the capital requirement was new 
capital for construction and the purchase of properties. Most of these funds were raised 
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through securities, especially bonds. Although high interest rate in 1920 led companies to 
issue short-term notes rather than long-term bonds, bonds still accounted for 57.5 per cent 
to 71.4 per cent of all financing from 1921 to 1928. In contrast, stock issues explained 
12.2 per cent to 35.8 per cent of all financing. Only in 1929 did stock overtake bonds; 
bonds accounted for 37.7 per cent of all financing and stock 58.6 per cent. On the other 
hand, unlike railroads, internal funds were still not an important financial source in public 
utilities. It was only during the 1930s that utility companies came to rely on internal 
funds. At that time, public utilities faced the difficulty in marketing bonds bearing low 
yields. Also, the slow growth of the public utilities due to industrial maturity in the 1930s 
led to the different financial method from that of the periods of expansion. [136]  
One significant features of post World War I finance of public utilities was the 
importance of the holding company. In the 1920s many small utility companies, 
especially electric light and power companies, integrated into several holding companies 
or parent operating companies. According to Clemens, 71 companies were incorporated 
as holding companies by 1930, of which 46 appeared between 1920 and 1929. [137] 
Under the holding company system, an operating company obtained funds from 
the holding company, either in exchange for the operating company's securities or as a 
loan. The holding company raised the money needed by the sale of its bonds and stock to 
the general public, using the stock and bonds of its operating companies as security. [138] 
According to Clemens, in the early 1920s, bonds issued by holding companies were only 
10 per cent of public utility debt, but in 1928 more than half of public utilities’ funded 
debt was holding company bonds. [139]   
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Another feature of finance in public utilities after World War I was customer 
ownership, that is, the direct sale of stock to customers. The introduction of customer 
ownership was associated with the war experience of the utility companies; under the 
increasing demand for capital, soaring costs, and unfavorable conditions of money 
market, utility companies used sales of stock to customers to obtain scarce capital. In the 
1920s, customer ownership became an increasingly important financial method. In 1923, 
approximately $250,000,000 of stocks was sold by the electric utility industry through 
customer ownership. The method was widely used not only by the electric utility industry 
but also by the gas and the telephone industries. [140]  
The policy of direct sale was advantageous for the public utility companies in any 
ways. First of all, the use of utility company employees to sell stock to the public was 
cheaper than hiring professional salespeople. The former cost $3 to $5 per share, while 
the latter $6 to $8.  Second, users of service were familiar with the utility company and 
thus not afraid of holding its shares.   Third, the employees could reach small local 
investors who were ―more likely to buy from them than from professional stock 
salesman.‖[141]  Fourth, the managers of the utility companies could reduce the power of 
investment bankers, who had in earlier years played a major role in distributing public 
utility stock. Finally, public utility companies improved public relations through 
customer ownership. By emphasizing public ownership, the companies attempted to 
justify their monopoly positions. They also held balance the rate reduction and dividend 
payments to match public interest and shareholders’ interest. [142]  
Although equity finance was not a major financial source in public utilities, stock 
of public utilities was more widely distributed than that of railroads. On one hand, 
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railroads mainly distributed stock to stockholders. This is attributable to the fact that 
railroads served local businesses and people; local interests were eager to maintain their 
control over management of the railroad companies, unlike outside investors. On the 
other hand, public utilities distributed stock through the market and later even allocated it 
to the customers of the companies. This wider distribution of stock of utility companies 
in the public was explained by the public nature of utility companies, which served a 
much broader section of the public than railroads.  
Although these corporate financial practices were considered to be typical in the 
public utility sector, actual practices were different from firm to firm within the sector. In 
particular, the telephone industry shows distinctive features of corporate financial 
practices due to its newness, nature of business, and monopolistic industrial structure. 
The industry was controlled by a huge holding and operating company, the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company.  
2.3.3 The American Telephone & Telegraph Company 
2.3.3.1 Corporate Finance before World War I 
The telephone industry was a latecomer in the public utilities sector. When 
Alexander Graham Bell patented his invention in 1876, the industry attracted few 
investors and was not treated as a public utility. With only a small amount of capital, the 
business started as a partnership, the Bell Telephone Association. However, along with 
the increasing demand for telephone service, the business was incorporated and greatly 
expanded its size in next decades through mergers and acquisitions. In 1878, it formed 
the New England Telephone Company and the Bell Telephone Company in 
Massachusetts, with capitalization of $200,000 and $450,000 respectively. The two 
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companies were integrated into the National Bell Telephone Company with capitalization 
of $8,500,000 in the next year. In 1880, in turn, the National Bell became the American 
Bell Telephone Company with a capitalization of $100,000,000. Finally, the company 
was taken over by its subsidiary, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
which had been established as a long-distance company in New York in 1885. Facing the 
interference of the Massachusetts legislature in the increase in capital and stock holding, 
the officials of the American Bell decided in 1900 to transfer the function of the parent 
company to the subsidiary in New York. As a holding company as well as an operating 
company of long-distance lines, the A.T.&T. rapidly grew before the World War I. [143] 
This gigantic corporate entity was mostly accepted by the public and by the state 
and federal governments because, as the company insisted, the industry required ―One 
system,‖ ―One Policy,‖ ―Universal Service‖ to provide better communication 
service.[144] According to Attorney-General George W. Wickersham, since ―the value of 
a telephone service depends largely upon the facility of connecting every individual 
telephone user with any point, upon any telephone line,‖ monopolistic industrial structure 
was accepted under ―suitable supervision and control‖ by the government. Although in 
some states, the company could not avoid the allegation of monopoly, in general it 
successfully justified its existence by insisting on the nature of its communication 
service. [145] 
To finance this big corporate entity demanded a huge amount of funds, especially 
long-term capital. According to annual reports of the company, fixed assets continued to 
increase from $9,992,861 in 1881 through $93,750,292 in 1900 to $595,041,161 in 1913, 
although in 1914, it temporarily decreased to $552,996,796 due to the reduction of 
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advance to associated companies and the sale of their stocks. Especially, after the 
recession of 1907, the ratio of fixed assets to gross assets accounted for 82 per cent to 94 
per cent. The huge capital requirement was mostly associated with the purchase of 
securities in other companies, which increased from $71,719,324 in 1900 to 
$533,403,879 in 1913. Compared with this huge amount of fixed assets, construction cost 
was not a significant amount. The construction item appearing in the annual reports 
increased from $16,152, 021 in 1900 to $49,819, 065 in 1914, but it accounts for only 
10.8 to 22.7 per cent of the purchase of stock and bonds. (Table 5)  
     (in Dollar) 
   A   B   C   D   E   F  
Year Gross Assets Fixed Assets B/A Securities Construction E/D 
1880      10,162,113          9,992,861  98.3%         1,837,500         N/A  N/A 
1890      36,636,336        34,404,188  93.9%       32,740,580         N/A  N/A 
1900    122,234,983        93,750,292  76.7%       71,719,324  16,152,021 22.5% 
1901    145,198,394      110,235,129  75.9%       84,339,912  19,116,209 22.7% 
1902    190,414,904      145,628,377  76.5%     114,864,799  22,486,192 19.6% 
1903    224,381,524      166,332,194  74.1%     130,678,449  26,876,806 20.6% 
1904    273,819,672      179,108,590  65.4%     138,684,248  30,889,710 22.3% 
1905    296,302,202      207,334,056  70.0%     161,554,277  34,694,764 21.5% 
1906    353,801,015      235,846,930  66.7%     182,357,238  40,336,776 22.1% 
1907    396,357,982      328,689,104  82.9%     273,404,797  41,621,175 15.2% 
1908    440,932,822      363,450,550  82.4%     309,018,695  42,650,990 13.8% 
1909    494,089,807      417,454,250  84.5%     310,475,309  44,295,660 14.3% 
1910    507,515,377      453,414,925  89.3%     356,950,838  45,948,392 12.9% 
1911    565,523,189      522,964,593  92.5%     407,548,400  48,155,893 11.8% 
1912    606,762,089      570,650,668  94.0%     447,598,318  48,635,006 10.9% 
1913    655,956,307      595,041,161  90.7%     454,888,264     49,269,173 10.8% 
1914    628,616,993      552,996,796  88.0%     435,727,228  49,819,065 11.4% 
Source: Annual Reports, 1880-1914 
Table 5: Assets of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company  
 
The significance of expenditure for stock purchase reflected the A. T. & T’s 
management policy; the company should make the best use of existing exchanges and 
facilities belonging to its associated companies in order to ―minimize A. T. & T’s capital 
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expenditures and to maximize its coverage of the national network.‖ [146] This policy 
was attributed to the nature of the telephone business. According to economic theory, 
companies requiring huge fixed investment benefit from economies of scale; the more 
they produce goods and services, the more unit costs decrease and profits per unit 
increase.  However, this was not the case with the A.T.& T. The extension of lines and 
the construction of new facilities in local areas increased costs more than profits per unit. 
Unable to finance all the costs for geographical expansion, the newly established 
operating   companies were financed by local entrepreneurs.  To maintain   controlling 
power over the telephone industry, the A. T. & T. acquired substantial amounts of stock 
of these operating companies. [147] 
To meet the financial needs, A. T. & T. heavily relied on common stock issue, 
unlike other utility companies. Stock outstanding overwhelmed bonds throughout the 
years except in 1908. From 1901 to 1914, the ratio of stock to gross assets was between 
41 per cent and 72.9 per cent, and that of bonds was between 8.2 per cent and 42.9 per 
cent. The company did not use any preferred stock. Thus, Dewing’s 1914 statement, that 
50 per cent of public utility financing was met by funded debt and 25 per cent by 
preferred stock, was not applicable to this company. (Table 6)  
Stehman attributed the company’s reliance on common stock to several factors. 
First of all, the company did not issue mortgage bonds because the assets of a telephone 
company were not suitable as mortgages. The assets of the company, Stehman explains, 
were ―of little value except for the business of telephone.‖ Also, public perceptions of the 
telephone industry made it difficult to sell other securities than stock. Since telephone 
business was not regarded as a public utility at first, the public was not eager to invest in 
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risky industrial bonds. In fact, telephone companies were officially regarded as public 
utilities in the early twentieth century for the first time. As public utilities, they began to 
be regulated by City and State Commissions from 1907, and the functions of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission were extended to cover telephones from 1910. [148] 
Finally, he argues that common stock was ―just as advantageous so long as no preferred 
stock was outstanding.‖ [149] In other words, although preferred stock was attractive for 
investors because of its preference in dividends to common stock, common stock could 
be attractive enough unless preferred stock is issued. 
                  (in Dollar) 
 A B C D E 
 Gross Assets Stock B/A Bonds D/A 
1900 122,234,983 89,100,500 72.9% 10,006,000 8.2% 
1901 145,198,394 104,650,600 72.1% 15,004,500 10.3% 
1902 190,414,904 114,946,500 60.4% 28,000,000 14.7% 
1903 224,381,524 154,179,300 68.7% 28,000,000 12.5% 
1904 273,819,672 158,661,800 57.9% 53,000,000 19.4% 
1905 296,302,202 158,661,800 53.5% 108,000,000 36.4% 
1906 353,801,015 158,661,800 44.8% 108,000,000 30.5% 
1907 396,357,982 179,595,255 45.3% 153,000,000 38.6% 
1908 440,932,822 180,587,000 41.0% 189,048,000 42.9% 
1909 494,089,807 256,475,300 51.9% 101,140,000 20.5% 
1910 507,515,377 263,335,600 51.9% 116,941,000 23.0% 
1911 565,523,189 318,427,500 56.3% 98,459,000 17.4% 
1912 606,762,089 334,805,700 55.2% 105,002,000 17.3% 
1913 655,956,307 344,616,300 52.5% 159,591,000 24.3% 
1914 628,616,993 344,681,900 54.8% 159,505,000 25.4% 
Source: Annual Reports, The American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 1900-1914 
 
Table 6: Long-Term Finance in the American Telephone & Telegraph Company 
 
Similar to the Pennsylvania Railroad, a significant portion of A. T. & T.’s stock 
was subscribed by existing shareholders. In 1899, A. T. & T.’s outstanding capitalization 
was $83,882,980, of which $51,772,600 was issued for the existing stockholders of the 
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American Bell Company. [150] After the formation of the A.T. & T. as the parent 
company, most of the stock was subscribed by existing shareholders; the stock issues of 
$21,000,000 in 1902 and of $55,000,000 in 1911 were all subscribed by existing 
shareholders. Only in 1907 in the middle of recession, shareholders were not able to 
finance the purchase of newly offered stock; they subscribed to 9,486 shares out of 
19,252 shares. The rest of stock was widely offered to the general public and even in 
London.[151] 
Although newly issued stock was usually allocated to existing shareholders, the 
number of shareholders increased not only through the sale of the stock by existing 
shareholders to other investors but also the issues of convertible bonds. The company 
issued $100,000,000 4 per cent Convertible Bonds in 1906 and $50,000,000  4 per cent 
Convertible Bonds in 1908. These bonds were distributed through the syndicate 
comprising J.P Morgan & Co., and Kidder, Peabody & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in the 
United States and Baring Brothers & Co. in London. [152] In addition, since the New 
York Stock Exchange listed the full amount of these bonds, the public had access to the 
purchase of the bonds. [153] The widely distributed bonds were convertible to stock after 
March 1909; in the end of the year, $101,861,000 convertible bonds was converted into 
stock, and between 1910 to 1914, additional $6.7 million bonds were converted. [154] In 
fact, the approximate number of shareholders increased from 12,000 in 1900 to 60,000 in 
1914, and the amount of capital stock per shareholders reduced from $10,465 in 1901 to 
$5,745 in 1914. [155]    
 To facilitate the sale of the stock and the conversion of convertible bonds, as 
Horace Coon explains, the company provided ―continuous, stable and substantial‖ 
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dividends. [156] From 1900 to 1905, the company paid $7.5 per share, and from 1906 to 
1921 $8 per share regularly. The company made profits enough not only to pay these 
dividends but also to increase its retained earnings. As a result, it could maintain stock 
price as high as $120 per share in the New York Stock Exchange. [157]    
Bonds were less important than stock in the telephone company, as indicated in 
the ratio to gross assets, but they played a significant role when the company expanded in 
the early 1900s. The amount of bonds outstanding rose from $10,006,000 in 1900 to 
$189,048,000 in 1908. [158] As Figure 4 shows, the increase in bonds outstanding 
overwhelmed that of stock between 1904 and 1908. According to Robert W. Garnet, 
since A. T. & T.’s financial support for the associated companies amplified the demand 
for new funds, debt financing in addition to stock issues were unavoidable. He also 
attributes the move into debt finance to the policy of President, Frederick P. Fish, who 
headed the company from 1901 to 1907.  Fish regarded financing by issuing of more 
stock as unrealistic in the phase of the expansion of telephone. He believed that 
increasing costs for expansion could not be financed without bond issues. Under his 
administration, the company issued bonds amounting to $188 million. [159] 
This change of financial practice was a surprise to the public. In 1905, after the issue of 
collateral trust bonds of $25,000,000, it was predicted that ―next capital issue will 
probably be stock instead of bonds.‖[ 160 ] However, the A.T.& T. decided to 
issue$150,000,000 in convertible bonds, which were regarded by investors as a change of 
financial ―principles‖ of the company. The stockholders of the A.T.&T. were 
discontented with this move. The bond issue would mean ―a large increase of fixed 
charge ahead of the stock.‖[161] 
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                                                                                         Source: Annual Reports, A.T.&T 
Figure 4: The Increase in the Amount of Stock Outstanding and  
Bonds Outstanding in A.T.& T. 
 
The bonds A. T. & T. used were mainly collateral trust bonds and convertible 
bonds. As a holding company, A. T. & T used the securities of its associated companies 
as collateral when it issued bonds to finance construction and improvement of those 
companies. Between 1900 and 1914, A. T. & T. issued collateral bonds in amount of 
$78,000,000. At the same time, the company issued a $150,000,000 convertible bond to 
fund the development, to reimburse notes and to make loans to associated 
companies.[ 162 ] As mentioned above, mortgage bonds were not used because the 
significant portion of assets was not in real estate or facilities but securities of associated 
companies.  
The connection between A. T. &T. and investment bankers appeared from the 
formation of the company through debt financing. From 1901 to 1903, the company 
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floated $28 million 4 per cent Collateral Trust Bonds due 1929, which were sold by a 
Boston investment banker, Kidder, Peabody & Company. [163] In 1904, it sold $20 
million three-years 5 per cent notes by using Speyer & Company and Lee, Higginson & 
Company. In 1905, Kidder, Peabody & Company and Baring Brothers Ltd. in London 
sold $25 million Collateral Trust Bonds, of which $10 million worth of bond were taken 
abroad.[164] In 1906, a $150 million issue of convertible bonds was sold through a 
syndicate which included J. P. Morgan & Company, Kuhn & Loeb & Company, Kidder, 
Peabody & Company, and Baring Brothers Ltd. Similarly, in 1907, the company sold 
additional $25 million Collateral Trust Bonds. This issue remained unsold in two years 
due to the economic recession at that time. In total, the company issued $228 million 
worth of bonds and $20 million notes with the financial support of investment bankers. 
President Fish’s aspiration to expand the business made him less concerned about a 
surrender of control in management to bankers. [165] 
Through investment bankers, A. T. & T. successfully obtained foreign capital. 
According to Wilkins, the Barings in London took 6.5 million of the collateral bond issue 
of the company in 1905. It served also a manager of the underwriting syndicate of 
convertible bond issue in 1906. The securities of the company were not only traded on 
the London Stock Exchange. They were also listed on the Amsterdam Exchange in 
Holland and the Paris Bourse in France. [166]      
The influence of investment bankers based on their financial involvement was 
seen in the appointment of President Theodore N. Vail in 1907. Distrustful of Fish’s 
financial and managerial strategy, investment bankers represented on the Board sought a 
new leader. Right after the election, President Vail named such bankers as H.L. 
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Higginson of Lee, Higginson & Co. and Robert Winsor of Kidder, Peabody & Co. to the 
Board.  Financial support from these investment bankers was indispensable for the 
expansion of the company.[167]  
Meanwhile, the use of retained earnings increased before World War I, although it 
was still less important than security issues.  The ratio of retained earnings to gross assets 
between 1900 and 1914 was from 10 per cent to 18 per cent except the depression years 
of 1907 and 1908. [168] Thus, retained earnings were not a major financial source for the 
gigantic company although it was profitable enough to accumulate earnings even after 
paying off high dividends.  [169] 
 Under President Vail, A.T.&T. expanded through acquisition of independent 
telephone companies. He justified it by insisting that the company was under the 
supervision and control of the government. However, in the end, the company was not 
free from anti-monopoly accusation. Right before World War I, A.T.&T. was subject to a 
suit, accusing it of violation of the Sherman Act. To resolve the suit, the company agreed 
to ―stop buying competing telephone companies and to connect them to its long distance 
lines.‖[170] 
2.3.3.2 Corporate Finance from World War I to 1930 
During World War I, A.T. & T. manufactured and furnished telephone facilities 
and equipment for the war emergency; it built many lines, underground cables, and toll 
switchboards in Washington, D. C., and established facilities and toll connections for 
military purpose. [171] In 1918, the Federal Government temporarily took over the 
telephone system. Under federalization, the government was responsible for maintaining 
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property, for making provision for depreciation and obsolescence, and for paying all 
annual charges on securities. [172]    
The size of war demand for new facilities and equipment was huge. In fact, fixed 
assets of the company increased by $221.9 million or by 37.5 per cent during the 
war.[ 173 ]  The expenditure for war emergency was mainly financed by debt, in 
particular, short-term notes. The increase in notes outstanding between 1917 and 1919 
was $72.8 million, while that of stock was $46.3 million and that of bonds was $44.4 
million. [174] Federal control of the company made it difficult to offer new stock, and 
high interest rate in the financial market dissuaded the company from issuing long-term 
bonds.   
After the war ended, the government returned the properties to the company in 
1919. In spite of the post-war depression, the company needed to make a large 
investment in facilities, in part because of the soaring demand for telephone service and 
in part because of the shortage and exhaustion of plants due to the restriction on the use 
of capital and material during federal control. [175]  The company also needed funds for 
acquisitions. Although before World War I the company promised not to buy any 
competing companies, following the anti-monopoly policy, the government allowed A.T. 
& T.’s expansion through acquisition after the war; public policy was changed ―from the 
preservation of competition to the achievement of efficiency‖, facing the post-war 
emergency. [176] In 1921, the ICC obtained power to exempt the company from antitrust 
laws for the acquisition purpose. As Peter Temin states, ―of the 234 independent 
companies purchased under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Bell System acquired 223.‖ [177]  
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To meet these financial needs, a large part of the capital was raised through stock 
issues; the company, as in pre-war years, pursued a ―safe proportion between capital and 
debt‖. [178] (Figure 5) From 1921 to 1929, the ratio of stock to gross assets accounts for 
between 52.5 per cent and 62.1 per cent, while that of bonds was between 20.7 per cent 
and 27.6 per cent. [179]  
 
                                                                                      Source: Annual Reports 
Figure 5: Long-Term Finance of the A.T. & T. 
 
To facilitate the subscription of the huge amount of stock, the A.T. &T. took 
various actions. First of all, it maintained the regular dividend policy. While setting the 
dividend rate at 9 per cent annually after 1920, high enough to attract investors, the 
company rejected any extra or special dividends. The policy of stable dividend rate was 
regarded as ―entirely consistent‖ with the safety of the investment. [180] The company 
also established in 1922 an organization called the Bell Telephone Securities Company.   
This new entity would ―disseminate information about the securities of the Bell system to 
the public, especially to Bell Telephone subscribers,‖  ―advise intending investors,‖ and 
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―facilitate their transactions in our stocks and securities.‖[ 181] More important, the 
company sought new investors by adopting customer ownership; it invited telephone 
users to the subscription of securities. According to Ralph E. Heilman, the company had 
―effective machinery to reach the public in the important cities served by its various 
affiliated companies.‖[182]  
The company adopted customer ownership not only to increase the number of 
shareholders but also to improve public relations. Wide distribution of securities to the 
public was ‖more than a plan to lay wider financial foundations of the Bell System….It 
will contribute to the promotion of national thrift, to the spread of a broader knowledge of 
investment, and to the development of machinery to assist investors. It will facilitate and 
strengthen the activities of all sound and helpful investment agencies. The nation is 
customer. Whatever promotes the prosperity of the nation promotes our prosperity.‖[183]  
After 1920, the number of shareholders rapidly increased, and despite huge issues 
of stock, the number of stock par shareholders was consistent in the 1920s. (Figure 6) 
This is a result of acquisition of many competing companies and of customer ownership. 
Although stock was the major financial source in A T. & T., bonds continued to 
play a role in financing. Similar to pre- World War I period, the company relied on 
foreign markets to distribute its securities through investment bankers. Even during the 
World War I when foreign investment in the United States decreased in general, the 
company could raise funds in Holland. In the 1920s, it continued to attract foreign 
investors from European countries. [184]    
 On the other hand, the A.T. & T. emphasized the importance of retained 
earnings. It repeatedly mentioned that ―the company has never paid out all of its earnings  
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                              Source: Berle and Means, p55 Table VII 
 
Figure 6: The Number of Shareholders in the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company. 
 
 
 
                                  Source: Annual Reports 
 
Figure 7: The Ratio of Retained Earnings to Gross Assets in the A.T. & T. 
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extending and improving its property.‖ [185] It even affirmed that the use of earnings 
-
100,000 
200,000 
300,000 
400,000 
500,000 
600,000 
1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
 64 
was ―a uniform practice throughout the entire history‖ [186]  In fact, the financial role of 
retained earnings increased only from 1927 to 1929.  The ratio of retained earnings to 
gross assets was between 14.7 and 16.9 per cent from 1914 to 1926, and more than 19 per 
cent from 1927 to 1929. [187] (Figure 7). The lateness in using internal funds was in part 
explained by the restriction on earnings. As a monopolistic public utility, earnings of the 
company were subject to criticism. To control earnings, rates were determined under the 
supervision of state commissions, so that the company could make only ―fair‖ return. 
Thus, A.T.& T. financed the growing need for funds mainly through equity 
finance except the years under President Fish. The stock of the company came to be 
widely held in the public along with the geographic expansion of the business. These 
financial features of the company were different from those of other public utility 
companies. The A.T.& T. was an exception; the uniqueness of telephone business and the 
distinctive financial policies to conform with public anti-monopoly sentiments diverged 
its financial practices from those of other utilities companies.  
2.4 Industrial Finance, 1880-1930 
2.4.1 Corporate Finance before World War I 
Following railroads and public utilities, large-scale industrial firms appeared in 
the 1890s. According to Alfred D. Chandler Jr., industrial corporations emerged only 
after railroads had drastically changed the American economy. From the 1840s to 1880s, 
railroads facilitated urbanization and enlarged markets, which led many manufacturing 
companies to adopt mass-production system. Along with the introduction of mass 
production, firms began to integrate vertically to coordinate purchasing, production, and 
distribution. [188] At the turn of the century, another movement toward the formation of 
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large-scale companies occurred. As Naomi Lamoreaux argues, large industrial firms 
faced serious price wars at that time. To prevent excessive competition, she argues, they 
expanded businesses through horizontal mergers.  The passage of the New Jersey general 
corporation law in 1889, which allowed the establishment of holding companies, also 
facilitated horizontal integration. [189] 
Although the emergence of big industrial businesses from the late nineteenth to 
the early twentieth century was a significant event in American business history, the size 
of these industrial firms was much smaller than that of major railroads and public 
utilities. Excluding one exceptionally huge business, the United States Steel Corporation, 
total assets of major American industrial firms before World War I was much smaller 
than those of major railroads and American Telephone & Telegraph. Also, after the 
formation of public utility holding companies in the 1920s, total assets of the large utility 
companies overwhelmed those of industrial firms. [190]  
The different size of firms from one sector to other was seen in the trend of capital 
intensity (capital/output). Figure 8 demonstrates clearly the high capital intensity of steam 
railroad and public utilities, especially electric light and power facilities, and how that 
declined over time. It also shows how low in relative terms was the capital intensity of 
manufacturing in general. Because of this high capital intensity of railroads and more 
important, electric light and power industry, there was a wide use of holding companies, 
for both management in general and management in finance in particular. In other words, 
railroads and public utilities required a huge cost to produce one unit of output. In order 
to increase output relative to capital, the firms attempted to improve managerial 
efficiency and reduce financial burden by adopting the holding company system. As the 
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use of holding companies spread, their capital intensity became low.  On the other hand, 
the manufacturing sector required the use of holding companies much less than railroads 
and public utilities due to its low capital intensity.  
 
 
Source: William Hausman, Peter Hertner, and Mira Wilkins [191]  
Figure 8: Capital/Output Ratio for U.S. Utilities, Transportation, and Manufacturing 
 
Another significant difference between the large–scale industrial firms on one 
hand and public utilities and railroads on the other hand lay in the nature of the 
businesses. Railroads and public utilities provided services, which were indispensable for 
the community.  To achieve better and cheaper services in the community, they were 
allowed to enjoy a monopoly within the community to the extent that they were under the 
supervision of the federal and state governments and made not more than ―fair‖ 
returns.[192]  The demand for public utility services was stable in general; railroads and 
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public utilities could predict earnings in the future. In contrast, industrial companies as 
purely private entities were not allowed to take monopolistic advantage and the demand 
for the commodity they produced was intensely fluctuated compared with that of the 
services provided by railroads and public utilities.   
The smaller scale of business, the exposure to intense competition, and the 
unstable demand all affected the finance of industrial firms; industrial firms heavily relied 
on equity finance. Relatively small demand for funds in industrial firms made it possible 
to raise enough funds from common stock issues. Also, common stock issues alleviated 
risk of insolvency due to competition and unstable income. Firms that issued stock did 
not incur the large fixed charges on funded debt and the payment of cumulative dividends 
on preferred stock. [193]  
Next to common stock, industrial firms issued preferred stock, which represented 
the value of plants. While preferred stock did not require interest payment like bonds, it 
had priority over common stock in the distribution of profits. The dividend rate of 
preferred stock in industrial firms was higher than that of railroads and public utilities 
because industrial firms sought to attract investors. As semi-speculative investment, 
preferred stock was more salable than common stock. [194]  
The use of bonds was the least common. Industrial firms were not willing to take 
financial responsibility associated with bond issue, given the fluctuation of earnings in 
industries. In fact, industrial bonds were regarded as inferior to those of railroads and 
public utilities. [ 195 ] Among bonds, in contrast with railroads and public utilities, 
industrial firms more often used debenture bonds. Dewing explains that ―a long cherished 
prejudice among bankers and shareholders against direct mortgages on a manufacturing 
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plant.‖ led to the aversion of mortgage bonds. [196] Also, collateral trust bonds were 
adopted in the middle of the great merger movement in the turn of the nineteenth 
century.[197]   
Industrial preferred stock and bonds were usually sold through investment 
bankers.  After the decline of railroad companies in the 1890s, investment bankers came 
to take an active role in industrial finance besides public utility finance. Especially, they 
raised funds to create gigantic industrial firms. For example, J.P. Morgan & Co. initiated 
the formation of General Electric Company and United States Steel Corporation. Through 
their financial power, investment banks not only distributed bonds and other securities of 
these companies, but also obtained director positions in order to control 
management.[198] 
On the other hand, short-term financing was not important for large corporations. 
Although the ratio of current assets to gross assets in industrial firms was much higher 
than that of railroads and public utilities, most of current assets were often financed by 
the sale of securities. The companies were reluctant to borrow short-term funds, which 
might cause insolvency should demand for manufactured goods decline. [199] 
2.4.2 Corporate Finance from World War to 1930  
The growth of the size of industrial firms accelerated during and after World War 
I. Although the impact of World War I was different from industry to industry, big 
corporations in major industries such as steel, chemicals, electric appliances and 
automobiles experienced rapid growth in investment due to large military orders from the 
U.S. and foreign governments. After the post-war recession in the early 1920s, large 
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corporations turned to mergers and acquisitions and increased investments in subsidiaries 
and affiliates. [200] 
This increasing demand for capital was met not only by stocks but by internal 
funds as well. Huge profits made during the war years enabled them to use accumulated 
earnings.  John Litner argues that they relied on internal funds for 79 per cent of the 
expansion of gross assets between 1921 and 1924, 91 per cent between 1924 and 1927, 
and 97 per cent between 1926 and 1929. [201] Similarly, Albert Ralph Koch shows the 
importance of internal funds in financing by using the statistical data of 84 large 
manufacturing companies (Table 7). In most years between 1921 and 1930, the amount 
of internal funds were larger the funds raised through the sales of securities. Considering 
retirement of securities, new funds obtained through securities were much smaller than 
internal funds. By using internal funds, the companies could avoid the payments of high 
dividends and interests and financier’s control over management.  
          (in Million Dollars) 
  Fixed Capital  Securities Sale New funds from 
securities 
Internal 
Funds 
1921               566   344(61)     142( 25)  
1922               431   222(52)   60(14)   488(113)  
1923               865   402(46)   297(34)   745( 86)  
1924               558   136(24)   35( 6)   772(138)  
1925               806   314(39)   42( 5)  1,053(131)  
1926            1,015   335(33)   188(19)  1,107(109)  
1927           1,034   447(43)   148(14)   912( 88)  
1928   1,001   265(26)   83( 8)  1,246(124)  
1929             1,717   1,239(72)   564(33)   1,459( 85)  
1930             1,291   340(26)   183(14)   717( 56)  
                                                                               Source: Koch, p103, Table 13 
       * Per cent of fixed capital is indicated in parenthesis.             
Table 7: Long-Term Financing of the Industrial Sector 
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Another feature of the post-war industrial corporate financial practices was the 
active role of investment bankers in the sale of stock. According to Dewing, bankers 
could obtain higher margin of profit on stock than on bonds at that time. These bankers 
were able to sell speculative stock, responding the increasing demand of investors in the 
booming 1920s for stock. Since new investors who sought large returns during the post-
war economic boom were not knowledgeable about industrial shares, they were easily 
persuaded to subscribe.  Even conservative investors put money into speculative stocks to 
obtain higher returns. In addition, the prosperity of manufacturing since the war 
accelerated the popularity of industrial stock. [202] 
In spite of the significant role of stock in industrial finance, however, the use of 
bonds was still vital. Koch finds that from 1922 to 1927, firms in his manufacturing 
sample sold more bonds than common stock. Although the new funds obtained through 
the sale of bonds decreased due to a huge amount of bonds retired, the companies were 
still optimistic in issuing bonds even under the condition that stock prices rose faster than 
bond prices at that time. [203] 
Thus, while equity finance was an important element of industrial finance, 
internal funds came to play a significant role and bond issues continued to be an 
important financial source. The importance of bonds and internal funds in industrial 
finance was seen in the case of the United States Steel Corporation, one of the biggest 
industrial companies.   
 71 
2.4.3 The United States Steel Corporation 
2.4.3.1 Corporate Finance before World War I 
The United States Steel Corporation was formed as a holding company under the 
plan made by financier, J.P. Morgan & Co. At the end of the nineteenth century, the steel 
industry experienced ruinous competition; the producers of primary steel attempted to 
enter the production of finished products, while producers of finished products tried to 
make inroads to primary production in order to secure raw materials. Such competition 
led to decreasing returns and in turn the stopping of dividends. In the end, it would result 
in ―a heavy fall in the value of steel stocks‖. The decline of the stock prices caused a 
significant loss to the owners of the steel plants as well as promoters and financiers who 
still held a large block of the stock. Financiers were also afraid of the loss of confidence 
from the public investors. To bring the stability in the industry and to prevent excessive 
competition, J. P Morgan & Co. planned to unite all conflicting steel interests into one 
corporation, which owned more than a majority of interest of the constituent companies 
to control them. [204]  
Thus, United States Steel was incorporated in New Jersey in 1901 by 
amalgamating the leading steel companies, including the Carnegie Steel Co., the Federal 
Steel Co., the American Steel & Wire Co., the National Tube Co., the National Steel Co., 
the American Tin Plate Co., the American Steel Hoop Co., and the American Sheet Steel 
Co., and other transportation and mining concerns. [205] Right after the organization, the 
company also took over the American Bridge Co. and John D. Rockefeller’s Lake 
Superior Consolidated Mines. To organize the corporation, it was authorized to issue 
$550 million of common stock, $550 million of 7 per cent cumulative preferred stock, 
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and $304 million of 5 per cent Mortgage Collateral Trust Bonds. In order to achieve 
consolidation, it issued $1,297,184,170 of stocks and bonds in exchange for 
$894,988,800 of stocks and bonds of the constituent companies. This meant that during 
the formation of the company, stock watering amounting to one-thirds of capital was 
created. [206] 
From the beginning, the United States Steel Corporation was gigantic in its 
capital, scale, and output. In the early twentieth century, the capitalization of more than 
$1 billion was unprecedented among industrial firms. United States Steel controlled more 
than two hundred manufacturing plants and transportation companies, and owned a 
number of mine, ore, and coke properties. [207] Controlling raw materials, production, 
and distribution, the company’s output of Bessemer steel ore was about 90 per cent of the 
output in the country and that of the estimated amount of iron ore deposit was about 70 
per cent. [208]    
With its concentrated capital, its dominance over the markets of primary as well 
as finished products, and control over major steel companies, the company could not 
avoid the accusation of monopoly. The government repeatedly alleged that the 
corporation should be dissolved due to its restraint of trade and the exercise of monopoly 
power. Unlike public utilities, the big business as a private entity was not allowed to 
retain monopolistic power. Against this challenge, Elbert H. Gary, the chairman of the 
company, stated that the corporation had never had monopoly or the intention of forming 
monopoly. He emphasized that ―the existence of Corporation has been of benefit and not 
of injury to its employees, its customers, its competitors, and the general public.‖ [209] 
As a consequence, the government suits were dismissed. In 1915, the Federal Court at 
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Trenton, New Jersey, applied the ―rule of reason‖; ―The Corporation was organized for 
business reasons and had purchased its various plants to promote such business and not to 
restrain trade or obtain a monopoly.‖ [210]  Five year later, again, the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed that the corporation did not achieve monopoly, opposing dissolution. The 
decision also stated that the dissolution infringed public interest; it would cause ―a 
material disturbance‖ and ―serious detriment to the foreign trade‖. [211]  The ambiguity 
of the Sherman Act and the importance of steel industry in the national economy enabled 
the corporation to continue its business.    
 
                                       Source: Annual Reports, the U.S. Steel 
Figure 9: Gross Assets and Fixed Assets of the United States Steel. 
 
After the formation of the corporation, its financial structure was consistent. The 
amount of gross assets from 1901 to 1914 was between $1,546 million and $1,801 
million; its growth was slow. Of gross assets, fixed assets, especially the property 
account, was a major component. Through vertical as well as horizontal consolidation, 
the corporation held not only manufacturing properties but also properties for raw 
materials such as ore, coal, and cork, and even transportation properties. (Figure 9) As a 
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result, the ratio of fixed to gross assets was high for an industrial firm; it marked more 
than 80 per cent. 
Gross assets were paid for mainly by stocks. Before World War I, stocks financed 
almost a half of gross assets. However, it is noteworthy that stock had not been issued 
since the formation of the company. As Edward Sherwood Meade explains, most of 
industrial combinations did not issue new securities after the promotion period. Instead of 
new stock issues, they needed to ―absorb the excess of capitalization by reinvesting of 
earnings.‖[212] 
The company used both common and preferred stock. Since both had equal voting 
power, the difference between the two was the dividend rate. Although the company was 
not obliged to pay common stock dividends, it paid a regular dividend nonetheless, 
usually 5 per cent annually. Meanwhile, the dividend rate of its preferred stock was 7 per 
cent cumulative. The company at first issued both common and preferred stocks in the 
same amount, but in 1903, it converted 7 per cent preferred stock in amount of 
$150,000,000 into 5 per cent bonds probably to reduce costs for capital. (Figure 9)     
 The huge amount of stock was widely held in the public. The number of the 
common shareholders gradually increased from 1901 to 1914, while the amount of stock 
outstanding did not change. Also, the stockholding of the largest shareholders was 
minimal. For example, in 1910, J.P Morgan & Co. owned $18,000,000 of common stock, 
equivalent to 3 per cent to the stock outstanding at that time. Even adding J.P Morgan’s 
individual holding only raised the total to 6.6 per cent. The other shareholder, the Dutch 
Syndicate held $21,687,000 of common stock, or 4.1 per cent of stock outstanding. As 
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for the president of the company, W. E. Corley, the amount of stock he owned was 
$113,200,000, only 0.002 per cent. [213]  
 Stock of the company was also widely distributed in foreign countries. The 
Rothschilds in London invested in common stock before World War I. In France, in 1909 
common stock of the company was not allowed to be listed on the Paris Burse, but the 
French could buy it ―from bankers and brokers in France or on other stock 
exchange.[214]        
 
 
        Source: Annual Reports, the U.S. Steel 
 
Figure 10: Stocks and Bonds Outstanding of the United States Steel. 
 
Unlike most of industrial firms, the corporation used bonds more than preferred 
stock. (Figure 10). In 1903, the corporation authorized $250,000,000 5 per cent 10 to 60 
year collateral trust bonds.  $200,000,000 out of $250,000,000 bonds were issued, of 
which $150,000,000 was used for the conversion into the same amount of preferred stock 
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at that time as explained above. This was an interesting financial scheme, compared with 
railroad finance.[215]  While many railroad companies under reconstruction attempted to 
reduce fixed charges by converting bonds into preferred stock, the corporation tried to 
avoid the payment of high preferred dividend by increasing fixed charges of bonds. U.S. 
Steel's good financial standing, high dividend on preferred stock, and the policy to pay 
off regular dividends to attract investors, all made it advantageous for the corporation to 
use more bonds than preferred stock.  
The company also used internal funds. The ratio of internal funds to gross assets 
increased from 10.5 per cent in 1905 to 20 per cent in 1914.[216] The ratio was smaller 
than that of stocks and bonds because of large capitalization during the formation of the 
corporation. However, internal funds were still an important financial source for the 
corporation. In fact, the amounts of ―allowance for depreciation, replacement, additional 
property, and new plants and the discharge of capital obligations‖ were larger than those 
of dividends, and the corporation still had undivided surplus. [217]  As the Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle noted, the corporation and its subsidiaries spent $463,817,201 
on capital account from 1901 to 1909, which included additional plant, construction, 
improvements, and retirement of bonds, mortgages, and other obligations. Against these 
outlays, ―the amount of new bonds and other obligations issued was only $59,482,593.‖ 
The rest of the $344,334,608 was paid out of appropriated earnings and the surplus. [218] 
United States Steel was one of the first industrial firms that investment bankers 
were deeply involved in its formation and finance. As explained above, J. P. Morgan & 
Co. took an initiative to establish the corporation through the consolidation of major steel 
companies. To carry out the consolidation plan, it organized a large syndicate to 
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underwrite the securities of the corporation in amount of $200 million. It was allotted not 
only to domestic investors but also those in Britain, Netherland, Germany and France. As 
a major financial agency, interest of J.P. Morgan & Co. was represented on the Board of 
Directors by three persons, J. Pierpont Morgan, Robert Bacon, and Charles Steele. 
Through directorship, they were able to supervise and control the management and 
finance of the corporation in order to maintain the confidence in the company and in 
themselves from the public. [219]  
J.P Morgan & Co. continued to provide financial support to the company after its 
formation. When the company issued $200 million Collateral Trust Bonds to change 
preferred stock for the new bonds, it again organized a syndicate to underwrite $100 
million of the securities. It was difficult to achieve conversion at that time; due to stock 
watering, stock price of the company was declining. Under the difficult situation, J.P. 
Morgan underwrote the operation of $80 million in preferred conversion and the sale of 
$20 million bonds. [ 220] Although there were many challenges against investment 
bankers in the early twentieth century, the company maintained strong ties with 
investment bankers to meet its gigantic financial needs.      
2.4.3.2 Corporate Finance from World War I to 1930 
The outbreak of the War in Europe in 1914 had a favorable impact on the 
corporation. The huge demand from foreign countries resulted in an increase in the 
volume of business and rise in prices of its products. [221] After the United States 
entered the war in 1917, the business prospered further with the increase in order from 
the federal government. From 1914 to 1918, the growth of gross assets of the company 
was much faster than pre-war years. (Figure 11)  It increased from 1,792 million in 1914 
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to $2,572 million in 1918, or by $780 million, of which the increase in property 
accounted for $106 million and, current assets including cash and inventories for $614 
million.[222]    
 
 
                                       Source: Annual Reports, The U.S. Steel 
 
Figure 11: The Increase in Gross Assets of the U.S. Steel. 
 
To meet the increasing financial demand, no long-term securities were issued; the 
corporation rather preferred to use notes issued by subsidiaries, which it guaranteed. The 
account of subsidiaries’ notes appeared in the annual report of 1914 for the first time in 
amount of $26,970,001, increasing to $33,912,076 in 1918. Considering high interest and 
dividend rates at that time, short-term finance was the best choice to economize financial 
costs.     
 More important, the corporation came to rely on internal funds more heavily than 
before. The ratio of internal funds to gross assets almost doubled, from 20.6 per cent in 
1914 to nearly 40 per cent in 1919. The accumulation of surplus during the war facilitated 
this financial trend. The sum of depreciation, reserves, and surplus increased from 
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$407,660,749 in 1914 to $1,082, 626,708 in 1919. As Figure 12 shows, the growth of the 
internal funds during the war was much faster than that of pre-war years.  
 
 
                                          Source: Annual Reports, the U.S. Steel 
Figure 12: The Ratio of Internal Funds to Gross Assets in the U.S. Steel. 
 
The war also changed the structure of stock ownership. Before the war, foreign 
investors subscribed to the stock of the company. However, because of the war 
emergency, many of them disposed of their stocks. 1,285,636 shares of common stock 
and 312,311 shares of preferred stock were held abroad in March of 1914, but the number 
of shares decreased to 491,580 shares and 148,125 shares respectively in December of 
1919.[223]  After the war began in Europe, the number of shareholders had decreased 
temporarily in part because of this return of the stocks to United States from Europe. 
However, it again rapidly increased after 1916. (Figure 13)  The number of shares per 
shareholders continued to decrease until 1921. Probably, those stocks returned to the 
United States were widely distributed to the public due to high dividends at that time. The 
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company, making huge profits, paid off extra dividends in addition to 5 per cent of 
regular dividends after 1916. [224]   
 
 
 
                    Source: Berle and Means, p55, Table VII 
 
Figure 13: The Number of Shareholders 
 
In the 1920s, gross assets of the company had not significantly changed. (Figure 
11)  Also, the increase in the investment in properties was moderate; from $1,607 million 
in 1920 to $1,710 million at its peak in 1927. In fact, however, the corporation spent 
much larger amounts of money to replace old plants and to establish modern equipment. 
Those expenditures were charged off from internal funds. The amount of internal funds 
was larger than stock outstanding. The ratio of internal funds to gross assets also shows 
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the upward trend in general, while repeating upward and downward movements. The 
ratio increased from 27.7 per cent in 1918 to 50.7 per cent in 1925. After the decline in a 
few years, it shows 38.6 per cent in 1930.[225] (Figure 12)  The corporation’s heavy 
reliance on internal funds is demonstrated in the testimony of Edward R. Stettinius Jr., 
the Chairman of the Board of the United States Steel Corporation during Hearings before 
the Temporary National Economic Commission in 1937. When Leon Henderson on the 
committee of the TNEC, asked whether the company had had ―any substantial outside 
financing,‖ Stettinius answered "no.‖  To Henderson’s next question, ―So your capacity 
was maintained principally from internal financing?‖ he affirmed that that was 
correct.[226] 
The role of common stock was important only in the late 1920s. In 1927, the 
corporation issued common and preferred stock in amount of $203,321,000 as dividends 
to its shareholders. This was the first issue after the promotion of the company. The 
purpose of the issue was additions and improvements of properties. In 1929, it also issued 
common stock of $101,660,500 for the same purpose. This issue was allocated to existing 
shareholders at $140 per share.  99.3 per cent of the stock was subscribed, and the rest 
was sold in the market. Furthermore, in the next year, it issued the stock of $53,643,800 
to acquire three companies such as the Atlas Portland Cement Co., The Columbia Steel 
Co., and Oil Well Supply Company. As a result of the increase in common stock 
outstanding, the ratio of common and preferred stock to gross assets jumped up from 35 
per cent in 1926 to 44 per cent in 1927 and to 51 per cent in 1930. [227] 
Although common and preferred share was still held abroad in the 1920s, foreign 
shareholding was no longer significant. In 1927, it accounted for 2.7 per cent only to total 
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shares. Wilkins attributes the decline in foreign capital to ―the maturity of the American 
steel industry.‖ Foreign investors preferred ―more vibrant sectors within the 
economy.‖[228]      
On the other hand, bonds were not issued at that time. Unlike railroad and utility 
companies, the company was reluctant to pay high interest rates and even did not believe 
the market could provide sufficient capital to meet its financial demand. Then, Chairman 
of the Board, Gary stated in 1920 that ―Do you think our corporation would be in a good 
position as it is if we had to borrow money at the present time, like some of other large 
business institutions who are paying 7 or 8 per cent for their money? If we borrowed in 
the same proportion to other borrowers that is our business is to their lines of business, I 
think, Gentlemen, we would bring on a financial panic within a very short time.‖ [229] 
Thus, the United States Steel Corporation heavily relied on equity finance during 
the promotion period. However, its expansion after promotion was mostly financed by 
other financial sources, bonds and later, internal funds. This was a result of 
overcapitalization of the company at the time of its formation. The company was not able 
to issue stocks due to stock watering; it had to absorb the water by using internal funds. 
In its early years, since the high dividend rates hampered its ability to accumulate internal 
funds, it had to mainly rely on bond issues. As profits of the business increased after 
World War I, it was able to accrue depreciation, reserves, and undivided surplus even 
after the payment of huge amounts of dividends.  
2.5 Conclusion  
The notion that large American firms came to rely heavily on equity financing in 
the early twentieth century is not borne out by a careful study of different sectors of the 
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economy.  Corporate financial practices differed from industry to industry and from firm 
to firm. They also changed across time. In fact, the railroad industry relied on stocks in its 
very beginning only. From the 1880s to World War I, its major financial source was 
bonds. A significant amount of these bonds were marketed in foreign countries. In the 
1920s, as the financial conditions were not favorable to sell securities and its surplus 
increased, it turned to the use of internal funds. Meanwhile, since the public utility sector 
served a wider section of the public than railroads, it was likely to sell more stocks to the 
public. However, its major financial source was bonds. In its early years, stocks of public 
utilities were not marketable because investors regarded them as risky. Even when public 
utilities prospered in the 1920s, bonds were indispensable in order to meet their huge 
financial needs. These bonds were mostly domestic bonds; compared with railroads, the 
foreign capital was less important in general. In contrast, the industrial sector, which 
required relatively small amounts of capital, faced intensive competition, and bore high 
risk, relied on equity before World War I. After the war, however, large industrial 
corporations that accumulated surplus turned to the use of internal funds. Since industrial 
securities were regarded as risky, foreign investors were usually reluctant to invest in 
them.   
 At the level of the firm, corporate financial practices were even more complex. 
The three big business examined in this chapter do not necessarily fit the financial 
practices in each sector. Before World War I, the Pennsylvania Railroad relied on 
common stock, disliking the increase in fixed charges through bonded debts. A. T. & T. 
also used stock as a major financial source, except the years of President Fish. To 
maintain equity finance, it paid regularly high dividends, facilitated customer ownership, 
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and distributed the information about its business and stock. The company also raised 
funds from foreign countries; the growing business could attract foreign investors.  
Although the United States Steel Corporation relied on huge stock issues at its promotion 
and the end of 1920s, it used bonds and internal funds only for its expansion in other 
years. The company also used a huge amount of foreign capital before World War I. The 
foreign investors were confident in the huge industrial business. However, after World 
War I, due to the maturity of the industry, foreign stock drastically declined.     
In their classic text, Berle and Means argued that wide distribution of stock 
weakened the power of small shareholders and allowed managers to obtain control. To 
prove this trend, they used the cases of the three big businesses, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, the A.T. &T., and the United States Steel. However, they were the biggest 
companies in the industries; they were exceptions in the size of financial demand, and in 
confidence of the financial institutions and the public. Hence, their financial practices 
were also exceptional to general patterns in their industrial sectors. Berle and Means 
interpretation of corporate financial practices has overemphasized a few exceptional 
cases.  
  Scholarship has often characterized American corporate finance as equity 
finance, attributing it to American market-oriented culture. However, corporate financial 
practices were not static. Such factors as the size of the business, the power over the 
market, and the nature and risk of business, diversified corporate financial practices, and 
government antitrust policy influenced corporate financial decisions. These 
environmental factors were not stationary either. Along with economic, financial, and 
managerial improvements, some companies grew bigger in size, obtained concentrative 
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power over the markets, and reduced their risks. These changes directly affected 
corporate financial practices. Also, other external incidents, including the change of 
economic policy, business cycles, and the impact of wars transformed corporate finance 
across time. Although securities markets had developed since the early nineteenth century 
in the United States, American corporate finance did not always relied on the markets.  
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Chapter 3   
VARIETIES OF CORPORATE FINANCE IN JAPANESE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Many economic historians have argued that national patterns of Japanese 
corporate financial practices were associated with corporate group called keiretsu, which 
appeared after World War II. A main bank included in each keiretsu played a role as a 
major financier for group companies. Before the war, there was another corporate group 
called zaibatsu as a predecessor of keiretsu. Zaibatsu emerged around the 1880 ―as a 
family-owned, diversified group of businesses‖ under the government support. [230] 
According to the notion of path dependency, group-oriented culture seen in corporate 
groups would create nation-specific institutions. Both keiretsu and zaibatsu shared their 
fundamental features as groups: close ties and mutual support within a group persist and 
create bank-centered financial institutions and financial practices. Japanese firm’s 
reliance on bank loans has been thought to fit the Gerschenkron model; Japan, often 
regarded as a latecomer of industrialization, would need bankers’ support for its 
economic growth. In fact, however, corporate financial practices of major industries in 
Japan, railroads, electric utilities and cotton spinning, were far from bank loans.   
This chapter shows how corporate finance in the early industrialization of Japan 
was different from that of post-war Japan and the Gerschenkron model, and how 
corporate financial practices differed from industry to industry. Although Japanese 
government had attempted to establish modern banking system since the late nineteenth 
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century, the major industries heavily relied on the securities markets with indirect support 
from banks. On the other hand, their financial practices were not the same. Different 
industries developed different financial practices from each other.  
3.2 The Development of Financial Institutions  
Modern financial institutions in Japan developed with strong governmental 
support in the Meiji Period. Although there were a few financial institutions that dealt 
with loans, deposits, and notes under the previous Tokugawa Shogunate regime, all 
collapsed along with the fall of the Shogunate in 1867 and the subsequent Meiji 
Restoration. [ 231 ] In the midst of economic and financial bewilderment after the 
Restoration, the Meiji government became deeply involved in building up modern 
financial institutions in order to catch up with western economies.    
  In 1872, the government promulgated the National Banking Act, modeled after 
comparable legislation passed in the United States during the Civil War. The American 
national banking system was established, aiming to ―reform heterogeneous state bank 
currencies into a more uniform national currency.‖[232] National banks were required to 
buy U.S. government bonds in dollar amount of one-third of their paid-in capital stock. 
The banks deposited these bonds with the U.S. Treasurer and received notes. [233] With 
this method, the banks obtained the privilege of bank note issue. In similar way, Japanese 
national banks were now granted the privilege of bank note issues. They were required to 
buy government bonds called kinsatu kosai shosho, in equivalent amounts of 60 per cent 
of their capital. The banks deposited these bonds to the government and received bank 
notes. [234]  
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The Japanese national banks were expected to redeem with specie the 
inconvertible notes issued by the government. However, the increase in the number of the 
banks stagnated due to the lack of hard currency for bond redemption. In 1876, the 
government amended the Act to facilitate the establishment of additional banks. The 
revised Act abolished the requirement of note conversion and allowed the use of national 
bonds, called ―kinroku kosai‖ issued to the nobility and old warrior class for banks' 
capital requirements. [235] As a result of the revision of the Act, the number of national 
banks jumped up from 4 in 1876 to 153 by 1879. In 1883, however, the government 
prohibited establishment of any new banks, since the amount of bank notes in circulation 
exceeded the upper limit set by the government. [236] 
In the meantime, private banking businesses appeared as early as in the 1870s. 
Without any regulation, most of the banking businesses were small in size, with little 
capital and limits on the amount of credit they could create. After 1876, with the revision 
of the National Banking Act, the government for the first time regulated the private 
commercial banks called, ―ordinary banks.‖ They were required to receive authorization 
from the government to begin banking activity. The number of ordinary banks rapidly 
increased after the government prohibited the formation of national banks in 1883. [237] 
The Banking Act of 1890 allowed the expansion of the financial activity of ordinary 
banks. Putting them under strict supervision of the government, the 1890 Act increased 
the public's faith in the banks, leading to more deposits and greatly increased credit 
creation by the banks. [238] 
Although the Banking Act of 1890 defined ordinary banks as merely commercial 
banks dealing with short-term deposit and loans, they came to play a role in industrial 
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finance as securities banks. [239] The major role of the banks before World War I was 
financing growing industries in the form of stock collateral loans; they made loans to 
investors, receiving stock as collateral. After World War I, they participated in 
underwriting bonds and played a role as trustees by having charge of collaterals for the 
securities.    
In order to connect these banks and to facilitate financial activity, the Meiji 
Government established a central bank, the Bank of Japan, in 1882, modeling it after the 
National Bank of Belgium (Banque Nationale de Belgique). [240] Half of its capital was 
provided by the government. The Bank not only enlarged the financial capacity of the 
banks but also adjusted interest rates by controlling bank notes in circulation, dealt with 
the National Treasury, and discounted bills. In order to let the central bank conduct these 
activities, the government granted it a monopoly on note issue, taking this privilege away 
from the national banks.   Without the right to issue notes, national banks were no longer 
different from private banks. The revision of the National Banking Act of 1883 ordered 
national banks to close their businesses or to transform themselves into private ordinary 
banks in twenty years. [241] 
The Belgian model rather than the decentralized American national banking 
system seemed to fit the government-led economy, often seen in less developed countries 
including Japan. The Meiji government, which was seeking the national economic 
growth to catch up the western countries, was eager to intervene in the economic activity 
with a centralized financial power.  In fact, Masayoshi Matsukata, who assumed office as 
the Minister of Finance in 1881, initiated the establishment of the Bank of Japan in order 
 90 
to settle continuous inflation since the late 1870s. [242] The centralized banking system 
was considered to be suitable for controlling money supply in the national economy.     
  In addition to the Bank of Japan, the Meiji government helped establish 
specialized financial institutions that would support the industrial development policy. In 
1879, before the formation of the Bank of Japan, the Yokohama Specie Bank was formed 
to finance foreign trade by dealing with foreign bills of exchange and documentary bills.  
While the establishment of the Specie Bank was based on the National Banking Act, 
which was amended in 1876, the Bank was under the governmental protection. The 
government financed a third of the capital of the Specie Bank when it was established. 
Then, it provided the Bank with exchange deposits without interest or with low interest 
rates. The Specie Bank at once set up branches in London and New York, and then 
elsewhere as well. [243] Although after 1889, all government deposits were transferred to 
the Bank of Japan, the Specie Bank was allowed to make a special contract in which the 
Specie Bank could borrow funds in the form of discounts on foreign bills of exchange 
with interest of only 2 per cent annually. [244] One of the significant contributions of the 
Specie Bank was that it facilitated the introduction of foreign capital to Japanese 
companies.  After the Sino-Japanese War, the bank handled the indemnity received from 
China at its London Branch and used it as exchange funds, which improved international 
credit toward Japan and in turn led to the adoption of the Gold Standard in 1897. [245]  
The Hypothec Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan were established in 1896 
and 1900 respectively in order to provide long-term, low-interest funds to manufacturing 
industry.  The business of the Hypothec Bank was to make real estate mortgage loans to 
industries. The Industrial Bank was formed to finance industry through collateral loans. 
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Apart from collateral loans, the Industrial Bank also played a significant role in importing 
foreign funds; after the Russo-Japanese War, the bank offered bonds of railroad 
companies, public bonds, and its own stock in Great Britain and the United States. [246] 
Along with the development of the banking system, the securities market was also 
established.  Under the Stock Exchange Ordinance of 1878, the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges were founded in that year. At first the exchanges mostly dealt with Japanese 
government bonds because there were not so many corporations at that time. However, in 
1886 the dealing on corporate securities exceeded those of government bonds, when 
many modern corporations especially railroad and textile companies appeared. [247] 
Unlike in the United States in the pre-World War I years, the Stock Exchanges in Japan 
dealt with stock more than corporate bonds. In fact, while the stocks of many companies, 
specifically railroad companies, were listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange during the 
1880 and 1914, only two companies listed their bonds: the Hypothec Bank of Japan and 
the Boso Railroad. [248] Takeo Hoshi attributes the slowness of the development of the 
Japanese bond market to the adoption of registered bonds; since registered bonds 
complicated transfers, they were not attractive to investors.[249] Also, the high risk of 
newly emerging businesses, Hoshi states, hampered the development of the bond market.   
Before 1920s, foreign capital also contributed to the industrialization in Japan. 
Although the Meiji Government feared of the semi-colonization of the country when its 
industries were still immature, foreign capital was gradually introduced in Japan as its 
demand for foreign capital grew after the victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. At 
that time, ―rising imports of capital equipment and overseas technologies‖ could not be 
financed with domestic funds alone. On 17 July 1899, as the first step to capital 
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liberalization, the Meiji government guaranteed U.S. citizens exclusive right to trade and 
to own properties for commercial purposes by the new bilateral accord with the United 
States. [ 250 ] After the victory in Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the expansion of 
industries, monopoly of Korean markets, and penetration of the open markets in China all 
further raised the international position of Japanese firms. As a result, some companies 
could successfully utilize British and U.S. funds. For example, Nippon Electric 
Company, Ltd. was established with Western Electric’s holding (U.S) of 54 per cent of 
shares in 1899. In 1905 and 1910, General Electric (U.S) entered the joint ventures, 
obtained Tokyo Electric and Shibaura Engineering respectively. In 1907, The Nihon 
Steel obtained 50 per cent of its capital from Armstrong and Vickers (U.K) and the 
Teikoku Filature 60 per cent of capital from J. P. Coats (U.K). [251] Although many 
other companies were unable to attract foreign capital into their venture (as direct 
investments) due to their low profitability and low international credit, the government 
supported some companies by a special law that guaranteed the foreign bonds they 
issued. [252] 
Under the nascent banking system and securities market, Japanese modern 
business emerged. Although the Japanese financial system was different from the 
American one, the growth of railroad industry was deeply associated with the 
development of Japanese financial institutions, as in the American case. 
3.3 Railroad Finance  
Although the government began railroad construction at first, private railroad 
companies appeared after 1880.  The government took it seriously that railroads were 
indispensable for industrial development, but it was not able to finance the construction 
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of the nation-wide railroad system by itself.  In 1872, considering the financial burden of 
the construction of state-owned railroads, Tomomi Iwakura, a politician of the early Meiji 
Period, asserted that the only way to construct railroads all over Japan lay in the reliance 
on private enterprises; they would finance the business by inviting the public to subscribe 
railroad stocks and pay them dividend. [253]  
The capital required for the railroad industry was huge. According to Masaho 
Noda, the average capital of the major railroad companies was 30 to 75 times as much as 
that of the other corporations.[254] Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer also show that 
in the 1890s average paid-in capital of railroad companies overwhelmed that of the other 
large industries—electric utilities and cotton spinning. [255] (Table 8)  
 
          (in 1000’s of Yen) 
  1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 
Railroads       
3,253  
      
3,711  
      
3,034  
      
3,383  
      
3,665  
Electric 
Utilities 
        
168  
        
152  
        
120  
        
145  
        
141  
Cotton 
Spinning 
        
143  
-          
271  
        
379  
        
456  
Source: Miwa and Ramseyer, ―Banks and Economic Growth‖, p143 
 
 
Table 8: Paid-in Capital per Firm in Three Major Industries  
 
Most of the capital required was long-term funds since it was mostly used to 
construct facilities in broad areas. As Iwakura stated, this huge capital requirement was 
mainly financed by common stock. From 1884 to 1898, the ratio of common stock to 
gross assets of the railroad industry was more than 88 per cent. [256]  
Despite the importance of common stock, it was not easy to find subscribers to 
railroad stock in the early years. The public was suspicious of the profitability of the 
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business because the railroad industry was quite new and it was the biggest business 
unprecedented by the public.[257]  For that reason, politicians and old feudal lords along 
the railroad lines often forced local capitalists to subscribe to railroad stock.[258] Also, 
the government lent support by guarantying dividends, providing subsidies, renting out 
land gratis, granting tax exemptions, and providing technical support. [259] 
The difficulty in distributing stock to the public was not limited to the promotion 
period for the companies; the high face value of railroad stock hampered new purchases 
when more capital was needed later. Before 1890, the face value of railroad stock was 
mostly ¥100.   This was too high for the public to afford.  Since 150kg of rice cost ¥7 in 
1880, ¥100 was equivalent to the value of 2,142.86kg of rice, or to 21 years of rice 
consumption per person at that time. [260] In 1890, according to the Commercial Law, 
the minimum par value was reduced to ¥50 when the capital was equal or more than 
¥100,000, and ¥20 otherwise, but even after the reduction of minimum par value, the high 
stock price was an obstacle for stock subscription. Therefore, when the companies issued 
new stock, it was usually allocated to existing shareholders, who were reliable investors 
with ample funds. In order to attract them, the companies had to provide them with 
premium through par value issue. [261]  
Under such high face value, the installment plan for the payment of stock prices 
called bunkatsu haraikomi seido, was adopted. When a company sold stock, subscribers 
paid a portion of share price at that time. The rest was paid in installments, whenever the 
company asked later on. This method was advantageous both to the company and to the 
subscribers. While it reduced the financial burden of shareholders, it also diminished the 
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dividend payment of the companies by collecting the payment along with the progress of 
construction. [262] 
Another method to facilitate the subscription of stock was the adoption of stock 
collateral loan [kabushiki tan’po kin’yu]. That is, in order to pay off the installments, 
shareholders could borrow money from commercial banks by depositing their stock as 
collateral. In turn, the collateral stock received by the commercial banks was discounted 
by the central bank, the Bank of Japan. [263] 
Along with the installments plan and stock collateral loans, a railroad stock boom 
in the late 1880s played a role in distributing railroad stock widely to the public. The 
prospects of the profitability of the railroad business and the reduction of interest rate as a 
result of the establishment of modern financial institutions at that time turned many 
middle-class people to stock speculation. [264] In fact, railroad stock was a major dealing 
in the Tokyo Stock Exchange; half the amount of stock trade in the Exchange was 
railroad stock in the late nineteenth century.[265]  
Preferred stock was also used in Japanese railroad companies, but similar to 
American counterparts, they tended to use it mainly during financial reconstruction. This 
is because the Commercial Law prohibited the use of preferred stock for promotion of the 
companies. Although preferred stock was sometimes used to refund debt or to redeem 
bonds with high interest rate, it was mostly used to meet long-term as well as short-term 
financial needs after the reduction of capital.  In particular, medium- and small- sized 
railroad companies that were more likely to face financial problems relied on it. Due to 
the difficulties in inviting subscriptions, most of the preferred stock was allocated to 
existing shareholders. In addition, in order to attract investors who bore the reduced 
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dividends and capital under reconstruction, they needed to provide them with preferred 
right to dividends and to the distribution of remaining properties when the company was 
in insolvency. [266]     
Although the main source of funds in the railroad industry was common stock, the 
companies also came to rely on bond issues. The use of bonds increased rapidly after the 
depression of 1890 when the decline of stock prices discouraged people to invest in 
stock.[267] Unlike stock, however, bonds were not distributed widely to the public. 
Although banks sometimes invited the public to subscribe to bonds, only a small number 
of institutional and individual investors held most of them. Since there were no collateral 
loans before the Railway Collateral Law and the Collateral Bond Trust Law, which were 
promulgated in 1905, many investors were not willing to buy unsecured bonds. Thus, the 
lack of the investors often led to the allocation of bonds to major shareholders. [268]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
In spite of the huge demand for capital, railroad companies were not eager to rely 
on foreign capital. One of the reasons was the policy of the exclusion of foreign capital in 
the early Meiji Period. In 1869, American, A. L. C. Portman, who had been granted a 
license to build a railroad between Tokyo and Yokohama in the end of the Tokugawa 
Period, was deprived of it by the Meiji government. Since then, no foreign capital had 
been introduced to the railroad industry before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. [269] 
After the victory in the war, railroad companies took an increasing interest in the 
introduction of foreign capital along with the industrial development and the rise of the 
international standing of the nation. After the issuance of the Railway Collateral Law and 
Collateral Bond Trust Law of 1905, two railroad companies issued foreign collateral 
bonds [270] In 1906, the Hokkaido Colliery and Railway Co., Ltd issued £1,000,000 
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15years 5 per cent collateral bonds, and the Kansei Railway issued £1,000,000 4.5 per 
cent 20 years collateral bonds.[271] These are the first and the last foreign bond issues in 
private railroad companies; major railroad companies were nationalized in 1905.  [272] 
In contrast to the importance of stock in railroad finance, the role of banks was 
indirect. Banks made stock collateral loan to investors, not direct loans to railroad 
companies. As Noda explains, a fourth to a third of loans made by ordinary banks were 
stock collateral loans. To finance these loans, the banks, in turn, received collateral trust 
loans made by the Bank of Japan. Another role of the banks was the bond-underwriting 
business, which appeared after the 1890s. [273] For example, the Kyushu Railway, one 
of the biggest railway companies, issued ¥1,500,000 bonds in 1893. A syndicate of 
twenty banks underwrote this issue. [274] Although some banks owned stock of railroad 
companies, banks’ ownership did not usually mean bankers’ control over the railroad 
management. The railroad companies’ financial demands were so huge that the 
ownership was not concentrated on a bank. Unlike main banks in post-World War II 
Japan, banks at that time were not able to control railroad companies through ownership 
and did not make any industrial loans. Rather, the banks indirectly contributed to 
corporate finance in the industry as supporters of the securities market.  
Thus, railroad finance in Japan was based on equity finance not bank loans. Since 
stock was widely held in the public, no shareholders had control power. On the other 
hand, since the role of the bank was indirect, bankers’ influence on management was 
limited, too.  As Chapter 1 explained, American railroad finance heavily relied on bond 
issues, and railroad stock was not widely distributed in the public. This does not fit the 
American model of corporate finance. Rather, Japanese railroad finance characterized by 
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the reliance on equity finance and widely distributed stock, seemed much closer to the 
American model than the Japanese one.     
3.3.1 Corporate Finance in the Nihon Railway  
The Nihon Railway was the first private railroad in Japan. It was established in 
1881 with the capitalization of ¥20 million to connect Tokyo through Takasaki to Aomori, 
the northern end of the main land of Japan. Considering that the capital of average 
corporation in Japan was about ¥100,000, the size of the company was remarkable. The 
major promoters of the company included descendants of samurai (the warrior class) 
such as Kentoku Hayashi and Tadanobu Otaguro, government officials such as Yasukazu 
Yasuba, and the nobility led by Tomomi Iwakura. These promoters were, however, not 
able to meet a huge financial demand of the company. They subscribed about 30 per cent 
of stock only. Besides, by adapting the installment plan, what they paid at first was just a 
fifth of their total payment. [275] 
Facing the financial difficulty, the Nihon Railway relied on the government in its 
early years. To facilitate the sales of the stock, the government guaranteed 8 per cent of 
dividend for the company’s stock until the construction of each section was 
completed.[276] As a result, the section between Tokyo and Sendai received the interest 
subsidy for ten years and the section between Sendai and Aomori for fifteen years. [277] 
Under the governmental support, even when the ratio of net income to capital was lower 
than 8 per cent, the company offered equal to or more than 8 per cent of dividends in 
many years. (Table 9)  Although the guarantee of interest was not always incentive 
enough to attract investors, it certainly raised the value of investment in the stock. [278]  
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The government also made loans to the Nihon Railway. In 1881, the company borrowed 
silver of ¥857,000 from the Ministry of Public Works (Kobu-sho) to purchase foreign 
products. [279] In 1882, it asked the Ministry of Finance (Okura-sho) to make a loan and 
received ¥300,000. In that year, the company also obtained ¥121,508 from promoters, 
which was equivalent to a fifth of their total subscription of the stock, and the first 
installment payment amounting to ¥436,290 from investors, but the sum of the two was 
far below the amount the company needed. [280]  
 
Year Net Income to 
Capital 
Dividends 
1883 9.0% 10.0% 
1884 7.1% 10.0% 
1885 6.1% 8.5% 
1886 6.2% 9.0% 
1887 9.4% 10.0% 
1888 9.5% 12.0% 
1889 6.8% 11.0% 
1890 5.5% 10.0% 
1891 6.6% 10.0% 
1892 9.4% 10.0% 
1893 10.3% 10.0% 
1894 10.1% 10.0% 
1895 10.1% 10.0% 
1896 8.8% 11.0% 
1897 8.7% 10.0% 
1898 7.4% 8.5% 
1899 11.1% 10.0% 
1900 12.0% 10.0% 
1901 12.6% 10.0% 
1902 12.5% 11.0% 
1903 13.5% 11.0% 
1904 13.6% 11.0% 
1905 16.9% 13.0% 
                                    Source: Nakamura, p iii. 
 
Table 9: The Ratio of Net Income to Common stock 
and Dividend Rate of the Nihon Railway 
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Furthermore, the government provided land grants, tax exemptions and 
construction support. [ 281] In 1881, the government sold the first national railway 
established between Tokyo and Yokohama to the Nihon Railway. The contract states that 
the land used for tracks, buildings, and parking lots for rolling stock should not be 
taxed.[282] Also, new construction was carried out by the Ministry of Public Works 
because the company did not have qualified technicians and equipments for 
construction.[ 283 ] As Noda explains, these governmental supports aimed at the 
concentration of capital to strengthen the national economy and at the protection of the 
wealth of the nobility who were the major financiers of the company. [284]   
 As a private company, the Nihon Railway also made efforts to raise funds itself, 
but the sale of the stock was not easy at first. The public was suspicious of its 
unprecedented scale of the business. [285] The government officials such as Tomomi 
Iwakura invited the subscriptions of the stock to the nobility with considerable effort. 
Local officials also attempted to persuade local capitalists to make investments in the 
company. As a result, the company managed to secure 889 shareholders. [286]    
The company expanded its size rapidly after its promotion period. Gross assets of 
the company in 1882 were ¥2 million. It increased to more than ¥20 million in 1892, and 
reached ¥66.9 million before the nationalization. [287] Most of the assets the company 
held were long-term assets, which included railroad tracks, rolling stock, other 
construction, equipments, and land. The proportion of long-term assets to gross assets 
was high. Especially, after 1890 when the business became stabilized, it mostly marked 
more than 80 per cent. [288]  
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The huge gross assets were mostly financed by common stock after the repayment 
of the loans from the government in 1882. The ratio of paid-in capital to gross assets after 
1883 market between 78.3 per cent to 94.6 per cent. Other financial sources than stock 
was negligible. (Table 10) 
 
          (in 1000’s of yen) 
Year Gross Assets Paid-in Capital 
1882    1,951         686  (35.2%) 
1883    3,109      2,435  (78.3%) 
1884    4,370      4,058  (92.9%) 
1885    6,330      5,960  (94.2%) 
1886    7,913      7,353  (92.9%) 
1887    9,889      8,772  (88.7%) 
1888  12,632    11,454  (90.7%) 
1889  16,439    14,824  (90.2%) 
1890  19,034    16,970  (89.2%) 
1891  19,025    17,994  (94.6%) 
1892  21,550    19,197  (89.1%) 
1893  22,034    19,200  (87.1%) 
1894  26,315    22,587  (85.8%) 
1895  31,101    26,985  (86.8%) 
1896  35,368    31,182  (88.2%) 
1897  44,779    40,258  (89.9%) 
1898  49,472    44,700  (90.4%) 
1899  50,490    44,700  (88.5%) 
1900  51,899    45,300  (87.3%) 
1901  53,542    45,900  (85.7%) 
1902  54,882    46,500  (84.7%) 
1903  56,442    46,500  (82.4%) 
1904  59,314    48,060  (81.0%) 
1905  64,019    50,400  (78.7%) 
                                              Source: Eigyo Hokokusho 
   *Gross assets do not include unpaid capital. 
Table 10: Equity Finance of the Nihon Railway  
 
Along with the progress of construction, the initial capital stock of ¥20 million 
was offered in 5 calls in 1882, 1885, 1888, 1890, and 1892.  To facilitate the sale of the 
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stock in each issue, the Nihon Railway adopted installment plans. For example, according 
to the annual reports, the issue of 1882, 1885, and 1888 of the stock adopted twelve times 
installments.  When the payments of installments were not made, the unpaid stock was 
often offered to the public.[289] After paid-in capital reached to the amount of total 
capitalization, the company increased total capitalization to ¥30 million in 1893, to ¥40 
million in 1896, and to ¥66 million in 1897 in order to construct branch tracks and to 
acquire the Ryomo Railways. [290]   
 
 
                                                   Source: Eigyo Hokokusho 
 
Figure 14: The Average Number of Shares per Shareholder in the Nihon Railway 
 
Most of the stock newly issued was allocated to existing shareholders, which led 
to the concentration of stock ownership. Shares increased from 119,314 to 1,320,000 or 
by 1,200,686 between 1884 and 1897, while the number of shareholders decreased from 
4,138 to 3,826.  As a result, the average number of shares held by per shareholder soared 
from 28.8 shares in 1884 to 386 in 1897. [291] After 1897, the number of shareholders 
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increased and the average shareholding decreased, but the stock was never widely 
dispersed in the public. (Figure 14)  In fact, Yutaka Katakura explains that the existing 
shareholders of the company did not sell the stock to other investors for two reasons. First, 
the stock promised high dividend income and was regarded as safer than bank deposits. 
Second, since the company offered new stock to the existing shareholders at face value, 
which was lower than the market price, the existing shareholders were willing to hold the 
old stock to receive new stock allocations. [292]  Thus, the slow increase in the number 
of shareholders and the shareholders’ willingness to hold the stock meant that 
shareholding of the company was less widely distributed in the public than other major 
railroad companies.  
Throughout the years from the establishment to the nationalization of the Nihon 
Railway, the biggest shareholders in the company were the nobility, in particular the ones 
who belong to the Fifteenth National Bank and the Mitsubishi group. The number of the 
shares the Fifteenth Bank held in total was overwhelming. It amounted to 22 to 28 per 
cent of the total number of stock from 1881 to 1906. [293] The purpose of the Bank to 
hold the stock on behalf was to grasp the control of the management at first. In 1898, 
however, the decline of profits and the confusion of management of the company led to 
the change of corporate governance; the Fifteenth Bank reduced the number of officials 
on the Board, while maintaining the ownership of the company. [294] In other words, it 
continued to own the stock for the profit from dividends and capital gains rather than 
control.  
To a lesser extent, the Mitsubishi group also contributed in the subscription of the 
stock.  Hisaya and Yanosuke Iwasaki, the leaders of the Mitsubishi Goshi Ltd. were 
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among the ten biggest shareholders of the company. The director of Mitsubishi Goshi , 
Yoshimasa Ono was also a major investor. Based on the ownership, Mitsubishi group 
could influence the management of the company; it could send three directors to the 
executive committee in 1891 and 1892, Ono became the president of the company. 
However, their ownership and managerial power was overwhelmed by the Fifteenth Bank. 
Stock ownership of Hisaya and Yanosuke Iwasaki accounted for only a few per cent of 
the total shares. [295] (Table 11) 
  
Shareholders 1894.6 1898.6 1901.6 1905.8 
The Fifteenth 
Bank 171,852 (28.6%) 305,732 (23.2%) 305223 (23.1%) 294,463 (22.3%) 
The Iwasaki's 19,297 (3.2%) 36,717 (2.8%) 33482 (2.5%) 33,482 (2.5%) 
Total shares 600,000 (100%)  1,320,000 (100%)  1,320,000 (100%)  1,320,000 (100%)  
       Source: Nakamura, p. xi, Table2 
*Per centages shown in parenthesis are the ratios of the shareholding to total shares. 
 
Table 11: The Number of Shares held by the Major Shareholders 
 
In contrast to stock, the Nihon Railway used bonds only once. While major 
railways usually issued bonds to meet financial needs during recessions, the Nihon 
Railway used bonds when it attempted to acquire the Mito Railway. In 1891, it issued the 
¥810,000  6 per cent, 21 years bonds.[296]  This issue was subscribed by the Mito 
Railway itself, through which the Nihon Railway paid interest of the bonds from the 
profit of the Mito Railway in order to reduce the effect of the large bond issue on its 
shareholders.[297]  
The role of banks in the Nihon Railway was limited. Although the Fifteenth Bank 
was the biggest shareholder of the company, it never owned the majority of the stock, and 
its control power declined after 1898 due to the decrease in profits under its management 
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and managerial confusion. The bank also did not make any long-term loans for the 
company. It was only negligible amounts of short-term loans that appeared in to the 
annual reports of the company. Rather, as Noda explains, the major role of the banks 
seemed to make collateral loans to investors.     
In the United States, private bankers had played a significant role in financing the 
expansion of the railroad industry by underwriting railroad bonds since 1880. Their 
financial contribution in the industry helped develop the American economy on the whole 
and shift the United States from agricultural to industrial society. On the other hand, in 
Japan, the nobility class and warriors in the feudal society came to be leading 
businessmen and capital-rich investors under government favoritism in the Meiji period.  
Their active part in business as a new economic entity drove the transformation from 
feudal society to industrial society in Japan.   
In 1906, as mentioned above, under the Railway Nationalization Law all railways 
except the ones to serve local transportation were nationalized.[298]  As railroad stocks 
disappeared as a result of nationalization, investors began to turn from railroads to 
electric utilities. Electric utility stock was suitable for investment; as a public utility, the 
stable growth of the business was promised by the increase in the demand as the 
economy grew.  
3.4 Public Utility Finance—Electric Utilities 
3.4.1 Electric Utility Finance before World War I 
The electric utility industry grew in size rapidly after 1880. The paid-in capital in 
the industry was only ¥200,000 in 1886, but increased to ¥87.7 million after Russo-
Japanese War of 1907, and to ¥762.1 million after World War I. Then, it reached 
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¥3,180.8 million in 1930.  The growing business required long-term funds because 
electric utility companies needed to construct facilities to generate and transmit electric 
power. These facilities have to be big enough to meet the demand for electricity at the 
peak, since electricity was not a storable product. [299] In spite of the demand for huge 
funds, unlike railways, the government did not provide the companies with any supports 
or protection; they were privately operated enterprises from the beginning. [300] 
 
                                                                                                            (in Yen) 
 Paid-in Capital 
A 
Bonds and Loans 
B 
Debt-to Equity Rate 
B/A 
1903      24,101,894          1,806,678  7.5% 
1904      35,405,006          2,054,167  5.8% 
1905      43,793,077          2,516,700  5.7% 
1906      63,386,268          2,636,115  4.2% 
1907      87,685,443          5,681,713  6.5% 
1908    104,998,339          8,924,278  8.5% 
1909    120,422,539         14,886,108  12.4% 
1910    169,201,354         23,993,264  14.2% 
1911    243,458,276         37,536,645  15.4% 
1912    286,634,539         51,985,391  18.1% 
1913    397,780,115         79,388,413  20.0% 
1914    460,355,240         98,697,414  21.4% 
                     Source: Denki Jigyo Kyokai, Denki Jigyo Yoran, p402, Table 52. 
Table 12: Equity and Debts in the Electric Utility Industry  
 
The huge financial needs in the industry were mainly met by selling shares of 
stock before World War I.  Miwa and Ramseyer show that in 1910 it was 83 per 
cent.[301] Similarly, the debt-to-equity ratio reveals the importance of stock.  As Table 
12 shows, from 1903 to 1914, the role of stock relative to bonds and loans in electric 
utility finance gradually decreased, but stock continued to be a major financial source. 
Despite huge amounts of stock issued in the industry, the shares were not widely 
held by the public at first.  As with the railroads, when electric utility companies were 
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promoted, stock was usually sold to descendants of samurai, and the nobility, national 
banks, rich merchants, and powerful local politicians. [ 302 ] When the companies 
attempted to increase capitalization, most of the new stock was allocated to the existing 
stockholders, at least before 1903.  
After the Russo-Japanese War, utility stocks for the first time came to be widely 
distributed in the public. This transformation is in part explained by the huge idle capital 
brought about through the nationalization of railroads in 1906 and in part by 
technological progress. As companies facilitated the use of hydro-electric power instead 
of thermal power, they needed much more capital to build hydro-electric facilities. Thus, 
the growing financial need had them rely on the general public. [303]  
In contrast to stock, bonds were not important financial sources before World War 
I.  Before the Russo-Japanese War, they accounted for only 2 per cent of gross 
assets.[304]  Even after the legal framework to issue collateral bonds were prepared 
through the issue of Collateral Bond Trust Law, bonds were less important. Bond issues 
accounted for only 8.6 per cent of the increase in capital from 1907 to 1914.[305]  In fact, 
there were no major companies that used bonds, except the Ujikawa Electric Company 
before World War I. [306] Also, no foreign bonds were issued before World War I in the 
industry.  Indeed, the Tokyo Electric Light and the Osaka Electric Light Companies were 
planning to issue foreign bonds in the early twentieth century, but all failed. 
Similar to railroad finance, the role of banks in electric utility finance was limited 
before World War I. According to Takeo Kikkawa, bank loans accounted for 8 per cent 
of the increase in capital from 1893 to 1903 and 13 per cent from 1904 to 1914. [307] 
Banks contributed to corporate finance indirectly through collateral stock loans. For 
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example, the Mitsui Bank accepted stock of major electric companies as collateral. Those 
electric power companies included Tokyo, Yokohama Kyodo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, 
Kyoto and Hiroshima Electric Light Companies. [308] Also, since bonds were not an 
important financial source in the industry, banks’ role as underwriters and trustees was 
not significant. In fact, most of the bonds issued in the industry were not underwritten.  
By law, only the Industrial Bank could act as trustee for bonds. [309]   
3.4.2 Electric Utility Finance from World War I to 1930 
Corporate financial practices in electric utility companies were radically changed 
after World War I. In spite of the rapid increase in capital stock, the importance of capital 
stock gradually declined. The ratio of capital stock to total fixed capital accounts for 67.8 
per cent from 1915 to 1919, 61.2 per cent from 1920 to 1924, and 37.4 per cent from 
1925 to 1930.[310]  Instead of capital stock, the role of bonds increased rapidly in the 
1920s. The ratio of bonds to the increase in total fixed capital rose from 15.1 per cent 
between 1915 and 1919 through 28.1 per cent between 1920 and 1924 to 42.5 per cent 
between 1925 and 1930. Kikkawa explained the reasons that led the companies to bond 
issues. First, in the 1920s, the use of bonds was more cost-effective than that of stock.  
While interest rates lowered to 6 to 7 per cent, dividends were around 10 per cent at that 
time. Second, it was the beginning of the 1920s that the bonds market was firmly 
established in Japan. Third, bond issues were suitable for meeting the exceptionally huge 
demand for capital of the growing industry. Finally, the stable growth of the business 
constantly required capital from bond markets. [311] (Table 13)  
More important, the electric utility industry turned to the use of foreign bonds in 
the 1920s. It began with the Sterling bond issue of the Tokyo Electric Light Company in 
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1923 and ended with dollar bond issue of the Taiwan Electric Power in 1931. In total, 
foreign bonds were issued in the industry sixteen times, amounting to ¥523 million 
during the years. The issues of foreign bonds in the industry were huge. (Table 14) In 
1929, Harumi Matsushima states, foreign corporate bonds in the industry reached 76 per 
cent of all of the foreign corporate bonds in Japan, and more than 40 per cent of the 
bonds issued by the electric utility industry were foreign bonds.[312] 
 
          (in Yen) 
  Stock Bonds Loans Reserves Total 
1915-
1919 
205,450(67.8%) 45,747(15.1%) 29,251(9.7%) 22,619(7.5%) 303,067 
1920-
1924 
1,013,196(61.2%) 464,980(28.1%) 137,647(8.3%) 40,437(2.4%) 1,656,260 
1925-
1930 
806,784(37.4%) 917,528(42.5%) 359,425(16.7%) 74,354(3.4%) 2158091 
     Source: Kikkawa, pp22-23 
 
Table 13: The Increase in Long-Term Finance of the Electric Utility Industry  
    
Foreign bonds in electric utility companies were mostly underwritten by British 
and American investment bankers. Although not quantitatively important in the foreign 
securities market, these bonds were ranked as high as German bonds. By dealing with 
them, some investment bankers made sizeable profits. Especially, after the late 1920s 
when the top investment bankers such as J. P Morgan & Co and Dillon Read & Co were 
cautious of excessive amounts of foreign bond issues, middle class bankers including 
Guaranty & Co., and Harris, Forbes & Co. actively involved in the underwriting 
business.[313] (Table 14)  
The use of foreign bonds was advantageous to electric utility companies. The 
maturity periods of foreign bonds were usually much longer than those of domestic bonds. 
 110 
While maturities of domestic bonds were two to seven years, those of foreign bonds were 
usually more than twenty years. (Table 14)  Also, companies sought exchange gains from  
 
Name of 
Companies 
Year  Amount of 
issues 
(Yen) 
Interest 
(%) 
Issue 
Price 
(Yen) 
Maturity 
(Years) 
Underwriters Trustees 
Tokyo Electric 
Light 
1923 3,000,000 6 94 25 Whitehall  
Trust 
  
Daido Electric 
Power  
1924 15,000,000 7 911/2 20 Dillon Read Industrial 
Bank 
Tokyo Electric 
Light 
1925 600,000 6 82 23 Whitehall  
Trust 
  
Ujikawa 
Electric Power 
1925 14,000,000 7 91 20 Lee, 
Higginson 
Industrial 
Bank 
Toho Electric 
Power  
1925 15,000,000 7 90 1/2 30 Guaranty Mitsui 
Bank 
Daido Electric 
Power  
1925 13,500,000 6.5 86 25 Dillon Read Industrial 
Bank 
Toho Electric 
Power  
1925 300,000 5 97 20 Prudential 
Life 
Mitsui 
Trust 
Tokyo Electric 
Light 
1925 24,000,000 6 98 7/8 3 Guaranty   
Toho Electric 
Power  
1926 10,000,000 6 98 1/2 3 Guaranty   
Shinetsu 
Electric Power 
1927 7,650,000 6.5 93 1/4 25 Dillon Read Mitsui 
Trust 
Nihon Electric 
Power 
1928 9,000,000 6.5 94     25 Harris, 
Forbes 
Mitsui 
Bank 
Tokyo Electric 
Light 
1928 70,000,000 6 90 1/2 25 Guaranty Mitsui 
Bank 
Tokyo Electric 
Light 
1928 4,500,000 6 90     25 Lazard 
Brothers 
Mitsui 
Bank 
Toho Electric 
Power  
1929 11,450,000 6 96 1/4 3 Guaranty   
                               Source: Japan Industrial Bank, Nihon Gaisai Shoshi, Shasai Ichiran 
* The foreign bonds were denominated in dollars or pound sterling. 
Table 14: Foreign Bond Issues of the Electric Utility Companies  
 
yen revaluation through foreign bond issues. Since most of foreign bonds were issued 
when yen was devalued, the companies expected the profits from the revaluation of 
yen.[314] The boom of foreign bonds issue was further facilitated by the revision of the 
Commercial Laws in 1927; it increased the upper limit of bonds issue from the amount 
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equivalent to paid-in capital to twice the amount of paid-in capital. [315] Meanwhile, 
lower interest rate of foreign bonds than that of domestic bonds was not a motivation for 
the companies to turn to foreign bond issues. The advantage of low interest rate was off-
set by the low issue price of foreign bonds. (Table 14) 
As the role of bonds in electric utility finance increased, banks helped the 
companies issue bonds more than before. Major banks such as the Mitsui Bank, the 
Mitsubishi Bank, the Yasuda Bank, the Sumitomo Bank, the Daiichi Bank, and the 
Industrial Bank, began to underwrite domestic bonds from the 1920s. During the 
financial depression of 1927, Kikkawa states, the six banks underwrote more than half 
the bonds issued in the industry. [316] 
Despite risk and financial burden of underwriting business, these underwriting 
banks tended to avoid forming syndicates during the 1920s. [317] Their avoidance of 
syndicates is in part explained by the banks’ intention to construct strong ties to electric 
companies. In fact, particular relationships between banks and the companies existed in 
the 1920s; the Mitsui Bank tied with the Tokyo Electric Light and the Toho Electric 
Power, the Mitsubishi Bank with the Daido Electric Power, the Sumitomo Bank with the 
Ujikawa Electric, the Yasuda Bank with the Tokyo Electric Power, the Daiichi Bank with 
the Kyoto Electric Power, and the Industrial Bank with the Daido Electric Power. [318] 
In addition, banks facilitated collateral bonds issues as trustees. Especially the 
Mitsui Bank and the Industrial Bank dealt with more than 60 per cent of the entire 
electric utility collateral bonds. Also, only the two banks were allowed to be trustees of 
collateral on foreign bonds. [319] When the Industrial Bank was established, the Meiji 
government decided on its policy that private companies should use the Industrial Bank 
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as a trustee as much as possible when they issued foreign bonds. With this policy, the 
government attempted to prevent private companies from tying into foreign capital 
market directly, fearing that scattering importations of foreign capital would harm the 
credit in Japanese economy. [320] Meanwhile, the participation of the Mitsui bank in 
trusteeship of foreign bond issue began after 1925. Although foreign bond issues were 
numerous in the 1920s, the Mitsui Bank was only one ordinary bank that was allowed to 
deal with the trust business due to its credit standing in foreign countries. [321]   
The role of banks as supporters of the bond market came to be important, but their 
financial role was not the same as that of post-war main banks. While banks tried to 
create close ties with the companies, they were not eager to own the stock. Rather, similar 
to foreign investment bankers, they attempted to obtain control power as underwriters 
and trustees. These financial features are examined in the case of the Tokyo Electric 
Light Company, the first electric light company in Japan. 
3.4.3  Tokyo Electric Light Company 
3.4.3.1 Corporate Finance before World War I 
The Tokyo Electric Light Company was established in 1883 with the 
capitalization of ¥200,000. It was the first company to supply electricity to the public in 
Japan. The promoters of the company were the people in financial circles such as Eiichi 
Shibusawa, Sakuro Yajima, Kihachiro Okura, and Rokuro Hara. [322] These promoters 
at first subscribed ¥50,000 of the stock, and planned to sell the rest to the public. It was, 
however, difficult to distribute the stock because of the recession of 1882 and the 
immature state of the banking system at that time. As Toyo Kurihara argues, Masayoshi 
Matsukata, the Minister of Finance, carried out the deflation policy against the issue of 
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huge amounts of inconvertible notes in the 1870s. At the same time, the recession in 
many countries led to the decrease in the exports of raw cotton from Japan. These 
circumstances resulted in the deep depression in Japan. On the other hand, Japan did not 
accumulate capital enough to finance big business. Without sufficient funds, national 
banks managed to finance the business only by using the privilege to issue bank notes. It 
was after 1882 when the Bank of Japan was established that the investors were eager to 
subscribe the company’s stock by utilizing stock collateral loans. These investors were 
the nobility, government merchant, and local capitalists. [323]   
 Although the scale of the business of the Tokyo Electric Light Company 
was smaller than that of major railroads at first, it expanded rapidly. While the amount of 
gross assets in the Nihon Railway were ¥2 million in 1892, that of the Tokyo Electric 
light was only ¥167,884 in 1887.  However, the company grew rapidly as the demand for 
electricity increased. The number of electric lights sold by the company surged from 138 
in 1888 to more than 1.5 million in1914. The use of electric power also increased 30KW 
in 1899 to more than 28,000 KW in 1914. To meet the increasing demand, the company 
grew one of the biggest businesses with gross assets of more than ¥50 million before 
World War I. [324]The growing company required a huge amount of capital. Gross assets 
of the company increased from ¥167,884 in 1887 to ¥54,420,352 in 1914, although 
temporary decreasing in 1891. [325]  
Long-term assets including construction accounts and securities of other 
companies to gross assets accounted for 86.3 per cent of gross assets in average from 
1887 to 1914. This financial need was met mainly by stock. [326] Along with the 
expansion of business, paid-in capital grew from ¥122,000 in 1887 to ¥39,601,560 in 
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1914. As Table 15 shows, from 1887 to 1914, 72.8 to 91.6 per cent of financial needs 
were met by common stock.   (Table 15)  
 
    (in Yen) 
  
 
A 
Gross Assets 
B 
Stock  
B/A C 
Loans 
C/A 
1887        167,884             122,000  72.7%                  0   
1888        361,939             300,000  82.9%          20,546  5.7% 
1889        463,795             425,000  91.6% 0   
1890        791,321             604,000  76.3%          60,099  7.6% 
1891        748,968             668,510  89.3% 0   
1892        797,731             668,520  83.8%  0   
1893        866,181             784,955  90.6%  0   
1894        952,478             817,865  85.9%  0   
1895     1,173,317             999,705  85.2%  0   
1896     1,627,596          1,295,935  79.6%  0   
1897     2,225,095          1,700,000  76.4%        270,000  12.1% 
1898     2,500,997          1,991,365  79.6%        216,000  8.6% 
1899     2,652,046          2,375,000  89.6%          30,000  1.1% 
1900     2,901,266          2,375,000  81.9%        286,000  9.9% 
1901     3,049,423          2,600,000  85.3%        181,832  6.0% 
1902     3,715,016          2,897,655  78.0%        300,000  8.1% 
1903     4,153,270          3,200,000  77.0%        533,087  12.8% 
1904     5,558,803          4,375,000  78.7%        656,403  11.8% 
1905     7,374,554          5,050,000  68.5%     1,671,812  22.7% 
1906   10,584,827          7,150,000  67.5%     2,675,000  25.3% 
1907   17,371,619        13,873,635  79.9%     1,370,000  7.9% 
1908   20,917,552        17,260,000  82.5%     1,208,952  5.8% 
1909   21,853,900        17,260,000  79.0%     1,727,329  7.9% 
1910   29,140,729        24,000,000  82.4%        178,507  0.6% 
1911   34,770,730        30,500,000  87.7%        150,700  0.4% 
1912   44,339,411        34,400,000  77.6%     5,387,492  12.2% 
1913   50,109,399        39,595,825  79.0%     5,609,274  11.2% 
1914   54,420,352        39,601,560  72.8%   10,213,576  18.8% 
              Source: Nitta, Appendix 1 
       *Loans do not include bonds. 
Table 15: Long-Term Finance of the Tokyo Electric Light Company  
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Similar to railroads, the stock issues of the company were closely related to the 
collateral trust loans and the installment plan. These financial practices helped 
shareholders finance the payments of the high face value of the stock from the first year, 
According to the Article of Association, shareholders were required to pay 20 per cent of 
stock price at first and then to pay the rest in five times. [327] When the amount of paid-
in capital came to be close to that of authorized capital, the company increased 
capitalization and used the installment plan again. The installments were often paid 
through stock collateral loans. Although it is difficult to trace the movement of funds 
from banks through individuals to companies, the use of collateral stock loans was an 
essential financial method. As Kikkawa argues, the majority of collaterals for loans made 
by Mitsui Bank were stock. [328]    
 Compared with railroads, the stock of the company was less dispersed. After the 
Russo-Japanese War, considering the number of shareholders jumped up from 64 in 1882 
to more than 3,000 in 1911, and the stock seemed distributed widely. However, the 
average number of shares per shareholder increased from 62.5 shares in 1882 to 322.1 
shares in 1911. [329] (Table 16)  Similar to the Nihon Railway, the stock was more likely 
to be distributed to the existing shareholders in spite of the increase in the number of 
shareholders.  
In contrast to its reliance on stock, the Tokyo Electric Light Company did not use 
bonds at all before World War I. The company was able to raise funds through stock 
issue only. In fact, the dividend of the common stock was high enough to attract investors. 
It was from 7 per cent to 12 per cent annually except the years of capital reduction 
between 1891 and 1893.  Without using domestic bonds, interestingly, the company 
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attempted to issue foreign bonds in 1907. In order to finance the construction of hydro- 
electric power station, it planned to market Sterling bonds of  £500,000  by making a trust 
contract with the Anglo-American Debenture Corporation Limited. However, this plan 
was cancelled. In the end, foreign financiers were suspicious of the profitability of the 
business due to the relatively high cost of electricity compared with gas and the 
destructive competition among many electric companies in Japan.[330]  The company 
instead increased capital stock by ¥10,850,000.[331]  
 
  The Number of 
Shares Outstanding 
The Number of  
Shareholders 
The Average Number 
of Shares per Shareholder 
1882                   4,000                   64                               62.5  
1886                  10,000                   56                             178.6  
1887                  10,000                   72                             138.9  
1888                  20,000                 108                             185.2  
1903                  70,000                 397                             176.3  
1904                  70,000                 469                             149.3  
1907                480,000               2,999                             160.1  
1911             1,000,000               3,105                             322.1  
1918             1,000,000               4,610                             216.9  
1924             5,160,000             22,542                             228.9  
         Source: Nippon Teikoku Nenkan 
Table 16: Shareholding of the Tokyo Electric Light Company 
 
Although the major financial source of the Tokyo Electric Light was common 
stock, bank loans played a supplementary role. Especially, in 1905 and 1906, loans 
accounts for more than 20 per cent of gross assets. (Table 15) The funds raised through 
the years were mostly used for the construction of the Katsuragawa hydro-electric station. 
The president, Sakutaro Satake, asked the Mitsui Bank to make loans of ¥1 million in 
August 1904. Seihin Ikeda, an executive director of Mitsui Bank, was willing to provide 
the fund. He even suggest that he would make another loans if the company used all of 
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the ¥1 million as far as it would repay the first loan through the collection of the 
installments from shareholders and through the increase in capitalization. By these 
methods, he believed, the company could easily raise funds due to its high stock price 
and high dividends. [332]     
Banks also contributed corporate finance of the Tokyo Electric Light indirectly 
through collateral stock loans. In 1907, the President, Satake, borrowed ¥180,000 from 
the Mitsui Bank on the security of the stock of Tokyo Electric Light. Likewise, the 
Wakao Bank, the major shareholder of the company, borrowed ¥1 million yen in the 
same way. These loans were used to pay for the installments of the stock. [333] 
However, the role of banks before World War I should not be exaggerated. Bank 
loans were only temporary financial solutions for the Tokyo Electric Light Company.  
Except the years of the hydro-electric power construction and right before World War I, 
the role of loans in corporate finance was not substantial. Second, collateral stock loans 
were regarded as commercial finance rather than industrial finance. It was an indirect 
financial source for the industry. Third, banks were not major shareholders of the 
company. The Mitsui Bank, which had the closest financial relationship with the 
company, was not eager to own the stock. The business men in the Mitsui group, such as 
Risuke Minomura and Takashi Masuda, were listed as the promoters when the company 
was established, but their ownership was only 6 per cent of total stock at the time. In 
1916, the bank even did not own the stock at all. [334] Finally, since the company did not 
use bonds, banks’ role as trustees or underwriters was not seen. [335] 
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3.4.3.2 Corporate Finance from World War I to 1930 
Like other electric utility companies, corporate financial practice of the Tokyo 
Electric Light Company was changed during and after World War I. The common stock 
increased from ¥39.6 million in 1914 to ¥404.1 million in 1930. This increase in 
capitalization was mostly a result of mergers and acquisitions. The new issue of common 
stock was a one time event; in 1919, the company issued stock of ¥50 million in order to 
expand facilities along with the rapid increase in the demand for electricity. [336] Despite 
the rapid surge of common stock, however, the contribution of common stock in 
corporate finance rather declined. The equity ratio decreased from 72.8 per cent in 1914 
to 50.3 per cent in 1930. (Table 17)  
 
                    (in Yen) 
  A B B/A C C/A 
  Gross 
Assets 
Stock   Bonds   
1915 56,539,656  44,787,145  79.2%     5,000,000  8.8% 
1916   57,838,428    45,163,880  78.1%     5,000,000  8.6% 
1917   59,317,386    47,508,245  80.1%     4,500,000  7.6% 
1918   62,041,128    50,000,000  80.6%     3,500,000  5.6% 
1919   75,739,405    62,500,000  82.5%     2,500,000  3.3% 
1920   82,475,837    68,500,000  83.1%     1,500,000  1.8% 
1921 145,017,619  113,973,718  78.6%     3,500,000  2.4% 
1922 202,043,285  165,044,705  81.7%     3,500,000  1.7% 
1923 292,867,897  193,770,000  66.2%   32,792,300  11.2% 
1924 339,789,767  228,605,288  67.3%   45,689,000  13.4% 
1925 487,926,801  266,962,040  54.7% 124,790,800  25.6% 
1926 632,846,650  345,091,270  54.5% 161,040,800  25.4% 
1927 648,874,896  345,698,773  53.3% 163,590,800  25.2% 
1928 846,404,553  407,149,000  48.1% 364,603,500  43.1% 
1929 843,293,608  407,149,000  48.3% 359,862,502  42.7% 
1930 808,719,893  407,149,000  50.3% 355,032,823  43.9% 
     Source: Nitta, Appendix1 
Table 17: Stock and Bonds of the Tokyo Electric Light Company after 1914 
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Instead of common stock, the company began to use bonds. The amount of bond 
issues shapely increased from ¥5 million in 1915 to ¥3.6 billion in 1930. The ratio of 
bonds to gross assets was 8.8 per cent in 1915 and 43.9 per cent in 1930. (Table 17)  The 
use of bonds instead of stock was advantageous to the company. Since stock prices sank 
after the peak of 1910 and reached the bottom in 1914, the company faced the difficulty 
in selling the stock at face value. [337] Also, costs for bond issues were much cheaper 
than that of stock issues because the dividends of the stock were higher than interest rates. 
While interest rates of the company’s bond were between 6 and 8 per cent, the dividends 
of the stock were between 8 and 12 per cent. [338]    
In particular, the Tokyo Electric Light relied on foreign bonds as well as domestic 
bonds. In the 1920s, the company succeeded in three foreign bond issues. In 1923, it 
issued 6 per cent, £ 3million 25 years Sterling bonds. This issue was the first foreign 
bond issue made in the electric light industry. The underwriter was the Whitehall Trust 
Ltd. in London. In 1925, the company also issued both Sterling and Dollar bonds; it 
required a huge amount of capital to deal with the loss caused by the Kanto Great 
Earthquake of 1923. These were £600,000 23 years 6 per cent Sterling bonds 
underwritten by the Whitehall Trust Ltd, and $2,400,000 3 years 6 per cent Dollar bonds 
underwritten by the Guaranty Co. of New York. In 1928, the company again issued both 
Sterling and Dollar bonds. The dollar issue was the $70 million 25 years 6 per cent 
collateral bonds. The underwriter, the Guaranty Co. of New York, required the company 
of the annual redemption of 1.6 per cent of total issue by using the sinking funds.  The 
trustee was the Mitsui Bank. The Sterling issue was the £4.5 million 6 per cent 25 years 
collateral bonds. The underwriters were Lazard Brothers & Co. and Whitehall Trust & 
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Co. Once again, the trustee was the Mitsui Bank. [339]  These issues were used to 
redeem the short-term dollar bonds of 1923, to reimburse the huge amount of loans made 
by the Mitsui Bank, and also to raise funds for construction.  
Similar to other electric utility companies, the advantage of using foreign bonds 
was the long maturity period and exchange gains. The maturity periods of foreign 
debenture bonds were not so different from domestic bonds. However, foreign bonds 
with security had much longer maturity periods than domestic bonds. While the 
maturities of the foreign bonds were 25 years, that of domestic bonds were at most 10 
years. Also, exchange gains may be one of the important incentives for the company to 
issue foreign bonds. On the other hand, the difference of interest rates between foreign 
and domestic bonds did not always create profits. Although the interest rate of foreign 
bonds was 6 per cent, lower than that of domestic bonds by 1 to 2 per cent, the lower 
issue price of foreign bonds paid off the profits from the difference of interest rates. The 
average issue price of domestic bonds was ¥97.75 and that of foreign bonds was ¥91. 
(Table 14) 
Although foreign bond issues were important financial sources for the Tokyo 
Electric Company in the 1920s, it was not easy to obtain funds through foreign markets. 
According to Kikkawa, in 1923 when the company issued Sterling bonds, it was allowed 
to issue bonds only up to a half of its paid-in capital. This restriction prolonged the 
company’s reliance on domestic bank loans. Also, in the bond issue of 1928, the U.S. and 
British investment bankers accepted underwriting only under the condition that the 
merger of the Tokyo Electric Light and Tokyo Electric Power Companies should be 
achieved and that the Sterling bond issue of 1923 should be redeemed. [340]   
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As the Tokyo Electric Light used bonds more and more, the role of banks was 
changed. Banks actively participated in underwriting business for domestic bonds. In 
particular, the Mitsui Bank dealt with almost all domestic bond issues of the company by 
itself or through syndicates. In fact, 44 per cent of the underwriting business of the bank 
was turned to electric utility industry, of which 33 per cent was for the Tokyo Electric 
Light. [341] Also, as the company relied on foreign bonds, the Mitsui Bank played a role 
as a trustee for the issue of collateral bonds. [342] As Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, the 
businessman who contributed so much to the development of the electric utility industry, 
argues, the credit of the Mitsui was a key to foreign bond issues. In the early 1920s, 
Japanese banks as well as the electric utility industry were not prepared to issue foreign 
bonds. Also the business license granted by the government was effective only fifteen to 
twenty years, while the maturity period of foreign bonds was thirty years. Under these 
financial and corporate immaturities, the fame and credit of the Mitsui was 
essential.[343]     
Bank loans were also used when the company was not able to meet the financial 
demand through bond issues. As stated above, in 1923 when the Sterling bond issue was 
restricted to a half amount of paid-in capital, the company needed to rely on bank loans. 
Bank loans continued to increase from 1924 to 1927. In 1928, the company repaid loans 
through foreign bond issues, but again had to borrow money from banks in 1929 and 
1930. Although it issued foreign bonds at that time, these were refunding bonds, not 
being used to repay the loans. The major bank to make loans to the company was again 
the Mitsui Bank. Although the bank did not make any loans to the company from 1915 to 
1922, it continued to lend money from 1923 after the Kanto Great Earthquake.  
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Although the Mitsui Bank was closely associated with the Tokyo Electric Light 
Company, it was not regarded as a main bank. The bank was hesitant to own stock of any 
electric utility companies. According to Kikkawa, it only owned ¥200,000 of the stock of 
the Tokyo Electric Light in 1931. [344] Also, the bank’s support for bond issues as an 
underwriter and a trustee was in part explained by its intention to collect debt from the 
company, not necessarily to maintain a long-term relationship with the company. [345] 
Bank’s credit toward the company was diminished in the 1920s. Seihin Ikeda, the 
director of the Mitsui Bank who had been supportive to the company in 1905, stated that 
the company was no longer able to increase capitalization and to collect funds to repay 
debt after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. [346]  To protect its credit toward the 
company, the bank helped issue bonds and even interfered with the management of the 
company through its trusteeship. In 1930, according to the contract between the bank and 
the company, the company should not pay dividends of more than 5 per cent and that 
total dividends should not be more than 75 per cent of net profit during the certain time 
period. In addition, the company was required either to use net profits for the cost for the 
construction of subsidiaries or to make loans to them. [347]        
  Meanwhile, reserves were not important financial sources for the Tokyo Electric 
Light. The company accumulated reserves from ¥595 in 1887 through ¥ 2.6 million in 
1914 to ¥26.6 million in 1930, but the ratio of reserves to gross assets remained small.  
Though reserves increased by ten times from 1914 to 1930, gross assets boosted by as 
mush as fourteen times during the same years. As a result, the ratio of reserves to gross 
assets was as low as 2 to 7 per cent except the early years. (Table 18) 
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     (in Yen) 
Year A 
Gross Assets 
B 
Reserves 
B/A 
1915     56,539,656          2,737,224  4.8% 
1916     57,838,428          3,260,436  5.6% 
1917     59,317,386          3,564,200  6.0% 
1918     62,041,128          4,007,501  6.5% 
1919     75,739,405          4,648,615  6.1% 
1920     82,475,837          5,468,587  6.6% 
1921   145,017,619          7,845,463  5.4% 
1922   202,043,285        11,519,895  5.7% 
1923   292,867,897        14,970,326  5.1% 
1924   339,789,767        15,885,117  4.7% 
1925   487,926,801        17,318,062  3.5% 
1926   632,846,650        18,959,879  3.0% 
1927   648,874,896        20,930,021  3.2% 
1928   846,404,553        22,777,070  2.7% 
1929   843,293,608        24,765,220  2.9% 
1930   808,719,893        26,575,810  3.3% 
Source: Nitta, Appendix 1 
Table 18: Reserves of the Tokyo Electric Light  
 
During the pre-World War I period, Japanese electric utilities relied on equity 
finance, similar to the railroads. In particular, after nationalization of the major railroads 
of 1906, idle capital was directed to electric utilities, and the stock came to be widely 
distributed in the public.  Although stock was an important financial source after the war, 
the use of bonds, especially foreign bonds, increased rapidly in the 1920s. On the other 
hand, banks played only supplementary role in public utility finance throughout the time. 
Bank loans were temporary and not substantial. They only made collateral stock loans to 
investors. In the 1920s, they underwrote bonds issued by electric utility companies, 
through which they could influence on the management of the electric utility companies. 
Considering the American public utility companies’ reliance on bonds, corporate 
financial practices of Japanese electric utilities was closer to the American model. 
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Meanwhile, Japanese banks’ underwriting business during the 1920s was quite similar to 
the activity of investment bankers in the United States.  
When securities of electric utility companies came to be held widely in the public, 
those of cotton spinning gained popularity for speculation purposes. Unlike electric  
utilities, the securities of the cotton-spinning industry were not suitable for investment 
because of the price fluctuation of raw materials, mainly raw cotton, and of the final 
products, cotton yarn, in the markets. [348]  
3.5 Cotton Spinning Finance 
3.5.1 Cotton-Spinning Finance before World War I 
Until the 1870s, the cotton-spinning was a home-handcraft industry in Japan. To 
facilitate modernization and to increase productivity under the industrial development 
policy [shokusan kogyo seisaku], the government attempted to introduce machinery 
production to the industry.  It established government factories as models, sold the 
spinning machines imported from Britain, and made loans to newly established private 
spinning firms. However, in the early 1880s, the cotton-spinning industry in Japan was 
still small, compared with Britain. While the British average firms had 12,600 spindles in 
1866, those of Japanese firms had 2000 spindles only. [349] Since capital required in 
such a small firm was not huge, the founder and family members could finance the 
business without relying on external sources. [350]  
It was during the 1880s that large-scale spinning firm appeared without 
government supports. The Osaka Spinning Company was the first to set up as many as 
15,000 spindles. [351]  In three years, the number of the firms with 10,000 spindles or 
more increased to ten. The spindles of these companies accounted for 74 per cent of all 
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the spindles in the industry. [352] As the size of the firms grew, long-term capital was a 
critical issue in the industry.  
The increasing demand for long-term funds in the industry was financed mainly 
by stock, but the equity ratio in the cotton-spinning industry was much lower than that of 
railroad and electric utility companies; it account for 50 to 60 per cent. (Table 19) This is 
explained by the difference of the financial structures between industries. Unlike the 
other two industries, cotton-spinning firms required huge amounts of working capital to 
purchase raw materials.   
      (in Yen) 
 1890 1893 1894 1898 
Number of 
Companies 
10 24 26 62 
Gross 
Assets 
7,505,000 16,555,000 21,654,000 53,114,000 
Paid-in 
Capital 
4,761,000 9,137,000 11,212,000 29,271,000 
Fixed 
Assets 
4,578,000 10,289,000 13,427,000 37,132,000 
Fixed/Gross 
Assets 
61.0% 62.2% 62.0% 69.9% 
Equity Ratio 63.4% 55.2% 51.8% 55.1% 
 Source: Takamura, vol. 2 p17 
Table 19: Fixed assets and Equity of the Cotton Spinning Industry  
 
 
Stock of cotton-spinning companies was not widely distributed before 1906. 
When companies were promoted, the stock was sold to rich local merchants, landlords, 
and politicians without using markets, similar to railroads and electric utility 
companies.[353] When companies needed to increase capitalization, they allocated most 
of the stock to the existing shareholders through the efforts of promoters; it was not easy 
to sell stock due to risk of the business. Therefore, financial power and social status of the 
promoters played a very important role for the sale of stock. In other words, promoters’ 
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wealth determined the amount of stock they would subscribe by themselves, and their 
social status affected the reputation of the stock. [354]  
After nationalization of railroads, the stock of spinning companies was widely 
distributed to the public. Similar to electric utility, part of idle funds brought about by 
nationalization of railroads was directed to speculation of cotton-spinning stock. 
According to Kazuo Yamaguchi, in 1914, fifteen industrial firms were listed in the Tokyo 
and Osaka Stock Exchanges, of which twelve were cotton-spinning companies. [355]     
Bonds were much less important than stock in cotton-spinning finance before 
1907. The companies considered the use of bonds only when they were unable to 
increase capitalization through stock issues. Since the Bank of Japan did not discount 
these bonds, they were rarely listed on markets. Facing the difficulty in selling bonds, the 
companies mostly allocated them to existing shareholders. [356] 
After the Russo-Japanese War, however, huge amounts of cotton spinning bonds 
came to be issued, which were used for the expansion of facilities. The newly issued 
bonds were often distributed to new investors through public offering by banks. The 
reasons of this bond boom were explained by three factors. First, the Collateral Trust 
Bond Law of 1905 alleviated risk of bonds. Second, as the scale of the business increased, 
firms required more funds than before. Finally, risk of bonds was reduced by establishing 
syndicates consisting of bankers and stockbrokers. [357] 
These bonds were domestic bonds; no foreign bonds were issued in cotton- 
spinning industry before and after World War I. Foreign investors were not willing to 
take risk of industrial securities. In fact, the business was not stable due to fluctuating 
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market prices of raw cotton and cotton yarn, and it did not have properties suitable for 
collateral unlike the railroad and electric utilities.  
As the business came to be profitable, spinning companies accumulated reserves, 
which were used to finance part of fixed assets from time to time. Table 20 shows that 
while the ratio of stock to total long-term capital (Column A) decreased from 88.2 per 
cent in 1902 to 57 per cent in 1914, that of reserves increased from 11.8 per cent in 1902 
to 24.8 per cent in 1914. To a lesser extent, bonds also increased; they accounted for 18 
per cent of long-term capital in the industry in 1914. In other words, the decline of the 
role of stock was compensated for mainly by the increase in reserves and then the 
increase in bonds. (Table 20)  This trend was further accelerated after 1914.   
One of the remarkable differences between railroads and public utilities, on the 
one hand, and the spinning companies, on the other, was that the latter needed huge 
amounts of working capital in order to purchase raw cotton. At first firms used raw cotton 
grown in Japan, which they could buy it on credit from domestic producers. However, 
their financial method was transformed as they obtained raw cotton from foreign 
countries. After the late 1880s, they came to use raw cotton imported from China, most of 
which was dealt in by Chinese merchants, not Japanese traders. Since Chinese merchants 
required payment at the time of possession, the spinning companies, without sufficient 
funds to afford the purchase, needed bank loans to secure ready cash. [358] 
After the depression of 1897, instead of bank loans, cotton-spinning companies 
obtained credit from Japanese trading companies under special contracts called Tokuyaku. 
Under the contract, the firms were allowed to pay with promissory notes for raw cotton to 
the trading companies they contracted.  Instead, they had to buy raw cotton exclusively 
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from the trading companies, which dealt with raw cotton imports from the United 
States.[359]  For example, the Mitsui Trading Company’s New York office  handled raw 
cotton imported from the United States. The company was responsible for more than 30 
per cent of the U. S. raw cotton imported into Japan.[360]  In fact, it was difficult for 
them to receive loans from banks at that time because the Bank of Japan decreased 
liquidity by reducing loans and bills discounted. The adoption of special contracts was 
advantageous to both parties. While the trading companies secured the markets of raw 
cotton, the companies were relieved from financial burdens. [361]   
 
                                          (per cent) 
 A B C 
1902 88.2 0 11.8 
1904 84.1 0 15.9 
 1906 64.4 7.0 28.6 
1908 62.0 12.5 25.5 
1910 57.5 19.1 23.4 
1912 58.8 17.3 23.9 
1914 57.0 18.2 24.8 
Source: Takamura, Nihon Boseki Shi, vol.2, p120 
 
A: paid-in capital/fixed capital; B: Bonds and loans/ fixed capital;  
C: reserves/fixed capital. 
 
Table 20: The Ratios of Financial Sources to Gross Assets  
in the Cotton Spinning Industry.  
 
After the Russo-Japanese War, however, the issue of promissory notes diminished. 
As retained earnings accumulated, funds available for working capital increased. Now, 
promissory notes were more likely to be used as an effective financial tool rather than a 
necessary means. For example, in 1914, the issue of notes increased temporarily because 
the discount rate was lower than interest rate. [362]  
 129 
3.5.2 Cotton Spinning Finance From World War I to 1930 
During World War I, an oligopolistic industrial structure appeared in the industry. 
The three biggest companies were the Toyo Spinning Company, Dai-Nihon Spinning 
Company, and Kanebuchi Spinning Company. The former two were established through 
mergers in 1914. The Toyo Spinning was formed through the merger of the Mie Spinning 
Company and the Osaka Spinning Company, and Dai-Nihon Spinning was through the 
merger of the Amagasaki Spinning Company and the Settsu Spinning Company. 
Meanwhile, the Kanebuchi Spinning had expanded itself through acquisitions since the 
1890s. [ 363 ] In 1918, the three companies produced 51.1 per cent of cotton yarn 
production. [364] 
 Making high profits, these big cotton-spinning companies were directed to self-
finance. In the end of 1918, according to Yamaguchi, their reserves accounted for 56.9 
per cent of all the reserves in the industry. Using three quarters of their reserves, they 
could have paid off all borrowed capital. [365] Thus, along with the emergence of 
oligopoly, the major cotton-spinning firms achieved financial independence.  
Again, the roles of banks were not direct. For long-term finance, they made stock 
collateral loans to individuals. [366] After 1907, banks also began to underwrite cotton-
spinning bonds. On the other hand, short-term loans made by banks to cotton spinning 
firms were ceased to exist. As explained above, the role of banks in short-term finance 
were replaced by the trading companies that could provide them with credit, and later 
major spinning firms were able to rely on self-finance.  
Thus, the cotton spinning firms were usually free from the pressure of 
shareholders due to wide distribution of stock and maintained loose relation with bankers. 
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However, these financial practices were not always applicable. Before World War I, 
corporate financial practices of the Kanebuchi Spinning were different from other major 
cotton spinning firms.     
3.5.3 The Kanebuchi Spinning Company   
3.5.3.1 Corporate Finance before World War I  
In 1886, the Tokyo Cotton Trading Ltd, the predecessor of the Kanebuchi 
Spinning Company, was established with the capitalization of ¥100,000. Its promoters 
were mainly merchants including Tokuemon Mitsukoshi, the president of Mitsukoshi 
Kimono Shop, and Wakichiro Omura, the president of the Sirakiya Department Store. 
Although the business began as a pure trading company, it came to deal with cotton 
spinning as well to market the raw cotton they bought. Facing the difficulty in trade due 
to the economic recession in the late 1880s, the company finally specialized in spinning 
business alone in August 1889, changing the corporate name to Kanebuchi Spinning 
Company Ltd.  
From the beginning, the company was huge and grew sharply in size; it held 
30,000 spindles, twice the size of the first large-scale spinning company, the Osaka 
Cotton Spinning Company.  As Figure 15 shows, its gross assets also rapidly increased. It 
was only ¥28,781 when the Tokyo Cotton Trading was established. However, it came to 
be more than ¥10 million in the early twentieth century, and before World War I, it 
reached ¥40 million. 
Although the proportion of fixed assets to current assets of the Kanebuchi 
Spinning was much larger than other companies in the industry due to its gigantic size, it 
was still smaller than that of railroads and electric utilities. According to Yamaguchi, the 
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company’s fixed assets including buildings, equipments and land accounted for 60 per 
cent of gross assets from 1889 to 1892, 75 per cent from 1898 to 1902, and 58 per cent 
from 1905 to 1908. The high per centage of fixed assets in the second time period was 
attributable to mergers. The company merged seven companies and added ¥3,430,000 to 
its fixed assets at that time. [367] 
                                                                               
                                                                               (in Yen) 
 
                                 (Source: Yamaguchi, Appendix 2) 
 
Figure 15: The Increase in Gross Assets of the Kanebuchi Spinning. 
 
Common stock was the major method to meet the increasing financial needs, but 
its role should not be exaggerated. [368] As Table 21 shows, the reliance on stock 
gradually decreased. After 1905, stock financed less than half gross assets.  
The stock of the company was not widely held by the public in its early years. 
When the Tokyo Cotton Trading was formed, the stock was sold to the merchants in the 
same industry. [369] In 1888, when the company needed additional funds to purchase 
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Ring spinning machines, the House of Mitsui undertook the unpaid parts of stock. [370] 
During the recession of 1889, the Mitsui Bank also bought the stock of shareholders that  
were insisting on the dissolution of the company.[371] As a result, in 1899, Mitsui held 
24,282 shares, most of which was owned by Takayasu Mitsui, the president of the Mitsui 
Bank. The Mitsui’s stock ownership accounted for 48 per cent of the total numbers of the 
shares. In 1902, Takayasu Mitsui still held 38,100 shares equivalent to 32.8 per cent of 
the total stock. [372] The concentration of the stock holding was also seen in the number 
of the stock transferred through the market. In the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the number of 
the shares transferred was not significant especially before the nationalization of railroads 
in 1905, and it is not until 1914 that the transfer of the stock increased in real earnest. 
(Figure 16) 
 
 
                            Source: Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo, p179-189, Table 60 
Figure 16: The Number of Share of the Kanebuchi Spinning Transferred 
 in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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                                                                                                                          (in Yen) 
  A B B/A C C/A D D/A 
  Gross Assets Sock   Reserves        Bonds   
1889     1,078,800        893,100  82.8%                -          
1890     1,455,300        985,700  67.7%           2,500  0.2%     
1891     1,423,200        986,800  69.3%           2,500  0.2%     
1892     1,551,500      1,000,000  64.5%         23,300  1.5%     
1893     1,798,100      1,249,700  69.5%                -    0.0%     
1894     2,237,400      1,785,400  79.8%         25,000  1.1%     
1895     2,839,300      2,393,400  84.3%         35,000  1.2%     
1896     3,821,100      2,500,000  65.4%         60,000  1.6%     
1897     3,776,900      2,500,000  66.2%         85,000  2.3%     
1898     4,023,600      2,500,000  62.1%       103,700  2.6%     
1899     5,710,200      3,400,000  59.5%       119,000  2.1%     
1900     6,499,700      4,000,000  61.5%       143,800  2.2%     
1901     6,688,400      4,000,000  59.8%       143,800  2.1%     
1902   11,456,097      5,803,400  50.7%       491,800  4.3%     
1903   10,203,419      5,803,400  56.9%       641,891  6.3%     1,000,000  9.8% 
1904   10,289,300      5,803,400  56.4%       941,800  9.2%     1,000,000  9.7% 
1905   12,133,400      5,803,400  47.8%     1,897,100  15.6%       935,000  7.7% 
1906   14,506,600      5,803,400  40.0%     3,861,400  26.6%       765,000  5.3% 
1907   16,946,400      7,854,200  46.3%     4,862,700  28.7%       595,000  3.5% 
1908   20,377,400      7,854,200  38.5%     5,167,200  25.4%       425,000  2.1% 
1909   23,039,900      9,083,400  39.4%     5,362,700  23.3%       255,000  1.1% 
1910   23,148,600      9,905,100  42.8%     5,562,700  24.0%     3,085,000  13.3% 
1911   28,783,900    11,825,900  41.1%     5,737,700  19.9%     6,000,000 * 20.8% 
1912   31,431,600    12,646,200  40.2%     6,038,100  19.2%     6,000,000  19.1% 
1913   39,357,400    14,966,600  38.0%     6,338,100  16.1%     5,750,000  14.6% 
1914   40,284,000    14,966,600  37.2%     6,638,100  16.5%     5,250,000  13.0% 
                                                                          Source: Yamaguchi, Appendix 2 
      * Through the acquisition of the Kenshi Spinning, the company undertook  the bonds  
of ¥3 million yen 
 
Table 21: Long-Term Finance of the Kanebuchi Spinning 
 
Bonds were less important financial sources than stock before World War I, but 
their use gradually increased, especially when banks collected debts. The company issued 
¥1 million 8 years 7 per cent debenture bonds in 1903. The purpose of this issue seemed 
to repay the loans made by the Mitsui Bank. In fact, this issue was underwritten by the 
Mitsui Bank itself, and the balance of bank loans that was made by Mitsui Bank 
diminished in this year. [373] The second bond issue was in 1910. It was ¥3,000,000,   9 
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years 6.5 per cent debenture bonds underwritten by the Yasuda Bank. Using the bonds, 
the company returned the loans of ¥2.5 million from Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Daiichi 
Banks and financed part of working capital. [374] Since these bonds were not listed in the 
Tokyo Stock exchange, the company relied on the underwriters to allocate them.   
The Kanebuchi Spinning Company was an exception that created close ties with a 
bank in its early years. The Mitsui Bank supported its corporate finance not only through 
collateral stock loans. The Bank was the largest shareholder of the company, as 
mentioned above. It also made loans to the company. For example during the recession of 
1890, the company borrowed ¥600,000 to ¥700,000 from the bank. [375]  In 1899, when 
acquiring the Kawasu Spinning, the Shibajima Spinning, and Awaji Spinning, it also 
received about ¥1 million from the bank.[376]  Through these financial supports, the 
leading businessmen in the Mitsui bank, such as Hikojiro Nakamigawa and Eiji Asabuki, 
participated in the management of the company. [377]  
However, the Mitsui bank’s involvement in the company weakened in the early 
twentieth century. The bank began to collect debt from the company in 1900. According 
to Yamaguchi, tight money caused by the imbalance of export and import, the criticism 
toward the Bank made by a publishing company, the Niroku Shin’po, and the death of 
Hikojiro Nakamigawa, who facilitated industrial finance, all led the Bank to conservative 
management and made the Bank apart from the company. [378]  Instead, the company 
came to rely on the short-term loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Mitsubishi 
Bank. It also directly borrowed from the Bank of Japan on the security of raw 
cotton.[379]  This financial trouble was finally solved through the long-term loans of 
¥500,000 from the Hypothec Bank of Japan and a bond issue of ¥1,000,000. [380]  In 
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1905, when the Russo-Japanese war took place, the company again borrowed ¥600,000 
from the Mitsubishi Bank, since the Mitsui Bank was reluctant to make loans to other 
companies than the Mitsui Trading Company. [381]  
The Mitsui Bank also sold the stock of the company after the death of 
Nakamigawa, following the scale-down policy directed by Kaoru Inoue, the advisor of 
the Mitsui group. At that time, approximately 40,000 shares were sold to a Chinese 
merchant, Gokindo, which were then sold to a speculator, Kyugoro Suzuki. In the end, 
after the depression of 1907, price of the stock was plummeted, and all the stock Suzuki 
had was again transferred to his creditor, the Yasuda Bank. [382] 
  The role of the Mitsui Bank in Kanebuchi Spinning further diminished as the 
company accumulated reserves. It used reserves instead of capital stock and loans to 
reduce the financial costs. In particular, after the Russo- Japanese War, the company 
could increase reserves due to high profits. The ratio of reserves to gross assets increased 
from 15.6 per cent in 1905 to 28.7 per cent in 1907. After 1907, the ratio was decreased 
but still much higher than that of before 1905. (Table 21) 
In addition to fixed capital, financing working capital was an important issue for 
the Kanebuchi Spinning, mainly because the business required purchasing a huge amount 
of raw cotton. Costs for the purchase of raw cotton accounted for more than a half of 
gross assets. For working capital, like other spinning firms, the company at first relied on 
short-term bank loans to obtain cash because it mainly purchased raw cotton imported 
from China through spot transactions. [383] The Mitsui Bank was a major bank to make 
loans to the company. [384]         
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The role of the Mitsui Bank as a creditor, however, was transformed to a more 
and more indirect form in the twentieth century. As the Kanebuchi Spinning used raw 
cotton made in India because of its price reduction, the Mitsui Trading Company played a 
significant role in financing the purchase of raw cotton. The Kanebuchi Spinning and the 
Mitsui Trading Companies entered into a special contract in dealings of raw cotton. 
According to the contract of 1901, the Kanebuchi Spinning should entrust the Mitsui 
Trading Company with the imports of raw cotton, and it should purchase not less than 70 
per cent of the total demand of all factories. Through this contract, the Mitsui Trading 
Company was successfully secured the market of raw cotton; the Kanebuchi Spinning 
purchased 60 per cent of total raw cotton imported by the Mitsui Trading Company.[385] 
In return, the Kanebuchi Spinning was allowed to pay with promissory notes for the 
purchase of raw cotton.  
The role of the Mitsui Bank was to provide the business of the Mitsui Trading 
Company with financial supports; it not only discounted the notes issued by the 
Kanebuchi Spinning toward the Mitsui Trading Company, but also prepared foreign 
exchange for imports done by the Mitsui Trading Company. [386] For example, in 1906, 
the bank made a contract with the Barclays Bank in London. Under this contract, the 
Mitsui Bank gave the Japanese national bond equivalent of ¥1.5 million on security and 
maintained the deposit of £10,000 without interest. In return, the Barclays Bank promised 
to provide £50,000 immediately and another £50,000 in a week from a notice. During the 
1910s, the Mitsui bank also made exchange contracts with foreign banks such as 
Kleinwort Sons, Frederick Huth & Co., and Parr’s Bank in London, the National Bank of 
New York, and the Disconto-Gesellshaft in Berlin, Commerz und Disconto Bank in 
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Hamburg, and Banque de L’Union Parisienne and  Comptoir National d’Escompte in 
Paris.[387]  
The other financial source beyond bank loans and promissory note issues was 
short-term foreign capital. In 1907, the Kanebuchi Spinning borrowed ¥2 million at 
interest of 7.5 per cent from a French bank without any pledge of property. The Osaka 
Mainichi Newspaper stated that this financial practice was based on credit and a simple 
way of note discounts. In other words, the Kanebuchi Spinning did not offer collateral, 
but both Mitsui and Mitsubishi Bank guaranteed the payment of interest rate.  Also, 
foreign note issues of ¥1 million in 1913 and ¥2.5 million in 1914 were underwritten by 
the Midland Bank, under the endorsement of the Yokohama Specie Bank.  So that the 
company could obtain funds at low interest from the international market, Japanese banks 
indirectly supported its financial needs. The banks guaranteed or underwrote foreign note 
issues. [388] 
 Thus, Kanebuchi Spinning had close ties with the Mitsui Bank in the late 
nineteenth century. The relationship between the company and the bank seemed similar 
to the one in the main banking system of post-World War II Japan, considering the 
importance of financial ties and the role of banks in management in both cases. However, 
the connection was loosened in the early twentieth century as the spinning company came 
to tie with many other banks in various ways.     
3.5.3.2 Corporate Finance after World War I     
 After World War I, Kanebuchi Spinning, as one of the biggest cotton spinning 
companies in Japan, continued to grow. Its gross assets were ¥100 million in 1923 and 
increased to ¥130 million in 1930. In spite of increasing financial needs, the company 
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used fewer and fewer securities and loans. Common stock was still an important financial 
source, but the equity ratio rapidly diminished. While the equity ratio in the early 
twentieth century was more than 50 per cent, that of 1923 to 1930 was from 16.1 per cent 
to 20.1 per cent. Also, there were no loans, and only a small amount of bonds were issued 
during the time period.    
 
                                                                           (in Yen) 
 Year Gross 
Assets 
Stock Reserve Bonds 
1923 100,222,845  16,486,970  (16.5%) 18,438,191  (18.4%)   1,250,000  (1.2%) 
1924 140,629,954  28,595,737  (20.1%)  29,438,191  (20.7%)     750,000  (0.5%) 
1925 117,744,528  28,595,737  (19.2%)  30,438,191  (20.4%)      250,000  (0.2%) 
1926 114,920,004  28,595,737  (19.5%)  31,438,191  (21.5%)               -      
1927 118,045,370  28,595,737  (19.1%)  32,438,191  (21.7%)               -      
1928 126,669,377  28,595,737  (18.1%)  33,428,191  (21.1%)               -      
1929 145,989,464  28,595,737  (16.1%) 34,438,191  (19.4%) 20,000,000  (11.3%) 
1930 129,572,060  28,595,737  (17.8%)  35,238,191  (21.9%) 20,000,000  (12.4%) 
            Source: Eigyo Hokokusho 
Table 22: Financial Sources of the Kanebuchi Spinning from 1923 to 1930 
 
 
                                                                                                        (in Yen) 
   Year    A 
Gross 
Assets 
         B 
Retained Earnings 
(Reserve+ Surplus) 
   B/A 
1923   100,222,845         37,228,402  37.1% 
1924   140,629,954         45,712,056  32.5% 
1925   117,744,528         48,670,424  41.3% 
1926   114,920,004         50,036,334  43.5% 
1927   118,045,370         50,623,292  42.9% 
1928   126,669,377         51,891,338  41.0% 
1929   145,989,464         53,107,194  36.4% 
1930   129,572,060         54,132,651  41.8% 
                                            Source: Eigyo Hokokusho 
 
Table 23: Retained Earnings of the Kanebuchi Spinning 
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The reduction of the equity ratio meant that the company moved to self-finance. 
The trend of the increase in reserves since 1907 had continued. The ratio of reserves to 
gross assets from 1923 to 1930 was between 18.4 per cent and 21.9 per cent, slightly 
larger than the equity ratio. (Table 22) The use of reserves was facilitated by its cost 
effectiveness because the cost of stock finance was quite high in the company; the 
dividend rate from 1923 to 1930 was between 26 and 35 per cent. If surplus is added to 
reserves, the ratio to gross assets become between 32.5 and 43.5 per cent. (Table 23) 
Furthermore, if depreciation, which was not shown in balance sheet, is considered, the 
trend of self-finance would be shown more explicitly. Thus, The Kanebuchi Spinning at 
first relied on the Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Trading. However, the relationship between 
Mitsui and the Kanebuchi Spinning was gradually loosened. Instead, the company came 
to rely on many other banks and even to issue bonds.  Most importantly, as it 
accumulated profits, its major financial source was retained earnings. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Unlike the post-war main banking system and the Gerschenkron’s theory that 
banks are necessary to the industrialization of latecomers, the three major Japanese 
industries in early industrialization heavily relied on stock finance. In all three industries, 
the ownership of common stock was in general widely distributed in the public. On the 
other hand, the role of bank was indirect. What they did was to make stock collateral 
loans to facilitate stock sales and support bond issues as underwriters and trustees.  
In spite of these similarities among the three industries, each industry has its own 
corporate financial practices. The railroad industry could issue domestic bonds from the 
 140 
early years due to its strong credit and government support. It was the predecessor of 
modern corporate finance. On the other hand, electric utility companies increased bond 
issues after 1905.  Especially, their reliance on foreign bonds in the 1920s was 
noteworthy. They created ties with banks, but the main role of banks was to support bond 
issues. Meanwhile, the cotton spinning industry required consideration of short-term as 
well as long-term finance. While the industry relied on stock and bonds for long-term 
capital, it used bank loans and then credit from trading companies for short-term capital.  
However, as the industry formed the oligopolistic structure, major firms were directed to 
self-finance.     
 Furthermore, corporate financial practices were often different from firm to firm 
within the same industry. While the three companies examined in this chapter maintained 
some of the industry-specific financial characteristics, their financial practices were not 
always the same as other companies in the same industry. For example, while the stock in 
the railroad industry in general came to be widely distributed in the late nineteenth 
century, that of the Nihon Railway was not. The number of shareholders of the company 
even decreased from 9,527 in 1883 to 2,682 in 1893. Until 1906, it reached to 4,497, but 
average number of stock per shareholder increased due to the rapid increase in 
capitalization. This tendency is attributed to the safety and profitability of the stock 
ownership under the support of the government. The company also could avoid using 
bonds. While other major railroad companies needed to rely on bond finance during the 
recessions, it was able to raise funds through stock due to investors’ confidence.            
 Also, the corporate financial practice of the Tokyo Electric Light Company was 
different from other major electric utility firms. Although many electric utility companies 
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tied with banks in the 1920s, the relationship between the company and the Mitsui Bank, 
the most aggressive financier in the industry among the banks, was the closest. The bank 
often intervened in company’s finance. However, bank’s power was not based on 
ownership but on its significant financial role, that is that making loans and support bond 
issues as underwriter or as trustee.     
Finally, although cotton-spinning companies grew in general without affiliation 
with zaibatsu, the Kanebuchi Spinning was an exception. After the reconstruction of the 
company in the late 1880s, Mitsui involved in corporate finance and management of the 
company. The company was officially regarded as an affiliated company of the Mitsui 
group until the early twentieth century. During the time period, unlike other companies, 
the stock ownership of the company was highly concentrated.  
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Chapter 4   
CORPORATE FINANCE OF THE HOLDING COMPANY 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, financial sources in the major industries including 
securities, loans, and self finance were examined in conjunction with the development of 
the securities market and the banking system in the United States and Japan. This chapter, 
from another viewpoint, examines holding companies, which played a role as important 
financial intermediaries in both nations. In the United States, to attain monopoly and 
managerial efficiency, the holding company system was widely adopted in railroads and 
then public utilities. Through the holding company system, a number of companies were 
consolidated into gigantic entities with smaller amounts of capital than required by 
mergers and acquisitions. In Japan, on the other hand, holding companies in family-based 
corporate groups called zaibatsu came to play a role in the national economy. A financier, 
having been involved in corporate finance of the major three industries—the railroad, 
electric light, and cotton spinning industries, the zaibatsu was a managerial form to attain 
loose control over major firms in other industries. According to Michael L. Gerlach, 
zaibatsu achieved both ―strategic centralization‖ and ―operational decentralization.‖ 
While the head office and key institutions such as a bank and a trading company within a 
group made ―integrated decision,‖ and allocated resources strategically, zaibatsu took 
advantages of ―creating entrepreneurial initiative, organizational flexibility, and close ties 
to strategic partners associated with satellite information‖ by using the holding company 
system. [389]    
 143 
This chapter examines the emergence of the holding company, its managerial and 
financial roles, and its corporate financial practices in the United States and Japan. The 
holding companies in each nation had different functions from each other due to the 
difference in the size of the market, the stage of economic development, and the place of 
family business. Also, the relationship between the holding company on the one hand and 
the securities markets and banks on the other hand was different from one nation to the 
other.  
4.2 Holding Companies in the United States  
4.2.1 The Holding Company and Its Early History  
The holding company was defined as any company, which controls or influences 
the management of the constituent companies by virtue of ―its ownership of securities of 
the latter.‖ [390]  The holding company usually obtains the shares of other companies in 
exchange for its own stock, or by selling its own stock and using the proceeds to purchase 
the stock of other companies. In general, there are two types of holding companies:  the 
pure holding company and the parent company. The former does not engage in any 
operation but holds stocks of other companies; the latter is an operating company that 
also owns stocks of other companies.  
  Before 1888, for the most part, holding companies in the United States were 
created under special authorization from state legislatures. Overall, corporations were not 
given the legal power to obtain stocks in other companies. The courts of most states 
denied such corporate power in general and accepted it only when specific legislative 
permission was granted to a company. No state granted such power in its general laws at 
first. For example, in 1832, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company were granted the 
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power to subscribe to nearly two-thirds of the stock of the Washington Branch Road by 
the state of Maryland. In 1853, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company received 
authorization ―to subscribe to the capital stock or guarantee the bonds of other companies 
to the extent of 15 per cent of its own paid-in capital stock.‖[391] The Western Union 
Telegraph obtained power to own stock of other telegraph companies in 1864. In 1880, 
The American Bell Telephone Company was created by a special Massachusetts charter 
and authorized to own stock up to 30 per cent of the stock of any telephone company in 
Massachusetts. [392]  
 While these companies’ right to own stock was limited to certain companies or 
industries, a few corporations were granted much broader power to hold the stocks of any 
companies. In particular, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized more than forty 
corporations with broad power of stockholding between 1868 and 1872. The 
Pennsylvania Company, which was a pure holding company investing in the 
Pennsylvania Railroad system, was one of the examples. [393] 
 Thus, corporate executives were not allowed to form holding companies without 
authorization from state legislature before the late 1880s. However, they were able to 
build a prototype of holding companies, called trusts, without any special grant from the 
state legislature. According to Edward S. Meade, trusts were organizations that held the 
stock of several firms in the same industry, and permitted the firms to work out 
agreements on prices, product and profits among the members. To secure this agreement, 
the constituent companies deposited their stocks with the trustees and in return received 
trust certificates. Through this organization, companies attempted to restrict competition. 
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The trustee, holding stocks of constituent companies, managed them and secured ―a 
uniform policy upon prices and output.‖[394]  
 In fact, however, the role of trusts was more than the restriction of competition. 
For example, the Standard Oil Trust controlled all aspects in the oil industry through its 
holdings of the securities in forty-one participating companies; it engaged in ―buying, 
transporting, storing, refining, and marketing petroleum products. ―[395]  It also made it 
easy to transfer holdings, to keep all operations in secrecy, and to achieve more efficient 
administration. [396]          
The transformation from trusts to holding companies was triggered by the 
revision of general corporation laws of New Jersey in 1889, the passage of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, and the Ohio Court ruling in 1892. The new corporation laws in 
New Jersey approved the ―right to purchase the stock of any company or companies 
owning, mining, manufacturing, or producing materials or other property necessary for 
their business and to issue stock in payment therefore.‖[397] It was not difficult to meet 
the conditions necessary to make use of this law.  Promoters were required to pay ―a 
small fee and annual tax,‖ to set up ―a principal office in New Jersey,‖ to prepare ―the 
stock-transfer books for inspection,‖ to turn in ―annual reports to the Secretary of State,‖ 
to hold ―annual shareholders meeting at the New Jersey office, and to elect at least one 
directors who is a resident of New Jersey.‖[398]  Following New Jersey, other states such 
as New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Delaware also adopted similar provisions 
before 1890 in order to attract businesses. However, the New Jersey law was more 
respectable by lawyers and business men‖ than those in other states. Through enactments 
in 1893 and 1896, the law became ―broader and more specific‖. The popularity of New 
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Jersey laws, for example, led to the unification of all standard oil companies under a 
holding company, Jersey Standard in 1899.[399]        
The use of the holding company was facilitated by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890. It declared every combination in the form of a trust illegal. As a result, all trusts 
were forced to dissolve. However, a majority of the stock in the constituent companies of 
a trust was often retained by the important businessmen. Seeking a method to maintain 
their control in the industry, they turned to a new corporate form, the holding company.  
Finally, the Ohio Court ruling in 1892 forced firms to move from the use of trusts 
to the adoption of the holding company. In 1890, the attorney general, David K. Watson 
filed a case against the Standard Oil Trust by pleading that the trustees who received the 
stock in the Standard Oil Company of Ohio had controlled the management of the Ohio 
Company and the company was empowered through association with the trust and 
achieved monopoly. The company responded, ―its shares had been transferred to the 
Trustees by the stockholders, not by the company, and that Ohio Standard was controlled 
by the majority holders of stock, albeit they were actually the Trustees of the Standard 
Oil.‖[400] However, the Judge of the Ohio Supreme Court, T.A. Minshall decided that 
―Ohio Standard was…controlled and managed by the Standard Oil Trust.‖ He continued 
that its object was ―to establish a virtual monopoly of the business‖ in the oil industry, by 
which ―it might not merely control the production, but the price, at its pleasure‖. [401] 
The decision prohibited Ohio Standard from maintaining the Trust Agreement. As a 
result, the executives of Standard Oil reduced the number of the constituent companies 
from the ninety-two to twenty and distributed the shares of these twenty companies to 
owners of certificates in the Trust. Then, they decided to set Standard Oil Company of 
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New Jersey, the leading operation unit in the Standard Oil, as a holding company by 
exchanging its shares for all the investments of the Trust. [402]. After the formation of 
this holding company in the Standard Oil group, the use of holding companies became 
the most important form of combination in the early twentieth century. For Standard Oil, 
the reorganization process was completed in 1899. [403] 
In fact, the holding company was quite similar to the trust; in the holding 
company, trust certificates were replaced by the shares of the holding companies, trustee 
and trust by ―owner and property of holding companies,‖ and a board of trustees by ―a 
board of directors of the holding company.‖[404] While each constituent company was 
an independent corporation, the holding company, which owned a controlling interest of 
each company, obtained power as trusts did. [405] 
4.2.2 The Holding Company in the United States before World War I 
4.2.2.1 Managerial Roles of the Holding Company 
After the formation of the holding company in the Standard Oil group, companies 
came to adopt the holding company for various managerial purposes. One of the most 
important was to evade competition. In particular, in railroads, to control rate-cutting and 
prevent competitive construction, investment bankers facilitated intercorporate 
stockholding. For example, in the East, the Pennsylvania and the New York Central 
systems made an agreement to prevent excessive competition under the leadership of the 
House of Morgan at the end of 1899. According to the agreement, the Pennsylvania 
purchased substantial amount of stock in ―the Baltimore & Ohio, the Chesapeake & 
Ohio, and the Norfolk & Western.‖ Then Baltimore bought the stock in Reading. 
Meantime, the New York Central owned stock in ―the Lehigh Valley, the Erie, the 
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Lackawanna as well as the Reading, and through the Reading obtained an interest in the 
Central of New Jersey.‖ In the South, Morgan also led the Atlantic Coast line to purchase 
51 per cent of the Louisville & Nashville. In the West, interlocking stockholding of the 
Rock Island, the Alton, the St. Louis, the Santa Fe and other small roads was arranged by 
Moore brothers. [406] However, the use of the holding company to restrain competition 
was finally restricted. When the Northern Securities Company, which owned the stocks 
of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific, was formed, the Supreme Court decreed 
that ―holding company might not be used as a means of effecting combinations in 
violation of the spirit of the Sherman Anti-trust Law.‖[407] 
Firms also used the holding companies to attain efficiency in production. Large-
scale production through the holding company, in particular in public utilities, reduced 
costs relative to output. Also, vertical combination, through which firms secured raw 
materials and markets to distribute their products, improved throughput, the speed and 
volume of the flow of materials. [408] Efficiency in vertical consolidation is seen in the 
case of the United States Steel Corporation, which consolidated various steel related 
companies.[409]  
Decentralization of the administration was another advantage in the use of the 
holding company. As Bonbright and Means explain, ―by maintaining separate branches 
of an enterprises as separate corporations with separate semi-independent board of 
directors the management of a concern can conduct it more as a group of federated 
enterprises than as a single army like organization.‖ [ 410] The use of the holding 
company would also minimize the risk of speculative business; the loss made by one 
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speculative constituent company would be less influential on other constituent 
companies. [411] 
Finally, the holding company was often the most effective way for combination. 
While mergers and acquisitions required ―a majority (usually two thirds) or unanimous 
agreement of the stockholders and may involve difficulties with the contractual rights of 
bondholders as well as the risk of lawsuits by dissenting stockholders,‖ the acquisition of 
stock control was simpler and less costly through a holding company. [412]      
4.2.2.2 Financial Roles of the Holding Company 
To obtain control of many constituent companies, the holding company had to 
own huge blocks of their stocks, but the capital required for this investment was much 
smaller than funds needed to effect mergers or acquisitions, or to establish a new 
company. In particular, by forming a pyramid of holding companies, the top holding 
company could obtain control with minimum investment. Control of many operating 
companies was obtained by a first-degree holding company through the ownership of the 
majority of their stocks. The first-degree holding company was controlled by the second-
degree holding company in a similar manner. Thus, the more holding companies were 
involved in pyramiding, the less the top holding company invested to obtain control of 
operating companies. If the operating companies or the lower-degree holding companies 
had bonds or non-voting stock, the investment required in voting stock to obtain control 
by the top company was further reduced.  
The holding company system was financially beneficial for the constituent 
companies, too; the holding company provided them with financial support and took a 
permanent investment in their stocks. Since the holding company owned large amounts 
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of their stocks, a deterioration of business in those companies would reduce its income 
and influence the value of its own common stock. To protect its stock and to achieve 
better business results, it could not ignore the financial condition of the constituent 
companies. Holding companies would issue their own securities to raise funds for their 
constituent companies. When the constituent company did not have a ―strong 
independent credit,‖ the holding company often issued collateral trust bonds, which was 
secured on the constituent company’s ―stocks, notes and bonds acquired for its treasury.‖ 
Since it was difficult to assure the value of the collateral, the bankers that underwrote 
these bonds required that ―the collateral shall constitute at least sufficient properties of 
the outstanding securities as will enable the holders of the bonds to secure possession of 
the physical property of one or more of the subsidiaries.‖[413] Only when the constituent 
company had good independent credit was the holding company able to issue debenture 
bonds and preferred stock. [414] These issues of huge amounts of securities in the 
holding company reduced financial costs to the operating company, because holding 
companies could usually raise funds at a cheaper price due to their strong credit.  
Likewise, holding companies guaranteed the bonds of constituent companies. As 
Arthur S. Dewing explains, the guarantee was often only a temporary expedient. Usually, 
it stood in line behind the other holding company securities. And holding companies 
could easily evade responsibility simply by giving a notice to bondholders. In fact, since 
the value of bonds was determined by ―the earning capacity of the physical property or 
the business good-will of the issuing company,‖ Dewing concluded, most guaranteed 
bonds were ―barely worth the paper they are written on.‖[415] In spite of the worthless of 
guarantee bonds, these facilitated the sale of bonds issued by small companies. Investors 
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believed in the participation of the large holding companies in bond issues of small 
companies.  
The holding company also advanced funds temporarily to the constituent 
companies as ―unsecured open accounts‖ or as ―loans secured by pledge of securities‖ of 
the constituent companies. [416] To secure this large amount of working capital, the 
holding company sold its own securities or retained its own earnings. When the advance 
increased to a certain level, the constituent company issued its own securities and used 
the proceeds to repay their obligation.  This short-term financial method was 
advantageous to the constituent companies. They could obtain temporary finance from 
the holding company even when the money market was in bad condition. Also, they 
could avoid piecemeal financing since they could wait until their borrowings became 
large enough to warrant large issues, and their securities issues were authorized very 
quickly by the holding company owning a majority of their voting stocks. [417] 
Lastly, the holding company was sometimes used for the purpose of capital 
inflation. It often issued common stock of the operating company to meet its financial 
needs. When the vast amount of stock of the operating company would not be salable in 
the market for any reason, the managers of the company set up a holding company, to 
which the operating company sold its own stock. The holding company financed the 
purchase by issuing its securities to the public. [418] 
4.2.2.3  Concentration and the Problems of the Holding Company  
Until the early 1900s holding companies helped concentrate economic activity in 
the United States. In 1904, as a result of consolidation, more than 80 per cent of the miles 
of railroads were directly controlled by six groups: the Vanderbilt Group, the 
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Pennsylvania Railroad Group, the Morgan Group, the Gould-Rockefeller Group, the 
Harriman-Kuhn Loeb Group, and the Moore Group. As is seen from these names of the 
groups, the railroad industry was controlled by prominent financiers and industrialists in 
the United States. [419]  
In the public utility sector, a gigantic telephone company, the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company controlled 35 subsidiaries, which accounted for 65 
per cent of the total aggregate business in the early twentieth century. [420] Although 
other public utilities companies were more local in nature, such industries as electric light 
and gas created networks through consolidation within their localities. [421] 
In the industrial sector in the early twentieth century, as John Moody shows, there 
were 318 important industrial big businesses, which controlled 5,288 plants and factories. 
Of these, seven greater companies—American Copper Company, American Smelting & 
Refining Company, American Sugar Refining Corporation, International Mercantile 
Marine Company, Standard Oil Company, and United States Steel Corporation—
controlled 1,528 plants. [422]    
Despite the growth of holding companies and their managerial and financial 
advantages, however, the movement of consolidation seemed to be on the wane by World 
War I. Although holding companies should have been making profits of consolidation 
equivalent to the value of the stock in the constituent companies, the declining value of 
industrial stocks reduced their income in the early twentieth century. Meade argues that 
the holding companies were in general the failure from the financial perspective in the 
early twentieth century. [423] William Leonard also argues the decline of combination in 
the railroad industry after the Panic of 1907 had an impact. The Panic terminated the 
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combination movement in railroads during the period of prosperity, and the market 
collapse and difficult financial conditions led many railroad companies to insolvency.  
[424] 
Another problem for the holding companies was the anti-trust movement. From 
1901 to 1912, Republican Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, and his successor, William 
Howard Taft dedicated their administrations to trust busting and dissolved many 
consolidations. For example, in 1904, the Northern Securities Company was dissolved, 
convicted as a violation of the Sherman anti-trust of 1890. [425] In 1911, two big 
businesses, John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company and James B. Duke’s American 
Tobacco Company were busted up due to the violation of the Sherman Act.  Furthermore, 
in 1914 under the Wilson administration, the Clayton Act was passed, which hampered 
the development of the holding company system; Section 7 of the Act prohibited 
corporations that dealt with interstate commerce from acquiring stock in other companies, 
when competition was diminished by the stock ownership. [426] 
4.2.3 The Holding Company in the United States during and after World War I 
During World War I, anti-monopoly policy seemed to disappear completely in the 
United States. Wartime mobilization achieved by the War Industries Board and other 
agencies was contradictory to the model of the competitive economy the Sherman Anti-
trust Law aimed to preserve. On the contrary, many people participated in the war 
mobilization regarded cooperation as a ―new model for organizing the American 
Economy.‖ [427] In fact, expansion of companies through consolidation was widely 
allowed, which led to the emergence of newly giant consolidated companies, such as 
General Motors Corporation and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Company. [428] The wartime 
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experience also affected the post-war anti-monopoly policy. Although anti-monopoly 
suits continued in the 1920s, the unfavorable attitude toward big business declined. While 
the anti-trust policy remained opposed to ―horizontal price fixing and market divisions,‖ 
it accepted vertical consolidation, which aimed to promote efficiency not to achieve 
monopoly. [429]  
Under the new, relaxed anti-trust policy, the holding company system reemerged 
and reached the heyday.  But the holding company’s role varied from industry to 
industry. Unlike the industrial sector, railroads and public utilities were allowed to 
combine through horizontal consolidations. They were subject to regulatory policies, 
which affected how holding companies operated in each case.  
In the case of railroads, the Transportation Act of 1920 attempted to facilitate 
consolidation in the railroad in accordance with the plan of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  Ironically, the act retarded the growth of the holding companies. The 
government plan hampered railroad managers’ initiative toward consolidation. In 
addition, new regulations set by the act required approval from the ICC to issue securities 
for consolidation purposes.  This changed the form of holding companies in railroads. To 
evade the regulation, some railroad companies newly set up pure holding companies; 
they were free from any regulation imposed on railroad companies. [430]  
One of the examples was the Allegheny Corporation engineered by the Van 
Sweringen brothers.  They established a pure holding company, the Nickel Plate 
Securities Corporation, in order to purchase the New York, Chicago, and St. Louis 
Railroad (The Nickel Plate) in 1916. In 1923, Securities Corporation sold the stock of the 
Nickel Plate to other Van Sweringen interests, and the company was dissolved. In the 
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next step, the Van Sweringen formed three pure holding companies, the Vaness 
Company, a personal holding company for the Van Sweringen, the Clover Leaf Company 
owning the Toledo, St. Louis, and Western Railroad (The Clover Leaf), and the Western 
Corporation owning the Lake Erie and Western Railroad in 1922. All the assets of the 
latter two companies were transferred to the Vaness Company and the two companies 
were dissolved in 1928. Since the Clover Railroad was merged with the Nickel Plate in 
1923, the stock of new Nickel Plate was also owned by the Vaness Company. Thus, the 
control of the three independent railroads was merged into one system. [431] 
Furthermore, the Van Sweringen’s System expanded through the Nickel Plate’s 
purchase of the stock of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway and the Pere Marquette 
Railway between 1922 and 1925. The stocks of the two companies owned by the Nickel 
Plate were transferred to a new holding company, the Special Investment Corporation in 
1926, and then the stock of the two companies were divided into new holding companies, 
the Pere Marquette Corporation and the Chesapeake Corporation in 1927. On the other 
hand, the stock of the Erie and the Pere Marquette, which had been acquired by the 
Chesapeake and Ohio before, was transferred to the Virginia Transportation Company. In 
the same year, a new holding company, the General Securities Corporation was formed to 
control the Chesapeake Corporation, under the control of the Vaness Company. Finally, 
the Alleghany Corporation was incorporated in 1929 ―to bring together the stock of the 
system already held by the Van Sweringen interests in various railroads and to add to 
these holdings.‖[432] The company obtained large interests in the Nickel Plate, the 
Chesapeake Corporation, and the Erie Railroad Company. [433] Thus, by using the 
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holding companies, the Van Sweringens built a huge railroad system without government 
intervention.  
It was the public utility sector that led the resurgence of American holding 
companies in the 1920s. In the telephone industry, the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, which 
allowed telephone companies to merge competing telephone companies by exempting 
them from the restrictions of the Clayton Act, accelerated consolidations in the 1920s. 
The ratio of Bell System telephones to the total telephones in the United States increased 
61 per cent in 1920 through 70.5 per cent in 1925, to 75.2 per cent in 1930. [434] Also, in 
electric industry, the economic prosperity after World War I sped up consolidations. 
Numerous promoters were eager to buy electric utility properties, which could be sold 
later at higher prices. According to Eli Winston Clemens, the number of electric power 
holding companies jumped up in the 1920s.  Prior to 1900, there were only 5, and there 
were 11 in the 1900s, but the number soared to 46 companies in the 1920s. [435]   
 The rapid increase in the number of the holding companies in public utilities was 
first explained by financial advantages. Public utilities, especially within the electric 
power and light industry, required huge amounts of capital to finance.  These were highly 
capital intensive industries using ―big‖ technology.  However, their earnings were usually 
not large enough to finance all their needs because operating companies were allowed by 
laws and by regulators to have only a limited return on the capital due to the public nature 
of their business. The holding company could meet the capital demand of constituent 
companies by passing over the dividends and interest revenues it earned from the 
stockholding and by distributing proceeds from issues of its own securities to the 
constituent companies.[436] 
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Through pyramids of holding companies, moreover, it was possible to reduce the 
financial burden of obtaining control over a number of companies. [437]  For example, 
one of the biggest utility group controlled by Samuel Insull included two top holding 
companies, the Insull Utility Investment, Inc., and the Corporation Securities Company 
of Chicago. The total investment of these two companies amounted to $435,700,000. The 
two companies directly owned the stock of five great systems—Peoples Gas Light & 
Coke Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Middle West Utilities Company, 
Public Service Company of Northern Illinois, and the Midland United Company. The 
total assets of these five companies were approximately $2,400,000,000, almost 5.5 times 
as large as the assets of the top two holding companies. The two Insull holding 
companies did not even need to own a majority of the voting stock of the five companies. 
Since their stocks were widely distributed to the public, the holding companies could 
obtain control with less than half of the total stock of each company.  In turn, the five 
companies also had subsidiaries totaling 152 companies, which meant that two holding 
companies controlled 152 operating companies through pyramiding holding 
companies.[438] 
Another reason to use the holding company in public utilities was managerial. 
Bonbright explains that the holding company system would attain ―efficiency and 
economy of centralized management or supervision by an organization of highly skilled 
experts.‖ [439] Although utilities were fundamentally local business and smaller than 
railroads, a need for centralized management provided the strong motivations to build a 
holding company system. On the other hand, decentralized administration through the use 
of the holding company was also beneficial to public utilities; since utilities were 
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essentially local businesses and their properties were distributed in different parts of the 
country, each unit required its own administration.[440] 
Finally, similar to railroads in the 1920s, the holding companies in public utilities 
were tools to evade government control. Public utility companies often used the pure 
holding form because regulation from the public service commissions did not affect non-
operating companies. In fact, while local operating companies were subject to the 
regulation, the transaction between the operating company and the holding company was 
not fully controlled, since the commission could not examine the books of the holding 
company.[441] 
Thus, holding companies dominated public utilities in the 1920s.  They controlled 
―three-quarter of the electric light and power business.‖ In the gas industry, ―16 systems 
controlled 45% of the gas output.‖ In the telephone industry, one company, A. T & T, 
dominated ―all except a small fraction of the business.‖ [442] 
4.2.3.1 Pure Holding Company versus Parent Company 
One prominent feature of the holding companies in the 1920s was more frequent 
use of the pure holding company form.  According to Bonbright, writing in 1940, of the 
large companies formed after 1920, eight were pure holding companies, and sixty-two 
were parent companies. But of those formed since 1920, thirteen were pure holding 
companies, and only one was a parent company. [443] This change was explained by the 
fact that the use of holding companies was shifted from railroads to public utilities. 
Railroads, which consolidated into six systems in the early twentieth century, used parent 
companies. The railroad parent companies were engaged in operation as well as control 
other parts of lines through stock ownership. On the other hand, public utilities, which 
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adopted holding companies more often in the 1920s than before, frequently used pure 
holding companies.  
Bonbright and Means, writing in 1932, attributed the different types of holding 
companies in railroads and public utilities from each other to ―the more recent 
development of the utility business,‖ ―the relatively small size of each utility operating 
unit,‖ and ―the freedom from financial control enjoyed by the railway operating 
companies prior to the Transportation Act of 1920.‖ [444] When railroads began to 
develop in the last half of the nineteenth century, corporations were not allowed to hold 
the stock of other companies without a special act of a state legislature. The legislature 
usually granted the power of stockholding to an operating company rather than a pure 
holding company. When the general corporation laws permitted the use of the holding 
company in many states, the corporate structure of the railroads had already been 
fixed.[445]  Although state laws allowed the formation of holding companies, the pure 
holding company did not seem to be widely accepted in the early twentieth century; the 
Northern Securities Company, which was dissolved in 1904 due to the violation of 
antitrust-laws, was a pure holding company.  
The size of the operating unit is another important factor. Railroads tended to 
grow into large centrally operated systems to achieve efficiency in transportation. In 
contrast, in public utilities, each operating unit was smaller and often geographically 
separated from other unit so that the link between public utilities companies was less 
tighter than that of railroads. This loose combination in public utilities could be attained 
by pure holding company, in which operation of the constituent companies were 
decentralized. [446] 
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Lastly, federal control affected the use of the holding companies. Before the 
passage of the Transportation Act of 1920, without serious restrictions on the railroad 
companies, the companies had no need to use pure holding companies to evade 
regulation. Meanwhile, public utilities, which expanded rapidly during the 1920s, were 
subject to regulation because of their public nature of the services they provided. [447]    
As public utilities used pure holding companies more than parent companies and 
played more significant roles as financial intermediaries of their constituent companies 
than before, the difference between investment companies and holding companies blurred 
in the 1920s. Holding companies issued their own securities backed by securities of their 
constituent companies. They also held various stocks in a large number of the constituent 
companies and planned diversification of their investment. These financial activities were 
analogs to those of investment trusts, which held the stock of many other companies for 
the purpose of financial portfolio diversification. Although, in a broad sense, investment 
trusts were classified as pure holding companies, in a usual sense, holding companies, 
which primarily aimed to control or influence the management of the certain companies, 
were not investment trusts. [448] 
4.2.3.2 Securities Market and Banks versus Holding Company 
The holding companies needed enormous amounts of funds to purchase shares 
and bonds of constituent companies and often to advance short-term funds to them when 
needed. They primarily meet these financial needs by bonds of their own. Railroad 
holding companies mainly used mortgage bonds with the lines of the constituent 
companies serving as collateral. They also used collateral trust bonds secured by the 
stocks and bonds of constituent companies. Public utility holding companies also relied 
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on collateral trust bonds. Since they did not have properties suitable to issue mortgage 
bonds, they could not issue mortgage bonds. To a lesser extent, industrial holding 
companies used collateral trust bonds, too. Although compared with railroads and public 
utilities, industrial companies were reluctant to issue bonds due to the unstable demand of 
their products, large industrial holding companies used collateral trust bonds. Responding 
to the demand for bond issues, investment bankers played a role in underwriting these 
bonds, considering that these were safe investments secured by sufficient collaterals.  
Holding companies also used common stock to raise funds. The stock was in 
general widely held in the public. The Pennsylvania Railroad, the American Telephone & 
Telegraph, and the United States Steel examined in Chapter One were holding companies 
that distributed their stocks widely in the public in the 1920s. These stocks were often 
allocated to the existing shareholders, but the number of shareholders increased in part 
due to the convertible bonds and in part due to the sale of the stocks by the existing 
shareholders through the securities markets. According to Berle and Means, these 
companies achieved managerial control through the dispersed stockownership.  
However, not all holding companies attained concentration of control in the same 
manner as these three companies. As Berle and Means show, in 1930, the companies that 
attained managerial control through the dispersion of stockownership were 62 per cent in 
railroads, 38 per cent in public utilities, and 40 per cent in manufacturing of the 200 
largest corporations. [449] In fact, some holding companies separated ownership from 
control through pyramiding holding companies. For example, as a result of the 
pyramiding, Van Sweringen’s interests represented only 8 per cent of the capital of 
Alleghany Corporation and 4 per cent of the Chesapeake Corporation. [450]  
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Another method was the manipulation of right to vote. The Cities Service 
Corporation, a pure holding company of public utilities, sold million shares of a preferred 
stock with a $1 face value to H.L. Doherty and Company, one-man company of the 
president of the Cities Service, H.L. Doherty. Each share of this cheap preferred stock 
was entitled to one vote, while each share of common stock was entitled to only 1/20 
vote. Thus, through the ownership of the preferred stock, Doherty secured 27 per cent of 
the votes, which was enough to provided him with control power over the Cities Service, 
since the other class of stock were widely held in the public. As a result, ― a million dollar 
par value of stock held virtual control over assets of approximately a billion 
dollars.‖[451] 
Still other companies used voting trust to concentrate control without ownership. 
For example, the Pennsylvania Railroad used this method to form its pure holding 
company, the Pennroad Corporation. The Pennsylvania Railroad placed the stock of the 
Pennroad in a voting trust, and offered voting trust certificates to its existing 
shareholders. The investors of the certificate did not have any power to control the 
company. [452]  
The public utility sector, which actively adopted the holding companies in the 
1920s, used these devices—pyramiding, voting right, and voting trust. Berle and Means 
show that managerial control achieved by these devices accounted for 36 per cent of the 
largest holding companies. [ 453] Thus, in distributing stocks widely in the public, 
corporate finance among the holding companies was closely associated with the 
securities market. 
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4.3 The Holding Company in Japan  
4.3.1 Zaibatsu and the Holding Company  
Zaibatsu were corporate groups whose capital was concentrated in families. 
Making the best use of the closely owned capital, they accumulated funds and achieved 
diversification.  While in the United States families such as the Rockefellers and the Du 
Pont were concentrated on specific industries, zaibatsu families extended their activity 
toward almost all kinds of business. [454] This is in part explained by the much smaller 
size of Japanese market than that of the United States. Big businesses of the United States 
attained economies of scale by forming combinations. However, in the small Japanese 
market, there were fewer opportunities to achieve economies of scale. Instead, the 
national policy to catch up with western economy and the lack of experience in foreign 
trade with western countries led Japanese businessmen to another kind of consolidation.  
To smooth business activity, zaibatsu families were eager to control companies belonging 
to wide array of manufacturing industries and services specialized in foreign trade, 
shipping, insurance, and finance. Interestingly, the Japanese zaibatsu was quite similar to 
family industrial groups in Belgium, which emerged in the last half of the nineteenth 
century. Belgian industrial groups were also based on families. Various industries 
included in the industrial groups were organized through the holding company system, in 
which a family-owned holding company was at the top. [455] 
4.3.1.1 Early History of Zaibatsu and the Holding Company System 
 Zaibatsu emerged after the Meiji Restoration. According to Hidemasa Morikawa, 
their emergence was associated with government patronage and loans often associated 
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with the mining business.  In the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi group, ―traders and financiers 
who had their strong ties to powerful political figures,‖ called seisho in Japanese, 
accumulated their wealth by obtaining ―subsidies, grants of monopolies or special 
privilege, favorable credit arrangement and sale of state enterprise at nominal 
prices.‖[ 456 ] For example, the Mitsui group as a financial agency of the Meiji 
government was allowed to utilize government funds deposited with them without paying 
interest. Through the privilege, the Mitsui group made profits large enough to establish 
one of the biggest private banks, the Mitsui Bank in 1876. With using ample funds from 
the bank, Mitsui engaged in diversification. [457]  
The Mitsubishi group also developed as zaibatsu under the government support. 
Yataro Iwasaki, the founder of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, had been associated with the 
management of Kyujukyu & Co, the trading company owned by the feudal domain of 
Tosa. In 1873 after the domain of Tosa collapsed during the Restoration, he established 
Mitsukawa & Co., using the ships that were bought from the domain of Tosa. The 
company was soon renamed the Mitsubishi & Co. Its business developed along with the 
government protection of shipping industry. Although the Mitsubishi group finally 
retreated from shipping when their business was merged into the Nihon Yusen Co. Ltd. in 
1886, the Mitsubishi group turned to a new business, shipbuilding. It purchased the 
Nagasaki Shipyard from the government for a nominal price by using the wealth 
accumulated in shipping. After Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War, benefiting from 
large-scale subsidies to the industry, shipbuilding became one of the leading industries in 
the Mitsubishi group and facilitated diversification in the related industries. [458]  
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Mining helped to establish other zaibatsu. In particular, the Sumitomo group 
diversified its business, relying on the Besshi Copper Mine. Although the family set the 
policy to specialize in the mining business, opposing to diversification in 1868, the 
stability of the management in the Besshi Mine ironically led them to various businesses 
such as banking, trading, shipping, and silk reeling. [459]  To a lesser extent, the Mitsui 
and the Mitsubishi groups also benefited from mining. They purchased mines owned by 
the government, the Miike Coal Mine and Takashima Coal Mine respectively. The 
success in the management of these mines brought about enormous funds to support 
diversification of family businesses. [460] 
The existence of these family-owned businesses was secured by kaken, which 
literally means family constitution in Japanese. The kaken was an unofficial moral code 
that imposed no legal obligation, but it played a significant role in maintaining family 
business. It differed by family group. In the Mitsui group, according to the principles 
made by Takahara Mitsui, the founder of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, the membership of the 
Mitsui business was limited to the family in order to ―avoid a dispersal of assets and loss 
of consensus within the family.‖[461] Also, the members were not allowed to dispose of 
assets, borrow money, or guarantee other people’s loans. These rules made the Mitsui 
organization more "corporate" and less "partnership" in American terms.  In the United 
States, partners can do just these things—borrow money or obligate the firm in some way 
without necessarily getting the consent of a central authority.  
Similarly, in the Sumitomo group, its family constitution emphasized family 
management under the cooperation between the main family and the branch families, and 
the control of the main family over the family business, aiming at the preservation of 
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family property and at the stability of family business. [462]  On the other hand, the 
Mitsubishi group did not have any stated family constitution, but the rule to avoid the 
dispersion of family property was set in 1907; the heads of two families, Yataro Iwasaki 
and his brother Yanosuke Iwasaki, and their heirs alone could be investors of the 
headquarter of the Mitsubishi group, Mitsubishi Ltd. [463] 
4.3.2 The Holding Company before World War I — The Case of Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi    
4.3.2.1 Diversification—the Case of the Mitsui Group 
After the late nineteenth century, zaibatsu families further diversified their 
businesses. However, unlike in the United States, the holding company system was not 
fully developed in the early twentieth century. In the Mitsui group, the Mitsui Omotokata, 
the administrative institution of the Mitsui family business, was not an incorporated 
entity, but it had 100 per cent ownership of its two key affiliates for managerial 
centralization, the Mitsui Bank and the Mitsui Trading Company. These companies 
played a significant role in promoting diversification. The Mitsui Bank contributed 
diversification, especially before the early twentieth century. It was established with 
capitalization of ¥2 million, of which ¥1 million was owned by the Mitsui Omotokata, 
¥500,000 by the Mitsui families, and ¥500,000 by its employees. [464] In other words, 
the bank was not exclusively owned by the family, but its stock was still closely held. 
The bank facilitated diversification under the industrialization policy made by a powerful 
manager, Hikojiro Nakamigawa, in the turn of the nineteenth century. [465] It gained 
control of the Kanebuchi Spinning Company and the Oji Paper Company by increasing 
its stockholding of these companies in the 1890s. It also acquired Shibaura Engineering 
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Works, Maebashi Silk Spinning Mill, and Oshima Silk Filature when they were defaulted 
on the Bank’s loans. Furthermore, it purchased two silk mills from the government and 
built two another silk mills by itself. Finally, the Bank actively invested in the mining 
business. It provided the Mitsui Mining Company with funds for the technological 
improvement and the purchase of mines. Thus, the Bank’s shareholding and lending was 
concentrated on Mitsui affiliates. [466]  
However, the industrial policy of the bank was drastically changed after the death 
of Nakamigawa in 1901. Takashi Masuda, another businessman in the Mitsui, spun off 
Shibaura Engineering Works. Away from financial support from the Mitsui group, the 
company entered the joint venture with General Electric in 1905. Masuda also sold all 
silk mills and filature, being anxious about the risks of financing manufacturing. [467]  
He also restrained the lending of the Bank to Mitsui constituent companies. After 
Masuda’s new financial policy, the bank rather focused on commercial banking; it mostly 
made short-term loans to commerce and raised funds from interests, away from industrial 
finance.   
The Mitsui Trading Company, called the Mitsui Bussan, was founded at the same 
time as the Bank in 1876. It was a general trading company (sogo shosha), dealing with a 
various services and commodities. The sogo shosha was a product of the modernization 
of Japan. Since Japan had been isolated from international economy for three centuries 
due to the national policy during the Tokugawa Period, it had had few experiences with 
foreign trade. To participate in it, Japanese businessmen needed to organize trading 
companies that would have special knowledge to deal with shipping, foreign exchange, 
and insurance. The trading companies implemented all the services required for foreign 
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trade. The general trading companies also helped to keep the price of Japanese products 
competitive by providing economies of scope in distribution. [468]  Since the Mitsui 
family regarded trading as risky, the Mitsui Trading Company was formed by two 
members of the branch families separated from the main Mitsui family, Tekenosuke and 
Yanosuke Mitsui. The company had no capital except a loan contract of ¥50,000 with the 
Mitsui Bank. [469] Although the company was not likely to prosper in the beginning, it 
came to play a significant role in the diversification of the Mitsui business. As its 
business expanded to various fields, it was put under the supervision of the Mitsui 
Omotokata, and its capital increased to ¥1 million in 1893.  
The managerial strategy of the company was to obtain monopoly in distribution as 
a sole agency, but not to control all production itself. [470] For example, it often financed 
the funds of expansion of the Mitsui Mining and paid for 80 per cent of proceeds of coal 
in advance in order to obtain a right as a sole agency of the coal products of the company.  
It also provided loans to the Onoda Cement Company for the same purpose in 1901. The 
two companies were connected by the Mitsui Trading Company; it sold coal purchased 
from the former to the latter. [471] As another example, the Mitsui Trading Company 
dealt with all process of cotton yarn industry. The company provided preference in terms 
of exchange, rebates for commissions, and credit for the purchase of raw cotton to the 
spinning companies. It obtained the right to be a monopolistic supplier of raw cotton, and 
it also became a sole agency of export of the finished product of spinning companies, 
cotton yarn, to the international market. The export of cotton yarn was also closely 
related to other fields—the import of spinning machinery and the coal business. Thus, the 
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Mitsui Trading Company dealt with all of the process from raw material through source 
of power to semi-finished and finished products. [472]     
Although diversification in the Mitsui group progressed, the innovation of the 
corporate form was gradual. The legal basis of the holding company system was the new 
Commercial Code implemented in 1893. It established three commercial entities: 
unlimited partnership (gomei kaisha), limited partnership (goshi kaisha), and joint-stock 
companies (kabushiki kaisha). In 1893, the Mitsui Bank and the Mitsui Trading Company 
were reorganized as gomei kaisha. The Mitsui group avoided adopting the joint-stock 
company form because it required disclosing financial information of the company. But 
limited partnership seemed more desirable than unlimited partnership. In fact, the Mitsui 
group sought limited liability at first. The thing that changed its decision was the content 
of the Commercial Code; it stated that when the employee had the last name same as the 
trade name of the company, he had unlimited liability. In other words, so far as the 
company was named the Mitsui, the family members were not exempted from liability. 
At last, considering the confidence of the general public in the Mitsui business, the Mitsui 
group decided to choose unlimited partnership. [473]  
Finally, the Mitsui group reorganized the central institution of the family 
business, the Mitsui Dozoku-Kai in 1909. [ 474 ] The concerns to maintain family 
properties safely through unlimited liability and to protect the secrecy of family business 
had hampered the change of the corporate form in accordance with the Commercial 
Code. The reorganization was promoted in reference to the advice of Max Warburg, the 
head of the M.M. Warburg & Co., Hamburg, Germany, and to the holding company 
system in the United States. According to Warburg, the Mistui Dozoku-Kai should be 
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reorganized as a pure holding company, and the three direct affiliates would be changed 
to joint-stock companies. The holding company would maintain control over them by 
holding at least 51 per cent of their stocks. Warburg’s advice suggested the formation of 
monopoly of the Mitsui business. Although in Germany, the holding companies were 
mostly applied to international industries rather than domestic ones due to ―the more 
limited use of stock company,‖ and ―legal regulation and government supervision‖ over 
the corporate activity before World War I, the holding company was widely applied when 
―monopoly was the main object of combination.‖ [475]  Warburg’s idea was carried out 
after the manager of the Mitsui business, Takashi Masuda, saw in 1907 the holding 
company system in the United States Steel Corporation. He believed that the organization 
of the holding company would be helpful for the reorganization of the Mitsui group.[476] 
Thus, the Mitsui Gomei Kaisha was established in 1909, of which 11 families of 
the Mitsui group were the members. The adoption of the unlimited partnership form 
would protect the secrecy of financial and other matters of the Mitsui Gomei. At the same 
time, the Mitsui Bank and the Mitsui Bussan became joint-stock companies. In 1911, the 
mining department of the Mitsui Gomei was spun off and became a joint-stock company. 
Without this method, the loss of a constituent company would directly affect the Mitsui 
Gomei and other constituent companies, since the Mitsui Gomei, which held all of the 
stocks of these constituent companies, took the form of unlimited partnership. [477] 
Thus, the reorganization in 1909 established the system which consisted of the central 
institution, the Mitsui Gomei, and major direct affiliates, the Bank, the Trading 
Company, and later the Mining Company. Through the adoption of the holding company 
system, the Mitsui group was able to attain administrative centralization. At the same 
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time, family-based monopolistic business system was sustained not only by unofficial 
family code but also by the commercial law. [478] 
4.3.2.2 The Financial Role of the Holding Company—the Mitsui Gomei Kaisha 
Similar to the Dozoku-kai, the Mitsui Gomei was financed by family funds. 
Technically, owners of the Mitsui Gomei were family members, but that does not mean 
the funds came from them. The capitalization of ¥50,000,000 (equivalent to $25,000,000) 
of the Mitsui Gomei was all financed by retained earnings in the Dozoku-kai and the 
three direct affiliates: ¥20,000,000 ($10,000,000) from the Mitsui Bank, ¥20,000,000 
($10,000,000) from the Mitsui Trading Company, ¥2,000,000 ($1,000,000) from the 
Mitsui Mining, and ¥8,000,000 ($4,000,000) from the Dozoku-kai.[479] 
As a holding company, the Mitsui Gomei accumulated funds, including the 
capital financed by the Dozoku-kai and the three direct affiliates and dividend income 
through stock ownership of the constituent companies. These funds were redistributed to 
the direct affiliates and other constituent companies mostly in the form of 
stockownership. In 1910, gross assets of the Mitsui Gomei was ¥70,090,000, (equivalent 
to $35,045,000) of which ¥44,040,000 ($22,020,000) was invested in the securities of 
direct affiliates, the constituent companies, and others.  
Most of the funds the Mitsui Gomei accumulated were distributed to the direct 
affiliates because the Mitsui Gomei owned all of their stock.  When the Mitsui Bank and 
the Mitsui Trading Company were reorganized as joint-stock companies, total 
capitalization of each company, ¥20,000,000, was all owned and paid in by the Mitsui 
Gomei. Also, when the Mitsui Mining was separated from the Mitsui Gomei, total 
capitalization of $20,000,000 was all owned by the Mitsui Gomei, of which $5,000,000 
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was paid in.[480]  In fact, in 1910, the stock of the Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Bussan 
accounted for more than 92 per cent of the securities of the Mitsui Gomei held. [481] 
Similarly, in 1912, more than 90 per cent of stock owned by the Mitsui Gomei was the 
three direct affiliates’, ¥20,000,000 of Mitsui bank’, ¥20,000,000 of the Mitsui Trading 
Company’s, and ¥5,000,000 of the Mitsui Mining’s. [482] 
4.3.2.3 The Case of the Mitsubishi Group 
The Mitsui group was the first zaibatsu to reorganize diversified businesses by 
adopting the holding company system. In contrast, the Mitsubishi group founded the 
Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha in 1893 according to the Commercial Code. It was capitalized at 
¥5,000,000, which Yanosuke and Hisaya Iwasaki provided. [ 483 ] However, this 
reorganization did not lead to the use of the holding company system. Until 1917 when 
the Mitsubishi group set the rule to clarify the relation between the Mitsubishi Goshi and 
its direct affiliates, it had relied on the divisional organization; unlike the holding 
companies, the Mitsubishi Goshi held many departments, which were not independent 
companies. [484] For example, the bank department of the Mitsubishi Gomei received 
¥1,000,000 from the head office of Mitsubishi Goshi and its management was always 
controlled by it. The mining and the shipbuilding departments also received ¥15,000,000 
and ¥1,000,000 respectively from the head office.  
The Mitsubishi Goshi was not able to finance its diversification by itself. Its major 
income was a portion of the profits each department made. [485] Although the funds 
were accumulated in the Mitsubishi Goshi, they were not large enough to afford rapid 
expansion of the businesses. To supplement the lack of funds, the company relied on 
individual contributions from the family. As Morikawa explains, Hisaya Iwasaki lent 
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funds from ¥700,000 in 1894 to ¥8,900,000 in 1906. Also, his equity in the Mitsubishi 
Goshi’s reserves rose to ¥10,700,000. [486]  Unlike the Mitsui group, the Mitsubishi did 
not set up the holding company system, and its finance counted on individual family 
members before World War I.  
4.3.3 The Holding Company in Japan during and after WWI 
4.3.3.1 The Expansion of Zaibatsu 
During World War I, Japan experienced the unprecedented economic growth 
through the development of various manufacturing industries. Needless to say, the 
leading zaibatsu, which contributed the economic development at that time, accumulated 
capital and expanded their business not only by enlarging investments in their existing 
constituent companies but also by extending their investments in the newly developing 
industries, such as steel, iron, chemicals, and electrical industries. [487]  
The Mitsui Gomei increased its capital from ¥50,000,000 to ¥60,000,000 in 1914, 
in part to pay the rest of the capital of the Mitsui Mining. [488] During the economic 
boom right after the war, the capital of the Mitsui Gomei reached ¥200 million 
(equivalent to $100 million). This huge increase was closely tied with the increase in the 
capital of the direct affiliates. The capital of Mitsui Bank rose from ¥20,000,000 
($10,000,000) to ¥1,000,000,000 ($500,000,000), that of the Mitsui Trading from 
¥20,000,000 ($10,000,000) to ¥1,000,000,000 ($500,000,000), that of the Mitsui Mining 
from ¥200,000,000 ($100,000,000) to ¥500,000,000, ($250,000,000), and that of the 
Toshin Warehouse from ¥2,000,000 ($1,000,000) to ¥5,000,000 ($2,500,000). The Mitsui 
Gomei as a holding company owned all of the newly issued stocks except a part of the 
stock of the Mitsui Bank. The total increase in the capital of the four direct affiliates 
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amounted to ¥1,930,000,000 ($965,000,000), of which ¥1,500,000,000 ($750,000,000) 
was paid-in. In addition, as the war introduced the growth of existing and new industries, 
the Mitsui Gomei extended its business by purchasing stocks of companies such as the 
Hokkaido Colliery Railway, the Kanebuchi Spinning, and the Denki Kagaku Kogyo 
Company (Electrical chemistry). [489] 
In 1917, the Mitsubishi group adopted the holding company system. The 
divisional organization could no longer finance the expanding businesses. The 
departments in the Mitsubishi Goshi came to be independent companies, and the 
Mitsubishi Goshi became a holding company, controlling the newly established 
companies. In 1917 the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding was incorporated with capitalization of 
¥5,000,000, Mitsubishi Steel with ¥30,000,000, the Mitsubishi Warehouse with 
¥10,000,000, and Mitsubishi Trading with ¥15,000,000; in 1918, Mitsubishi Mining with 
¥50,000,000 and Mitsubishi Marine with ¥5,000,000; in 1919 Mitsubishi Bank with 
¥50,000,000, Mitsubishi Internal Combustion Engine Manufacturing with ¥5,000,000, 
the Mitsubishi Electric with ¥15,000,000, and Mitsubishi Trust with ¥30,000,000; and 
finally, in 1927,the Mitsubishi Oil with ¥1,5,000,000. To help finance the establishment 
of these companies, the Mitsubishi Goshi’s capital increased from ¥30,000,000 in 1918 to 
¥120,000,000 in 1922. [490]  
4.3.3.2 Financing the Expansion of Zaibatsu 
Thus, the two major zaibatsu established the holding company system, in which 
the holding company took the form of a limited or unlimited partnership, and the 
constituent companies were joint-stock companies. Another major zaibatsu, the 
Sumitomo group also took a form of unlimited partnership.  The holding company system 
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continued to expand through accumulated profits and family funds during and after the 
war. In the case of the Mitsui Gomei, the increase in capital was financed by the funds 
that its direct affiliates accumulated during the war and paid to the Mitsui Gomei. [491] 
In particular, the Mitsui Gomei received special dividends equivalent to the increase in 
the capital of the key direct affiliates, the Mitsui Bank, the Mitsui Trading and the Mitsui 
Mining. In the Mitsubishi Goshi, its capital was owned within the family; Hisaya and 
Koyata Iwasaki owned ¥90million and ¥30 million of shares respectively in 1922.[492] 
However, the expansion of these zaibatsu was too rapid to finance internally over 
the longer term.  Public offerings of stocks in part helped the holding companies reduce 
their financial burden for the expansion of the constituent companies. In the Mitsui 
group, the Mitsui Bank, which came to have a huge financial demand, was allowed to 
offer 300,000 shares to the public out of 800,000 newly issued shares in 1919. [493]  In 
the Mitsubishi group, Mitsubishi Mining offered 400,000 shares in the public in 1920. In 
1929, the Mitsubishi Goshi also offered 235,000 shares in the public.       
It is interesting to note that public offering at that time did not necessarily mean 
that zaibatsu families were eager to distribute the shares of their holding and constituent 
companies widely in the general public. In fact, the companies often offered their stock to 
their associates; the employees and directors of their holding companies and other 
companies within the group or the clients of the company. For example, in the Mitsui 
Bank’s public offering in 1919, more than 70 per cent of the shares offered in the public 
were subscribed by its important clients and depositors of the bank.[494] As another 
example, in Mitsubishi Mining’s public offering in 1920, the associates of the company 
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had priority to the assignment of the shares. [ 495 ] Through this method, zaibatsu 
attempted to limit the rights of shareholders.  
Another method to raise funds was mutual stock ownership; one constituent 
company held stock of another within the same zaibatsu. On one hand, mutual stock 
holding reduced the financial burden of the holding company. On the other hand, the 
control over the constituent companies remained inside the zaibatsu. In the Mitsubishi 
group, the major affiliates heavily used this scheme; 1,000 shares were mutually held 
between the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and the Mitsubishi Steel, between the Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding and the Mitsubishi Warehouse, between the Mitsubishi Steel and Mitsubishi 
Warehouse, between Mitsubishi Mining and the Mitsubishi Trading and between 
Mitsubishi Trading and the Mitsubishi Bank from 1918 to 1919. [496]  
Even without mutuality, the major affiliates often supported the holding company 
in financing the other constituent companies. In particular, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, one 
of the oldest and biggest direct affiliates of the Mitsubishi Goshi, was the largest 
shareholders of the Mitsubishi Electric and the Mitsubishi Internal Combustion Engine 
Manufacturing in the early 1920s. Mitsubishi Trading was also a major shareholder of 
Mitsubishi Electric at that time. [497] 
 Finally, zaibatsu introduced foreign capital for some constituent companies, 
although its purpose was to allow Japanese firms obtain technology licenses not to raise 
funds from foreign countries. [498] Even before 1914, zaibatsu participated in joint 
ventures. Especially in the Mitsui Group, there were three joint ventures; between Tokyo 
Electric and General Electric (U.S.) in 1905, Japan Steel Products and Vickers and 
Armstrong Whitworth (U.K.) in 1907 and Babcock & Wilcox (U.K.) and Mitsui Trading 
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Company in 1908.[499]  Between 1914 and 1931, the use of foreign capital (and foreign 
technology) in zaibatsu groups seemed to be further accelerated. In the Mitsubishi group, 
the first joint venture was carried out between Toyo Electric and English Electric (U.K.) 
in 1917. In 1923, the Mitsubishi Electric Company, which was separated from Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding and incorporated in 1921, made a contract of technology affiliation with the 
Westinghouse Company (U.S.). At that time, 30,000 shares out of total issue 300,000 
shares of Mitsubishi Electric were transferred to Westinghouse. Since par value of the 
share was ¥50, the total capital transferred amounted to ¥1,500,000, of which 
Westinghouse received ¥1,000,000 for nothing and paid ¥500,000 only. [500] Also, 
Mitsubishi Oil Company was formed as a joint venture with the Associated Oil Company 
in the United States in 1931. Mitsubishi, including Mitsubishi Goshi, Mitsubishi Trading, 
and Mitsubishi Mining on one hand and the Associated Oil on the other owned a half of 
the capital respectively. The joint venture aimed to ―obtain technological assistance‖, 
―train Japanese to run the operations, and ―furnish crude oil.‖[501]  The introduction of 
facilities and technology of oil refining in addition to the importation of crude oil was 
necessary due to the underdeveloped refining technology and the lack of oil resource in 
Japan. [502] Similarly, in the Sumitomo group, there were four joint ventures with the 
U.S and U.K companies from 1914 to 1931.  
4.3.3.3 The Holding Company and the Role of the Bank 
The expansion of the holding company system was associated with the declining 
role of banks in corporate finance. During and immediately after World War I, the 
Japanese banking business grew rapidly as the economy boomed. The Mitsui Bank 
increased capital from ¥20,000,000 to ¥100,000,000 in 1919, the Mitsubishi Bank from 
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¥50,000,000 to ¥100,000,000 in 1920, and the Sumitomo Bank from ¥15,000,000 to 
¥30,000,000 in 1917. However, the expansion of the zaibatsu banks did not necessarily 
support the companies belonging to the same zaibatsu. In the Mitsui group, as explained 
above, the Mitsui Bank was no longer active in financing long-term funds in industries 
after the 1900s. In the early 1920s, Mitsui Gomei and its direct affiliates could finance 
themselves without the support from the bank. Even other constituent companies did not 
need large amounts of funds; they relied on the Bank only 6.8 per cent of its total capital. 
The money was abundant because huge profits made during the war had no way to be 
disposed under the post-war recession in the early 1920s. [503] Similarly, the Mitsubishi 
group minimized lending by the Mitsubishi Bank to the constituent companies in the 
1920s, even though the Mitsubishi Trading Company still relied on the bank. The 
isolation policy of the banks from the constituent companies was explained in part by the 
intention of zaibatsu families to ―eliminate the common impression that its bank was the 
private possession of the zaibatsu.‖[504]   
Instead of financing within the zaibatsu, the idle capital of the banks turned to 
outside zaibatsu. Especially, the banks were actively involved in electric utility finance. 
Although their ownership of electric utilities was negligible, they made huge amounts of 
loans. For example, the amount of loans to the electric utilities of the Mitsui Bank, which 
was the most aggressive in electric utility finance among the zaibatsu banks, amounted to 
¥99.5 million.[ 505 ]  The banks also began to underwrite electric utility bonds. In 
particular, the Mitsui Bank dealt with huge amounts of bonds in the Tokyo Electric Light 
and Toho Electric Power Companies. From 1924 to 1932, it underwrote 17.7 per cent of 
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all the electric utilities bonds issued, and assigned these bonds to other financial 
institutions and the associates of the Mitsui. [506] 
Unlike the holding company, the Mitsui Bank did not aim to obtain control, but to 
protect its credit. It often tried to collect loans by having electric utility companies issue 
foreign bonds as alternative financial sources. For example, the Tokyo Electric Light 
Company issued Sterling bonds for the first time in 1923, in part to repay loans to the 
Mitsui Bank, although the company failed to do so due to the special contract with the 
British underwriter, which limited the maximum amount of the bonds issued to half of 
the paid-in capital. Until 1928, the company was forced to rely both on foreign bonds and 
bank loans as a result of financial difficulty. In 1928, however, the Mitsui bank 
successfully collected a large amount of repayment through the Tokyo Electric Light’s 
huge bond issue. Recognizing the availability of the use of foreign bonds to refund its 
loans, the Mitsui Bank could continue to make loans to the company. In the case of the 
Toho Electric Power, another utility company with which the Mitsui bank was associated, 
the balance of loans for the bank was inversely proportional to foreign bond issues. [507] 
Thus, as the holding company system expanded, the activity of the zaibatsu banks were 
extended to outside the zaibatsu, but they seemed to aim at financial gains rather than at 
obtaining control power over the companies they supported to finance.  
4.4 Conclusion   
Both in the United States and Japan, holding companies were primarily formed 
for managerial purpose; they sought monopolistic power and managerial advantage. In 
the United States, the holding companies achieved concentration of power with a small 
quantity of capital. As a result, some firms attained large-scale economies (large 
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industries), others took advantage of the use of talented staff in the administration of 
constituent companies (public utilities), and others enjoyed economies of network and 
system (railroads, telephones, and electric utilities). Meanwhile in Japan, adopting the 
holding company system, zaibatsu maintained the monopolistic power of family business. 
They also achieved administrative centralization and operational decentralization; while 
the close ties between the head office and key firms such as a bank and a trading 
company strengthened the financial and administrative controls within the zaibatsu, the 
loose ties between key firms and other constituent companies made it possible to control 
diversified businesses. 
 Although holding companies were established primarily for managerial purposes, 
they played a significant role in financing group companies in both the United States and 
Japan.  However, the way they raised funds for that purpose differed from nation to 
nation. In the United States, in the formation of the holding company system, the 
securities market was an important source of funds. Holding companies were able to 
distribute their stocks widely to the public by using such methods as pyramiding, voting 
rights, and voting trusts. The role of the banks was underwriting the securities of holding 
companies. The use of the banks facilitated foreign investment in the U.S. holding 
companies. Before World War I, banks were often an influential in management, but their 
financial activity was not primarily aiming to obtain control of the firms.  
In Japan, on the other hand, the role of the securities market for zaibatsu was less 
significant. The funds required for the constituent companies in zaibatsu were usually 
financed by head office of zaibatsu (holding companies), by leading companies in 
zaibatsu, which accumulated ample funds from profits, or by mutual shareholding within 
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zaibatsu. Even when outside funds were needed, zaibatsu often used private 
subscriptions. Zaibatsu also used foreign capital for some constituent companies, 
although its purpose was to obtain advanced technology from foreign countries.  The role 
of banks should not be exaggerated. Unlike main banks in post-World War II keiretsu, 
the banks within zaibatsu were reluctant to be involved in zaibatsu finance. Their funds 
were rather directed to outside zaibatsu. Especially, in the 1920s, they made loans and 
underwrote the securities of electric utility companies.  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The paths of the development in financial institutions in the United States and 
Japan were quite different from each other. In the United States, financial institutions 
were characterized by the fragmented banking system and the development of the 
securities market. These resulted from a political culture of anti-monopoly and the huge 
financial demands of private railroad companies from the middle of the nineteenth 
century. On the other hand, Japan, in the chaos after the Meiji Restoration, created a 
centralized banking system under the leadership of the government in the 1880s, while 
the lack of the accumulation of capital also led to the establishment of the securities 
market at the same time. Thus, the different timing of industrialization and different 
political culture resulted in different financial institutions in each nation. According to the 
notion of path dependency, financial institutions created distinctive corporate financial 
practices—in this case, the reliance on equity finance in the United States and on bank 
loans in Japan. These national patterns of corporate financial practices were also 
demonstrated in the two classics, Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation and Private 
Property for the United States, and Gerschenkron’s Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective for Japan. Berle and Means showed that the size of corporation 
was an important factor to determine financial practices, while Gerschenkron argued that 
the timing of industrialization led to different financial practices.  
This theory of the national patterns emphasized distinctive patterns of corporate 
financial practices in each nation. However, comparing corporate financial practices of 
large corporations in the United States and Japan, this study demonstrated similarities as 
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well as differences in the two nations.  In the railroad industry before World War I, both 
U.S. and Japanese companies relied on securities.  The securities of the railroad 
companies in both nations were distributed through personal connections. In the United 
States,  investment bankers played a significant role to provide investors with confidence 
in the securities they dealt with, and in Japan, leading businessmen contributed the 
distribution of the stocks in a similar way. This is in part explained by the immaturity of 
the securities market at that time. Market failure caused by asymmetry of information in 
the securities market might cause the reliance on mediators between companies and 
investors.  
 The differences in railroad finance between U. S. and Japan also existed. The 
former used mainly bonds and the latter stocks. This national difference was in part 
caused by the size of the railroad industry and in part by the degree of the development in 
the securities markets. In the United States, the size of railroad companies was large due 
to the gigantic geographic scale in the nation; they needed to rely on bond in addition to 
stocks to meet their huge financial demand. In Japan, on the other hand, the scale of 
railroad companies was large relative to other Japanese companies, but it was much 
smaller than that of U. S. railroad companies. Hence, equity finance was able to meet the 
demand of Japanese railroads. In addition, compared with stock markets, bond markets 
were underdeveloped before World War I in Japan.   
Another difference between the two nations lay in the use of foreign capital. 
While U. S. railroads obtained huge amount of capital through foreign bond issue, 
Japanese railroad companies were not able to utilize foreign capital because major 
Japanese railroad companies, which could obtain credit from foreign investors, were 
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nationalized in 1906 before the Railway Collateral Laws and the Collateral Bond Trust 
Law were passed.  
Similar to railroads, public utility finance in both nations relied on securities, 
although U. S. companies used mainly bonds and Japanese ones stocks before World War 
I.  The difference in corporate financed was obscured when financial demand of Japanese 
electric utilities increased after the War; electric utility companies came to rely on bonds 
more than stocks, especially foreign bonds by using British and American investment 
bankers as underwriters. The access to foreign capital was quite important in order to 
meet huge financial demands of Japanese electric utilities.  
 In the manufacturing industry, the patterns of corporate finance of the two nations 
were quite similar to each other. Before World War I, both relied on equity finance. In 
the United States, the smaller scale of the manufacturing industry than railroads and 
public utilities, the exposure to intense competition, and the unstable demand for 
manufacturing products, all led manufacturing companies to the use of stocks. The 
Japanese cotton industry also used stocks not bonds. It could not obtain credit from 
investors large enough to issue bonds in part because the Bank of Japan did not discount 
the bonds of the cotton spinning industry.  
  After World War I, internal funds became more important both in the U.S 
manufacturing industry and in the Japanese cotton industry.  In the 1920s of the United 
States, the size of the manufacturing companies grew through mergers and acquisitions. 
The large-scale companies made huge profits and accumulated earnings, which made 
internal finance possible. Similarly in Japan, the cotton spinning industry organized an 
oligopolistic system through consolidation and accumulated internal funds.  
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The adoption of the holding company form was also a common feature in 
corporate finance in the two nations; although zaibatsu, a holding company form in 
Japan, was often regarded as unique Japanese features, many U. S. firms, especially, 
public utilities companies also used the holding company form. Holding companies in 
both nations functioned similarly in terms of finance. The holding companies obtained 
dividends and interests through the securities holding of subsidiary companies and 
redistributed these funds to them. Major differences in the use of holding company form 
between the two nations lay in the managerial roles. In the United States, the holding 
company form was adopted in order to obtain control in the industry as wide as possible 
with limited capital. The U. S. businessmen achieved their goal by creating multiple 
layers of holding companies.  On the other hand,   in Japan, the maintenance of family 
enterprise was the one of the most important purpose for zaibatsu. In order to sustain 
close ties between zaibatsu headquarters (holding companies) and their direct 
subsidiaries, the structure of holding company form was rather flat in Japan.  
Thus, although the distinctive features of corporate finance in each nation existed, 
there were also the similarities. Scholarship has often focused on national differences in 
corporate finance, but previously identified national patterns seems to be less significant 
than emphasized, considering the many common features between the two nations.  
This study also shows that the national patterns in the two nations obscure the 
complexity of corporate financial practices. In fact, the reactions of companies in both 
countries to evolving financial institutions were quite varied, and the financial practices 
of major industries from 1880 to 1930 were diverse in the United States and Japan. In the 
United States before World War I, the railroad industry relied on bond issues, which were 
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underwritten by investment bankers, with strong international connections. Railroad 
stocks were in general not widely held by the public. After the war, railroad companies 
came to use internal funds. In public utilities, most of the firms relied on bond issues 
through time, although stocks of public utilities, especially the telephone industry, were 
more widely distributed than those of railroad companies due to their large service r area. 
Even after World War I, they did not use internal funds in part because of the immaturity 
of the utility industries. In manufacturing, before World War I, firms usually relied on 
equity finance in part due to the smaller size of firms in manufacturing than the railroads 
and public utilities and in part due to its instability of business. After World War I, 
however, many of the firms came to rely on internal funds more than stocks. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, the railroad industry heavily relied on equity finance before 
its nationalization of 1906. Its stocks were widely held in the public. The role of banks 
was indirect; they just made stock collateral loans to investors. In electric utilities, firms 
used mainly stocks, which were widely distributed after the Russo-Japanese War of 1908. 
After World War I, electric utilities also used bonds. Especially their use of foreign bonds 
was noteworthy. Meanwhile, the cotton spinning industry used stocks to meet the demand 
for long-term funds, while relying on bank loans and then credit from trading companies 
for short-term funds before the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, the use of internal 
funds increased to meet the demand both for long- and short-term financial needs. In 
particular after World War I, when the industry formed an oligopolistic structure, it 
heavily relied on internal funds.       
These generalizations about corporate financial practices are further complicated, 
when we focus on individual companies. Unlike other railroad companies in the West, 
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one of the major railroad companies in the East, Pennsylvania Railroad, heavily relied on 
equity finance before World War I; the company attempted to avoid increasing fixed 
charges borne from bond issues. The high standing of the company enabled it to use 
common stock as a major financial source to meet its huge financial needs. Similarly, 
A.T. & T. used mainly stock issues. The company was not able to issue bonds in its early 
years because the assets of the telephone industry were not suitable for collaterals. The 
newly emerged telephone industry was also so risky that the company could not sell 
bonds. Even after World War I when the telephone business prospered, the company 
continued to rely on stock due to its corporate policy, emphasizing the importance of self-
finance. United States Steel also used huge amounts of stock to finance its promotion, but 
unlike other industrial companies, its expansion relied on bonds before World War I and 
internal funds after the War.  
In Japan, on the other hand, the Nihon Railway and the Tokyo Electric Light 
before 1920 both relied on equity finance, but their shares were more closely held than 
those of other companies in the same industry. High dividends on their stock and 
premiums of new issues, which were allocated to existing shareholders, prevented 
shareholders from reselling shares. Finally, the Kanebuchi Spinning had close ties with 
the Mitsui Bank, while other spinning firms were independent from banks.  
Holding company finance demonstrated another aspect of corporate financial 
practice in both nations. In the United States, of the three companies dealt with in the 
second chapter, one was a pure holding company (the United States Steel) and the other 
two were parent companies (The Pennsylvania and A.T.&T). While pure holding 
companies do not deal with management of businesses, parent companies do. Aiming to 
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achieve monopolistic power and managerial efficiency, these companies used the holding 
company form. As Berle and Means explain, the stock of the pinnacle company was 
widely held by the public and the managers obtained control through the dispersed power 
of stockowners. Similarly, many other holding companies distributed their stocks widely 
through the securities market, but unlike these three companies, they often used devices 
such as pyramiding, voting rights, and voting trusts, to obtain centralized power over the 
constituent companies with limited amounts of capital.  
In Japan, zaibatsu often financially supported the three major industries 
considered in Chapter 3, but the purpose was not to obtain control. Due to huge financial 
needs of the three industries, zaibatsu were not able to accumulate funds enough to 
control the companies in those industries. For example, although the Mitsubishi group 
owned shares of the Nihon Railway, its ownership was too small to influence the 
management of the company. The Tokyo Electric Light also had close tie with the Mitsui 
group, but the Mitsui group did not own shares of the company. These two companies 
were not included in zaibatsu groups. In addition, although the Kanebuchi Spinning at 
first belonged to the Mitsui group, the Mitsui group pulled away from the company as the 
company accumulated capital for itself. In contrast, the holding companies in zaibatsu 
were formed from managerial consideration. Interestingly, banks within zaibatsu was not 
actively involved in financing group companies unlike main banks in the post- World 
War II period.  
Thus, corporate financial practices were influenced not only by financial 
institutions, the size of the company, and the timing of industrialization, but also many 
other factors such as political and economic changes, production process, the level of 
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risk, the degree of maturity in the industry, government intervention, and even managers’ 
preference and ownership consideration.   
The transformation of corporate financial practices across time in both nations 
also shows that the national patterns were plastic. In the United States before World War 
I, U.S firms relied on investment bankers. Although they were not important shareholders 
of the firms, their financial role and control power resembled the activity of main banks 
in the post-World War II Japan. On the other hand, the reliance on equity finance of 
Japanese railroads, electric utilities, and cotton spinning before World War I seems to fit 
the American model of corporate finance. In addition, in post-World War I Japan, banks’ 
role as underwriters of electric utility bonds was quite similar to that of investment 
bankers in the United States before World War I.  Corporate financial practices changed 
across time, and neither converged into one system nor remained divergent. According to 
the notion of path dependency, corporate financial practices seem static; history and 
culture determined financial institutions and then financial practices of the companies. 
However, corporate financial practices were much more dynamic.  
  Our thesis reveals that corporate financial practices are too complex to be 
presented simply by the stereotyped national patterns. So are capitalist systems from a 
broader perspective. Many scholars are now insisting that capitalist systems are different 
from nation to nation, attributing the persistence of national patterns of capitalist systems 
to a notion of path dependency. This seems true when we look at the capitalist systems in 
post-World War II United States and Japan. The capitalist system in the United States 
was based on competition and anti-monopoly policy, and the one in Japan reflected 
group-oriented culture and active government. However, capitalist system in any nation 
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was not unitary and unchanging. As this study shows the reaction of firms to financial 
institutions and opportunities were diverse and did not always conform to economic 
policy and culture.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Blanket mortgage: A mortgage secured by the pledging of more than one property or 
collateral. 
 
Closed-end mortgage: A method to issue mortgage bond. When specific property is 
pledged, no more bond can be issued having the same hold on it. 
  
Collateral loans: Loans secured by property.  
 
Collateral trust bonds: Bonds not secured as a lien on physical property but rather by a 
lien on securities deposited with a trustee as collateral.  
  
Common stock: Security that represents ownership in a corporation. Common 
stockholders have voting right. When the company is liquidated, common stockholders 
have rights to receive company's assets only after bondholders, preferred shareholders, 
and other debt holders have been satisfied.  
  
Convertible bonds: Bonds exchangeable for common or preferred stock in a certain time 
period after the issue.  
  
Cumulative preferred stock: Preferred stock having the provision that if dividend 
payment is omitted, the unpaid dividends have to be paid to the preferred stockholders 
before common stockholders. 
  
Debenture bonds: Bonds not secured by any pledge of property. The company merely 
promises to pay a certain sum of money at a given time. 
  
Documentary bill: A kind of bill of exchange, which the seller of the product issued 
attached to bills of landing (B/L). When the buyer paid for the documentary bills, bills of 
landing are returned to the seller. 
  
Dollar-dominated bonds: Dollar bonds that are traded inside and outside the United 
States. They reduced exchange risk for Americans.   
  
Equity ratio: Ratio of capital stock to gross assets. 
  
Equipment trust bonds: Bonds that are secured by some form of equipment. It is usually 
issued by railroad companies. 
  
General and consolidated mortgage bonds: Bonds issued under the blanket mortgages, 
which come after all the preceding mortgages. 
  
Income bonds: Bonds whose income is paid only when the company earned. 
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Open-end mortgage: A method to issue mortgage bond, which permits the further issue of 
bonds with the same lien as those already outstanding. In the case of subsequent failure, 
the holders of all these issues stand on the same footing. 
  
Preferred stock: Capital stock with fixed dividend that is paid before any dividends are 
paid to common stockholders. When the company is liquidated, preferred stock 
shareholders takes precedence over common stock. It sometimes has cumulative dividend 
and voting right provisions. 
 
Promissory notes: Written promise to pay a certain amount of money on demand or at a 
specific time. 
  
Receivers' certificate: Notes issued by corporate receivers. When a company passes into 
the control of the court, following threatened or actual default on its obligations, the court 
authorizes its agents or receivers to obtain money by issuing short-term notes. 
  
Refunded bonds: Bonds issued to refund other debt. 
  
Registered bonds: Bond whose owner is registered his name to the issuer. 
  
Reserves: Portion of earnings set aside for future expenditure or for specified purposes. 
  
Retained earnings: Sum of surplus and reserves. 
  
Scrip dividend: Dividend paid in notes, scrip dividend divides the profits but defer the 
actual distribution of assets. 
  
Sterling bond: Bond denominated in British pounds. This is issued to sell in Britain.   
  
Stock collateral loans: Loan made by banks, which is pledged by stock as collateral. 
  
Subsidiaries’ notes: A short-term debt security issued by companies whose voting stock 
(more than 50 per cent) is controlled by a holding company.  
 
Voting trust: An administrative device to maintain the executive or financial control of 
the company, The shareholders surrenders all control over the company to his trustees, 
who are entitled to exercise the right to vote for every purpose and to consent to any 
corporate act. Instead, the shareholder received a voting trust certificate, which entitled 
them to all the privilege of stock ownership except that of voting.  
 
 
  
Source: Arthur S. Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations, New York, The Ronald 
Press, Vol. 1-III, 1919-1920; Yuhikaku Dictionary of Economic Terms [Yuhikaku Keizai 
Jiten], Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1998. 
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